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Abstract
The democratization of the use of mobile devices and the creation of location-based
services have modified our perception of the notion of privacy. Mobile devices and,
more specifically, smartphones contain positioning systems that enable them to be
located almost continuously. Location-based services are mobile applications that use
location has a key parameter to provide information to users. They are extremely
useful on a daily basis: Google maps can be used to easily find a meeting point;
Uber can be used to find a ride to a destination; the mobile application of the public
transportation of our city can be used to find the next metro/bus departures; to
name only a few examples. Our mobile devices are constantly with us and record our
location history. When this information is shared - even partially - with the location-
based services, they can know much about us by exploring our history, deriving
information about our politics, religion, and health, among others. This leads to
privacy issues. In order to enrich the content location-based services provide to end-
users or to simply create new content, these services can use mobility prediction
of users. This is even more critical because these services must build predictive
mobility models related to the users and need their entire location history to reach
this prediction goal. Various solutions have been proposed in the literature to protect
the privacy of users. However, they are not always adapted to protect it when the
users use location-based services because of their lack of flexibility and because the
users cannot have a fine-grained control over the privacy protection.
In this thesis, we address the location privacy issue related to users using location-
based services, potentially including mobility prediction. We also explore the mobil-
ity behavior of users by analyzing the effects of spatio-temporal and demographic
characteristics on their mobility rhythms.
In the first part of this thesis, we present a privacy-aware architecture that enables
users to share frequently visited zones with location-based services. The users have
the possibility to select the granularity of the shared zones. We also propose a new
estimator of the level of location privacy contained in a sequence of locations shared
with a location-based service. We evaluate this estimator by comparing its results
with the level of success of different localization attacks performed on the sequence
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of shared locations. We also demonstrate how to use the estimator by applying three
different privacy preserving protection mechanisms on the raw sequence of locations
of users.
In the second part of this thesis, we add the mobility prediction to the analysis of
the location privacy of users (when they use location-based services). We first present
a system that enables us to compute future locations of users with a low number
of locations, in order to reach the goal of building mobility prediction models on
mobile devices. Then, we propose an architecture that contains a system that enables
us to predict future location of users for location-based services. This architecture
preserves location privacy of users and location-based service utility. The users can
have a fine-grained control of their privacy because they must indicate the maximum
level of location privacy they want to sacrifice when they use a service.
Finally, in the last part of this thesis, we focus on a privacy-aware mobility be-
havior analysis. This analysis is based on the evolution of spatio-temporal entropy
of users and not on the analysis of movements amongst sensitive places visited by
users as it is usually done in existing research works. In addition, we use General-
ized Additive Models (GAMs) to study the effects of variables that can explain and
predict mobility behavior of users.
Keywords - Location privacy; Mobility prediction; Mobile device; Location-based
service; Positioning system; System architecture; Location privacy preserving mech-
anism; Predictive model; Mobility behavior; Spatio-temporal entropy; Generalized
additive model
Re´sume´
La de´mocratisation de l’utilisation des appareils mobiles ainsi que le de´veloppement
des services ge´olocalise´s ont totalement modifie´ notre perception de la notion de
vie prive´e. En effet, les appareils mobiles, et plus particulie`rement les smartphones,
sont dote´s de syste`mes de positionnement permettant de capturer leur localisation
courante pratiquement en continu. Les services ge´olocalise´s, quant a` eux, sont des
applications mobiles qui fournissent des informations en lien avec les localisations
d’un utilisateur. Ils sont ge´ne´ralement extreˆmement utiles, tant et si bien qu’ils
nous accompagnent tout au long de notre journe´e: l’application Google maps peut
eˆtre utilise´e pour atteindre facilement le lieu exact d’un rendez-vous; l’application
Uber pour trouver facilement un taxi; l’application mobile des transports publics
de notre re´gion pour trouver les prochains de´parts des me´tros/bus a` proximite´ de
notre position courante, et bien d’autres encore. Par conse´quent, si ces appareils sont
continuellement avec nous et que tout notre historique de localisations est transfe´re´
vers des services ge´olocalise´s, cela constitue une menace majeure a` notre vie prive´e
car ils peuvent absolument tout connaˆıtre de nous en explorant cet historique. En
effet, l’historique de nos localisations contient des e´le´ments sensibles a` notre su-
jet. Les entreprises, qui sont derrie`re les services ge´olocalise´s, peuvent connaˆıtre les
lieux que nous fre´quentons sur une base regulie`re et e´galement en extraire de multi-
ples informations critiques: de´couvrir nos loisirs, notre lieu d’habitation, notre lieu
de travail, mais e´galement nos affiliations politiques ou encore nos choix religieux.
Cela s’ave`re encore plus critique lorsque le service ge´olocalise´ en question utilise la
pre´diction de la mobilite´ d’un utilisateur pour produire du contenu, car il construit
alors un mode`le de la mobilite´ de l’utilisateur, mode`le ayant une capacite´ pre´dictive.
De nombreuses solutions ont e´te´ propose´es dans la litte´rature et ne sont pas toujours
ade´quates pour prote´ger la vie prive´e des utilisateurs lorsqu’ils utilisent des services
ge´olocalise´s. En effet, ces solutions peuvent souvent manquer de flexibilite´ en termes
d’utilisation et l’utilisateur n’est pas ne´cessairement partie prenante au processus
de protection.
Cette the`se aborde la protection de la vie prive´e des utilisateurs de services
ge´olocalise´s utilisant ou non la pre´diction de la mobilite´ pour produire leur contenu.
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Elle explore e´galement les comportements de mobilite´ d’utilisateurs en analysant les
effets des caracte´ristiques spatio-temporelles et de´mographiques sur leur rythmes de
mobilite´.
Dans la premie`re partie de la the`se, nous pre´sentons une architecture visant
a` partager des zones fre´quemment visite´es par des utilisateurs a` des services
ge´olocalise´s, tout en respectant la vie prive´e des utilisateurs qui vont pouvoir
controˆler la granularite´ des zones partage´es. Nous proposons e´galement une nouvelle
mesure permettant de calculer le niveau de vie prive´e que les utilisateurs de´voilent a`
travers le partage de leur localisations avec les services ge´olocalise´s. Cette mesure a
e´te´ e´value´e en comparant ses re´sultats avec le succe`s de plusieurs attaques re´alise´es
sur des localisations d’utilisateurs prote´ge´es par diffe´rents me´canismes de protection.
Dans la deuxie`me partie de la the`se, nous ajoutons la pre´diction de la mobilite´
a` nos analyses. Nous pre´sentons premie`rement un syste`me permettant de calculer
les futures localisations des utilisateurs avec un faible nombre de localisations avec
pour but final d’estimer s’il est possible de construire des mode`les pre´dictifs de
mobilite´ sur des appareils mobiles. Puis, nous proposons une architecture contenant
un syste`me permettant de pre´dire les futures localisations d’utilisateurs a` des services
ge´olocalise´s tout en visant a` prote´ger la vie prive´e des utilisateurs et a` maintenir
une bonne utilisation des services ge´olocalise´s. Les utilisateurs sont acteurs de ce
syste`me car ils doivent indiquer le niveau maximal de vie prive´e qu’ils acceptent de
sacrifier lors de l’utilisation d’un service.
Pour terminer, la dernie`re partie de la the`se se focalise sur les comportements
de mobilite´ et leur analyse a` partir du calcul de l’entropie spatio-temporelle adapte´
au domaine de la mobilite´. Cette analyse est respectueuse de la vie prive´e des util-
isateurs analyse´s car elle ne va en aucun cas extraire et analyser des informations
sensibles lie´es aux utilisateurs, leur lieu de travail ou d’habitation par exemple. De
plus, nous utilisons les mode`les additifs ge´ne´ralise´s, i.e., Generalized Additive Mod-
els (GAMs), afin d’explorer les variables qui ont une influence sur les comportements
de mobilite´ des utilisateurs analyse´s et de pre´dire leur rythmes de mobilite´.
Mots cle´s - Protection de la vie prive´e; Pre´diction de la mobilite´; Appareils
mobiles; Services ge´olocalise´s; Syste`mes de positionnement; Architecture syste`me;
Me´canismes de protection de la vie prive´e; Mode`les pre´dictifs; Comportement de
mobilite´; Entropie spatio-temporelle; Mode`les additifs ge´ne´ralise´s
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”Recent inventions and business methods call
attention to the next step which must be
taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual what Judge Cooley
calls the right to be let alone.”
The right to privacy, Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 5 (Dec. 15,
1890), pp. 193-220
The word privacy appeared for the first time in a law article, published in the Har-
vard Law Review in 1890 [22], written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. More
specifically, they advocated the right to be let alone. Since this date, the perception
of this notion has continuously evolved, according to the evolutions of technolo-
gies in various domains. Major technological evolutions are, amongst others, linked
to the evolution of devices, e.g., cameras and mobile devices, but also to the evo-
lution of the means of communication, the Internet for example. In addition, the
geo-political climate and terrorist attacks have contributed to the change of the per-
ception of privacy by the population, and this is linked to the mass surveillance of
people managed by governments, supposedly to protect citizens. The development of
social networks has also changed the notion of privacy because, they are extremely
valuable: distance is no longer a barrier between content-producers and content-
consumers. Although social networks facilitate communication amongst users, they
can easily capture personal information and extract value from them. Parallel to
these evolutions, the legal framework has continuously been updated to be aligned
with technological progress; it is still the case today with the European General
Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR1). History shows that there is always a sig-
nificant delay, due to the discovery of new threats and/or abuses coming from these
novelties, between the democratization of a new technology and the alignement of
the legal framework. Today, this notion has recovered its popularity because of all
the well-known privacy scandals, involving big companies and third parties, such
as Wikileaks2, Edward Snowden or, more recently, Cambridge Analytica/Facebook.
All these cases triggered a high number of debates around the notion of privacy and,
more importantly, how to efficiently protect citizens all over the world. We will now
1 European General Data Protection Regulation description: https://www.eugdpr.org/
2 Official website of Wikileaks: https://wikileaks.org
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talk about mobile devices and location-based services and their impact on privacy
in order to get closer to the subject of this thesis.
Location Privacy, Mobile Devices and Location-Based Services.
Two major technological evolutions contributed to the modification of the percep-
tion of privacy: The democratization of mobile devices and the creation of location-
based services running on those devices. People did not pay attention to the privacy
loss resulting from these two technological evolutions, probably due to the lack of
knowledge and/or the absence of information about exposed threats. In truth, there
was a complete privacy paradigm shift that created an open door to strong privacy
losses. Mobile devices are with us most of the time, thus they can be used to track
us constantly. These devices are able to locate themselves due to the location track-
ing system located on the operating system layer. According to the last statistical
trends about desktops and mobile devices worldwide, the market share of mobile
device users exceeds that of those of desktops.3 These statistics confirm the pop-
ularity of mobile devices. The presence of location tracking systems in the mobile
devices boosted the development of location-based services that use location as a
key element for providing information to users. The use of location-based services
is part of our daily lives, for example Google maps, Facebook, Instagram, Uber
and Snapchat, as well as public transportation applications. To operate properly,
location-based services must capture user locations with accuracy, which leads to
a real location privacy threat. Indeed, if users cannot control the access to their
locations, there is a clear privacy threat for them. All movements of a user define
her behavior, as all her frequently visited places describe her tastes and other very
private information. In summary, the information about a user’s life is contained in
her location history.
Depending on the mobile device model, a user can have means to control the
access to or accuracy of her locations that are provided to location-based services.
For example, iPhone users can specify if an application can always have the access
to her locations, only when the application runs in the foreground, or never (iOS
version 11.4). Whereas, Android users can modify the granularity of the locations
captured by applications with several basic pre-defined options or also simply disable
the location tracking (Android Marshmallow). Although all these privacy controls
already exist, they do not truly benefit the users because the range of the location
privacy preserving options proposed to them are not sufficient, and users sometimes
do not know how to change these privacy parameters. Some location-based services
are very convenient to use on a daily basis and, we must admit, it is sometimes
difficult to avoid them, especially due to social pressure.
3 Worldwide market share of desktops and mobile devices from March 2017 to March
2018: http://gs.statcounter.com/platform-market-share/desktop-mobile/worldwide/
#monthly-201703-201803
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In order to create new contents or to increase the quality of the existing contents
displayed to users on their device, location-based services also try to take into ac-
count the predicted locations of users, such as their next movements or those in
the future. To do so, they must build mobility prediction models of users. This re-
quires a complete history of the user’s movements; this is highly critical in terms
of privacy because location history contains sensitive information. Thus, new archi-
tectures need to be created to facilitate this prediction goal from the point of view
of location-based services and to still preserve user location privacy. More broadly,
it is crucial to think how it could be possible to provide users a more fine-grained
control of their location privacy when they use location-based services.
Therefore, we will present several research works in this thesis; they explore several
perspectives about location privacy but also about the mobility behavior of users,
including prediction. More formally, these works contain new system architectures
regarding location privacy and/or mobility prediction, but also new methodologies
for computing location privacy and for studying mobility behavior of users.
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows. In Section 1.1,
we present the background and several definitions of key terms used in this thesis.
In Section 1.2, we detail the overall research question of the thesis as well as its sub-
questions. Then, in Section 1.3, we describe the research methodology used during
the thesis. Finally, we conclude this chapter with a thesis overview and a list of
publications written during this thesis in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 respectively.
1.1 Background and Definitions
As mentioned in the previous section, the key terms must be defined before going
into more details in the thesis.
1.1.1 From Privacy to Location Privacy
Privacy is difficult to define because it relates to multiple domains that can be
combined, such as law and computer science. As mentioned at the beginning of the
introduction, privacy is primarily a right, the right to be let alone, as stated in [22].
In [20], Smith et al. present various definitions of privacy found by reviewing a large
number of existing works around this notion. One of the definitions is extremely
interesting: Privacy is defined as the ability to manage information about oneself,
which is obviously linked to the notion of control of the information. If we change this
definition to location privacy and, more specifically to the notion of sharing locations
with location-based services, this becomes the ability to manage how locations are
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shared with location-based services. In [3], Duckham defines location privacy as the
right of individuals to control the collection, use, and communication of personal
information about their location. For this thesis, we choose the second rephrased
definition because we focus mostly our research on the sharing of locations with
location-based services. In order to control the sharing of her locations, a user must
have the possibility to have different ways to share her locations by deciding what
kind of information the location-based services should know about her. Below, we
give some additional definitions of important terms linked to the privacy domain.
Location Privacy Preserving Mechanism.
A location privacy preserving mechanism is a mechanism that protects the loca-
tion privacy of users. In [19], Shokri et al. define two categories of location privacy
preserving mechanisms: in the first category, mechanisms are used to obfuscate a
sequence of raw locations of users, and in the second category, mechanisms are used
to anonymize this sequence. In this thesis, we only focus on the first category of lo-
cation privacy preserving mechanisms. In this first category of mechanisms, we find
various techniques for protecting locations, such as perturbing a location by adding
noise, reducing the precision of a location, deleting locations or adding fake loca-
tions. Location perturbation can be achieved with different techniques, as described
by Krumm in [7]. For example, spatial rounding transforms the coordinates of a
main location into the coordinates of the closest vertex of a cell in which the main
location is located. To make this transformation, we discretize space by creating a
grid. We can also use spatial cloaking or Gaussian noise mechanisms to obfuscate
location data. In this thesis, we use the term blurring mechanisms as a synonym of
obfuscation mechanisms.
Adversary Model.
In [19], Shokri et al. indicate the importance of defining an adversary model
when a location privacy preserving mechanism must be assessed. In other words,
this definition enables to clearly define the threat a user will face. In the papers
presented in this thesis, we use threat model as a synonym of adversary model. We
must clearly state what the adversary is, its knowledge, as well as its goal that is
expressed as the attack it will perform. In our context and throughout this thesis,
the adversary is obviously a location-based service that collects and uses locations
of a user. The knowledge of an adversary is crucial because this has a clear impact
on the success of the attack it will perform. The more knowledge it has, the higher
the success of the attack will be. According to [19], there exist two categories of
attacks: presence / absence disclosure attacks and meeting disclosure attacks. The
first category of attacks tries to create links between users and locations, whereas
the other tries to find relationships amongst users. In the first category, there are two
main sub-categories of attacks: tracking attacks and localization attacks. Tracking
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attacks consist in discovering a complete or a partial stream of locations of a user.
In this thesis, we mainly focus on localization attacks, which consists in finding
sensitive locations of a user at a given time.
1.1.2 From Locations to Mobility Prediction
As mentioned at the beginning of the introduction, to display new or more accurate
content to users on their mobile devices, the next step of location-based services is
to include mobility prediction as a key element. In order to achieve this location
prediction goal, such services must create mobility prediction models to be able to
compute the future locations of users. It usually starts with the location history
of a user; the history contains the raw locations that are then processed to create
the user’s mobility prediction model that can then be queried in order to obtain
her future locations. There exist various techniques for processing locations, these
techniques clearly depend on the targeted prediction goals and their related models.
In [5], one of the most intuitive models is described; it is a mobility Markov Chain
model. A Markov Chain model contains states and transitions amongst them, where
states and transitions are discovered by exploring the location history of a user. This
structure basically helps to compute the subsequent state that will be reached by a
user, according to her current state. The states describe frequently visited places by
a user, commonly called clusters of locations. These clusters can share common spa-
tial and/or temporal characteristics. In [4], Gambs et al. describe the main ways to
compute these clusters. According to the above description, Markov Chain models
may be limited in terms of prediction goal, unless we choose to extend the states of
the Markov Chain with additional temporal characteristics, in order to be able to
handle other types of prediction requests. In [6], Hendawi and Mokbel propose an
extensive survey of existing queries and prediction functions including their related
prediction models. Some functions are extremely interesting for computing short-
time predictions, whereas others need a sufficiently long location history to provide
long-term predictions. In addition, we can also use other predictors, such as decision
tree models, classification-based learning models, e.g., k -Nearest Neighbors method
(k -NN), or Artificial Neural Network (ANN) models. However, it is sometimes dif-
ficult to clearly understand mobility behaviors by using these models. For example,
these models not give details regarding the influence of seasonal variables on a pre-
dicted variable. In order to better understand user mobility behaviors, there exist
Generalized Additive Models (GAMs), with which it is possible to see the impact of
variables on a predicted variable. In [18], Pearce et al. show how it is possible to use
GAMs to explain relationships between events: for example, the influence on local
meteorology on air quality. Hence, in the context of mobility behavior, GAMs could
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be used to answer the following question: What are the days that influence specific
movements of a user?
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions
The main research question explored in this thesis is the following: What kinds of
algorithms and system architectures can preserve users’ location privacy when they
use location-based services that potentially include mobility prediction? This question
contains two main elements: The first element focuses on location privacy and the
second element is linked to the prediction of mobility of users. In several works
presented in this thesis, these two subjects are combined. Both subjects can also
be related to the analysis of mobility behavior of users. Consequently, we chose to
separate our research into three different parts: location privacy, location privacy
and mobility prediction and mobility behavior analysis. Each part contains its own
group of research questions, that are described hereafter.
Part I - Location Privacy.
Location-based services need locations to operate properly and to offer reliable ser-
vices to users. As they need them, the first research question is focused on system
architectures that could exist on the mobile device of a user in order to protect her
privacy, without including the notion of mobility prediction.
Q1: How is it possible to extract and model the transformations that result from
the application of a blurring mechanism on a sequence of locations and include them
into a metric for quantifying location privacy?
Location privacy preserving mechanisms, more specifically blurring mechanisms,
can affect the spatial and temporal dimensions of the location stream of a user.
These transformations can generate spatio-temporal uncertainties when they are
shared with location-based services because they are created to protect the loca-
tion privacy of the user. However, the existing means of quantification are mainly
focused on the effect of specific attacks but not necessarily on the inherent location
privacy value of the locations shared by the user with a location-based service. If a
user sends her raw locations, the value of the locations shared is very high, whereas
when a blurring mechanism is applied on them before being shared with a location-
based service, the value decreases. The first challenge is to analyze different blurring
mechanisms and how they transform a sequence of locations of a user. The second
challenge is to create a location privacy metric that includes these transformations.
Finally, the last challenge is to assess this metric because it is extremely complex to
compare different location privacy metrics. This is due to the fact that they belong
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to different contexts described by different adversary models.
Q2: How can users control their location privacy when they are using location-
based services?
According to the literature, several algorithms have been proposed to protect the
location privacy of users. In addition, some privacy parameters are present at the
operating system level of mobile devices (e.g., iOS and Android), which can have an
impact on the location tracking quality obtained by location-based services when
they want to obtain and use the locations of users. For example, they give the option
to select a basic pre-defined location tracking accuracy level to users. However, these
existing options are not very flexible and do not enable users to control their pri-
vacy in a fine-grained manner. Our goal is first to design a mechanism that enables
a fine-grained control of location privacy, and second to create a system architecture
that will include this mechanism. At this level, the goal is to analyze what kind of
locations or group of locations could be shared with a location-based service, instead
of sending a complete stream of locations, and to design an architecture that could
support it.
Part II - Location Privacy and Mobility Prediction.
This research question group merges both location privacy and mobility prediction,
because mobility prediction is a real added-value for location-based services that en-
riches the content they provide to users. To preserve user location privacy, we need
to create and propose new system architectures, hence it is important to analyze
the specific context of mobility prediction in the context of location-based services.
Q3: Is it possible to create mobility prediction models on local devices in order to
preserve the location privacy of users?
If location-based services need mobility prediction to operate, they will have to
create predictive models that represent the user mobility. If they must create a
predictive model of a user, they will have to access the complete user location history
in order to build it, which is an important privacy issue. Consequently, we want to
assess to which extent a predictive model of a user can be created in real time in the
trusted part of her mobile device, i.e., operating-system layer. This question leads
to two research sub-questions.
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Q3.1: To which extent could we avoid using a large amount of data to obtain
relevant location predictions?
In order to create and train a mobility prediction model, we usually use a large
amount of data, e.g., 90% of a user dataset. If we want to create predictive mobility
models on mobile devices, we must consider that they have limited resources, for
example, power consumption. Intuitively, we must verify whether it is possible to
avoid using a large volume of location data in order to create a predictive model
that provides accurate predictions.
Q3.2: How can major changes in the mobility of a user be detected?
This question is linked to the update of the predictive mobility model, because
the system must be always aligned with the current mobility of the users and cannot
gather a large amount of locations to balance it automatically. To update the pre-
diction model of a user, we must find mechanisms that detect major changes that
occur in the mobility of the user.
Q4: How can the location privacy of users be ensured while the location-based ser-
vice utility is maintained in a mobility prediction context?
The utility of a location-based service is crucial for the user because it will de-
termine if she will continue to use it in the future. For example, if a location-based
service provides inaccurate information to the user, she will simply decide to not use
it anymore. By considering a location-based service that includes mobility predic-
tion, we will analyze how to protect the location privacy of a user and to maintain
the utility of the location-based service. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between
location privacy and service utility, from the point of view of a user.
Part III - Mobility Behavior Analysis.
We all agree that our location history contains sensitive information about our lives.
Several papers already highlighted this. The next research question focuses more
specifically on the discovery of the mobility behavior of a user by exploring her loca-
tions and the effect of seasonal and demographic attributes on her movements. This
analysis should be done in a privacy-aware manner in order to protect the location
privacy of the user. Indeed, several existing works used frequently visited places to
explore the mobility behavior of users, which is highly critical in terms of location
privacy.
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Q5: Which metric could describe the mobility of a user in a privacy preserving
manner?
For this research, the first challenge is to create a metric that describes the mo-
bility of a user as a rhythm, i.e., without extracting frequently visited places of the
user. Then, we must find how this metric can be applied on the location history of
a user in order to study her mobility behavior in a second time.
Q6: What kind of seasonal or demographic variables could affect the mobility be-
havior of users?
The second challenge is to select a model that captures the influence of different
variables on one specific variable. Therefore, this model will help us to determine the
variables (e.g., days of the week, working profile) that have an effect on the mobility
of a user or a group of users.
1.3 Research Methodology
In order to explore our research questions and to realize all the work aforemen-
tioned, we follow a three-step process that includes the design and implementation
of solutions, evaluations of the solutions through tests using real mobility traces of
users, and the analysis of the obtained results. It is an iterative process similar to
a standard application development process, with the exception that it is entirely
research oriented. For our evaluations, we use several well-known datasets such as
Nokia dataset [12], Geolife dataset [23] and PrivaMov dataset [1].
In addition, we launched a data-collection campaign, called Breadcrumbs, whose
location data was used to realize the analysis of the last paper presented in this
thesis. As it is a large part of our research, we explain in more detail the data-
collection campaign, Breadcrumbs, hereafter.
Breadcrumbs Data-Collection Campaign.4 The reason for our data collection
campaign comes from the lack of rich user datasets, in terms of location-tracking
frequency, the lack of ground truth related to user datasets (e.g., point of interest
validated by the user) and the lack of demographic data that could explain the
mobility behavior of users. We collected data for this campaign during three months
- from the end of March 2018 to the end of June 2018. We created an iOS application,
which was installed on the smartphones of the participants, and a server in order
4 Breadcrumbs Data Collection Campaign was a collaborative work of three research laboratories of
HEC Lausanne (University of Lausanne): Distributed Object Programming Lab (http://doplab.
unil.ch), Information Security and Privacy Lab (https://people.unil.ch/kevinhuguenin/)
and Business Information Systems and Architecture Lab (https://wp.unil.ch/bisa/)
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to store all the data collected during the data-collection campaign. We selected 130
participants who were linked to the campus of the University of Lausanne (UNIL)
or the campus of Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) in Switzerland.
The participants were mainly students; this means that the population was very
homogeneous in terms of a working profile (i.e., the majority of them were full-time
students) and age group (i.e., the majority of them were between 18 and 27 years
old).
1.4 Thesis Overview
We chose a thesis by publication format. Each chapter can be read independently
because it contains an entire research paper published in the proceedings of a con-
ference or submitted to a journal for the last paper. Although the weaknesses of
this format are that it can lead to content redundancies and some small termi-
nology differences across the different papers, the advantage is that the thesis has
self-contained chapters. The structure is composed of three main parts, following
the three groups of research questions, described in Section 1.2.
Part I - Location Privacy.
This part presents our contributions to preserve location privacy of users when they
interact with location-based services. We recall that this part does not include mo-
bility prediction. This part is linked to research questions Q1 and Q2, detailed in
Section 1.2.
Chapter 2. A System-Level Architecture for Fine-Grained Privacy Con-
trol in Location-Based Services [13].
We address Q2 in this chapter by presenting a new location privacy preserving
architecture that enables users to use location-based services that require points of
interest to provide location-aware information, as presented in paper [13]. We con-
sider zones of interest of a user as her frequently visited places that are defined with
a location and a radius. This architecture includes a service called ShareZ : it con-
tains a component called a privacy tree, thus enabling us to create a tree of different
levels of zones of interest. These levels are automatically computed, according to the
number of zones of interest of a user. This tree structure can be used to send only
specific zones of interest to location-based services that need them to operate instead
of discovering them by exploring the location history of a user. The radius of these
zones of interest corresponds to a level of the tree that is aligned with the location
privacy preference given by the user. We present a comparison of existing blurring
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mechanisms with different levels of the proposed tree structure. We highlight that
our tree structure provides reasonable privacy protection levels and a real flexibility.
Chapter 3. A Location Privacy Estimator Based on Spatio-temporal Lo-
cation Uncertainties [14].
In this chapter, we present an answer to the research question Q1 in [14]. The
previous chapter highlighted that it is difficult to properly compare different blur-
ring mechanisms and that this is an important lack in the literature. In this chapter,
we present a new metric for describing the effect of different blurring mechanisms
on a sequence of raw locations and for computing the location privacy level related
to this sequence. We use space and time dimensions to describe a blurring effect on
a raw location or several raw locations. In order to properly evaluate our metric, we
compare the location privacy level obtained with our metric and the success level
of different localization inference attacks on locations protected with three blurring
mechanisms. More specifically, we evaluate the level of correlation between the re-
sults obtained with our metric and the success of these attacks. The results show
that our location privacy metric gives reasonable results and can be used for differ-
ent types of blurring mechanisms.
Part II - Location Privacy and Mobility Prediction.
This second part contains our contributions for preserving the location privacy of
users who use location-based services for which mobility prediction is a key element
for them. This part is linked to research questions Q3, Q3.1, Q3.2 and Q4, detailed
in Section 1.2.
Chapter 4. MobiDict - A Mobility Prediction System Leveraging Real-
time Location Data Streams [10, 11].
In Chapter 4, we address research questions Q3, Q3.1 and Q3.2. We propose a
new mobility prediction system called MobiDict : it can process realtime location
stream, as described in [10] (we also wrote a poster [11] that contains a description of
the discovery of zones of interest with a pseudo-code). In this system, we implement
two ways to detect mobility prediction model updates by using mobility behavior
analysis. Intuitively, the detection of these updates can be seen as modifications in
the mobility pattern of the user, for instance, when a significant change occurs in
the set of her frequently visited places, i.e., her zones of interest, in order to effi-
ciently update the models according to these modifications (because we assume that
they are strongly linked to the models). By exploring her locations, we analyze the
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periodicity of movements of a user and the evolution of her zones of interest. We
also present a new evaluation method that enables to directly capture prediction
accuracies after each major update. These major updates trigger new training win-
dows and new evaluation windows. For the evaluation, we also use several prediction
methods in order to highlight the more accurate one. The final results demonstrate
that it is also possible to start predicting with a low number of locations and that,
theoretically, it could be implemented on a mobile device, preserving the location
privacy of the user because the location history is not shared with a location-based
service.
Chapter 5. ResPred: A Privacy Preserving Location Prediction System
Ensuring Location-Based Service Utility [15].
In this chapter, we address research question Q4 and present a privacy preserving
location prediction system that ensures location-based service utility called ResPred,
as presented in [15]. This system has two components: the first enables us to predict
future locations according to a certain time in the future and the second preserves
the location privacy of a user. Location-based services must request the system to
obtain future locations of a user, instead of creating the prediction model them-
selves. The user must indicate the maximum location-based service utility she is
willing to sacrifice in order to protect her privacy. And the location-based service
must state its location-based service utility in order to operate properly. The eval-
uation of the system is done mainly from a location privacy/utility perspective, by
comparing our location privacy mechanism to other existing blurring mechanisms.
We also provide a brief evaluation of the mobility prediction model created in the
first component of ResPred. The results show that our location privacy mechanism
provides good results regarding location privacy and utility evaluations. Thus, the
location privacy mechanism proposed helps to find an appropriate tradeoff between
the location privacy the user wants to preserve and the location-based service utility
that the user uses.
Part III: Mobility Behavior Analysis.
In part three, our contributions are focused on the analysis of mobility behavior and
the variables that influence it; in particular, seasonal and demographic variables.
We conducted this research by analyzing a user’s movements in a privacy preserving
manner, more specifically, by exploring the user’s movements as rhythms, instead
of her movements amongst her frequently visited places. This part is linked to the
research questions Q5 and Q6, described in Section 1.2.
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Chapter 6. Analyzing Privacy-aware Mobility Behavior using the Evolu-
tion of Spatio-temporal Entropy [16].
In this chapter, we address research questions Q5 and Q6 and present the pa-
per [16]. We use data obtained with the Breadcrumbs data-collection campaign.
First, we describe how to extract rhythms from users’ locations. To do so, we com-
pute the spatio-temporal entropy at a very fine-grained scale, i.e., one hour. By using
Generalized Additive Models (GAMs), we explore the effects of seasonal and demo-
graphic characteristics on the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy of users. We
also test the prediction of the mobility rhythms of users by injecting the evolution
of spatio-temporal entropy of users into GAMs. The results show that GAMs are
not only extremely interesting for predicting the mobility rhythms of users but also
for understanding them.
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Abstract We introduce a system-level architecture providing fine-grained control
over user privacy, in the context of location-based services accessed via mobile de-
vices. In contrast with most mobile platforms today, users only have coarse-grained
control over their privacy, either accepting to unconditionally stream their loca-
tions in order to use a service, or renouncing the service altogether. However, not
all location-based services do require the same level of location accuracy and the
same level of privacy renouncement. With this architecture, the user can adapt the
tradeoff between location privacy and location accuracy. To achieve this, our archi-
tecture relies on three main elements: a trusted module extending the underlying
mobile platform, a secure protocol between that module and untrusted applications
offering location-based services, and a tree capturing user’s zones of interest and
organizing them in various accuracy levels. Untrusted mobile applications no longer
receive user locations directly: the trusted module intercepts them to compute user’s
zones of interest and create the tree. The user can then decide what level of accuracy
will be disclosed to what application. We evaluate this architecture from a privacy
preserving point of view by comparing well-known blurring mechanisms and the tree
included in our architecture.
2.1 Introduction
In less than a decade, mobile devices, in particular smartphones, have radically
changed the way we consume digital services, be they web searching, online gaming,
media streaming, etc. Basically, we can now access such services whenever we want
and wherever we are. Furthermore, the ability of mobiles devices to locate them-
selves, either via the Global Positioning System (GPS) when outside or via WiFi
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or 3G/4G when indoor, has given birth to a new breed of digital services, so-called
location-based services.
2.1.1 For better or for worse?
There is little doubt that location-based services can be very useful, ranging from
simple one-shot queries about one’s surroundings, e.g., when looking for nearby
restaurants using applications such as Google Maps or Apple Maps,1 to continuously
tracking one’s movements, e.g., while jogging using applications such as Runkeeper
or Runtastic.2 Location-based services come however at a price: loss of location
privacy.
It is important to stress that location privacy is just one of many facets of privacy
as a whole, yet a crucial one, and that this paper focuses exclusively on location pri-
vacy. Indeed, locations generated by mobile devices offer a powerful means to link
virtually any data associated with a user to a very tangible aspect of her life: her
physical location in the real world. For this reason, most mobile platforms, such as
Apple iOS or Google Android, are trying to make users aware of this potential pri-
vacy loss, by explicitly asking them whether they are willing to share their locations
with applications requesting them, either at installation time or at run time.
Unfortunately, this choice is usually binary: either the application is granted full
access to the user locations or no access at all. Furthermore, once access has been
granted, the user has no control over what the application will do with her location
information. It could theoretically confine this information to the user mobile device,
which is almost never the case, or forward it to some backend server, in order to
compile statistics, use it later or even sell it to some third party.
A key problem here is that by giving away location information, users are actually
revealing a lot about themselves, most of the time without even realizing it. In [22] for
instance, it is shown that although most users may occasionally exhibit spontaneous
behaviors, their moves bear strong regularity, which leads to high predictability of
their future locations. Furthermore, according to [6] only four spatio-temporal coor-
dinates are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the users of the dataset. As mentioned
in the paper, this dataset contains locations, location antenna more specifically, of
a large number of users, approximately 1.5 M. These locations were caught when
users used their mobile device (e.g., when a user receives or initiates a call or a text
message). Additionally, another paper [23] demonstrates the consequence of privacy
leakage via a quantification of social inference from it. They found 90% inference
accuracy concerning social and community relationships with only three week’s user
1 http://google.ch/maps, http://apple.com/ios/maps
2 http://runkeeper.com, http://runtastic.com
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data by using their leakage inference framework they create. The dataset used in
this paper contains real mobility traces and Foursquare data.
2.1.2 Location accuracy vs. privacy
When it comes to locations, a rather straightforward way to control privacy consists
in controlling accuracy (in this paper the term accuracy is a synonym of precision):
the lower the location accuracy, the higher the location privacy. Obviously, knowing
that Alice is located within a 100 meters range around the cathedral of Notre-
Dame de Paris damages her privacy more than knowing that she stands within
a 10 kilometers range (which boils down to simply say that Alice is somewhere
in Paris). Furthermore, the privacy level associated with Alice’s location is not only
dependent on its geographical dimension but also on its time dimension: knowing
that Alice was located within a range of 100 meters around Notre-Dame de Paris
between 8:00 am and 9:00 am yesterday compromises her privacy more than knowing
that she was there between 8:00 am and 8:00 pm, some day last week.
Based on this privacy-accuracy duality, a key question is the following: what is
the level of accuracy a location-based service requires to fulfill its function and hence
the level of privacy loss one has to accept to benefit from that service. A related
key question is then: given the level of accuracy required by some service, how can
the mobile platform ensure that only the corresponding level of privacy will be lost?
This is precisely the question we address in this paper by proposing a system-level
architecture for fine-grained control over privacy, in the context of location-based
services. As implied above, this architecture must be implemented at the operating
system level.
2.1.3 Contributions and roadmap
As already pointed out, today’s mobile platform only offer the binary choice of
revealing all or nothing in terms of user locations.3 With our architecture in contrast,
the user can decide what level of location privacy she wants to retain, which then
translates to the level of accuracy the location-based service will be able to offer.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After presenting our system
model and defining the problem we address in Section 2.2, we describe the conceptual
architecture and generic protocol proposed by this architecture to solve this problem
in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 then focuses on the notion of privacy tree, which is at the
3 Most mobile platforms also allow to grant location access to certain applications only when they
are running in the foreground (while others can access them even when running in background).
Still, users only have the choice to either accept or refuse continuously sharing their locations.
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heart of our approach, while Section 2.5 presents key aspects of the implementation
of the architecture on a mobile device. Then, Section 2.6 details how the location
privacy is ensured by using this architecture. Section 2.7 proposes a quantitative
evaluation of the privacy tree and compares it with existing approaches. In doing
so, we introduce a spatial and temporal probabilistic measure of the privacy loss
induced whenever some location information, even partially inaccurate, is provided
to a location-based service. Finally, we discuss research results that are close to our
approach in Section 2.8 and conclude the paper with future research directions in
Section 2.9.
2.2 System model and problem statement
We consider a user moving on the surface of the earth with a mobile device that
has the ability to locate itself, typically via the Global Positioning System (GPS)4
or some other positioning means, e.g., WiFi positioning (WPS).5 The architecture
of this mobile device is depicted in Figure 2.1: Alice, the user, sits on the top and
interacts with both the underlying trusted operating system and some untrusted
location-based service. At the bottom, the system-level location provider is contin-
uously pushing raw location information to the location access protocol above it.
The latter processes this information according to some privacy policy and feeds
the resulting altered location information to the untrusted location-based service,
which can potentially forward this information across the network to some equally
untrusted remote server.
We model the stream of raw locations originating from the location provider as
sequence L = 〈loc1, loc2, . . . , locn〉, where loci = (φ, λ, t) is a tuple representing an
individual location. In this tuple, φ, λ ∈ R represents a latitude and a longitude
respectively, while t ∈ N represents the time when the location was captured. In the
following, we sometimes use the notation loc.φ, loc.λ and loc.t to designate specific
parts of tuple loc. In addition, the duration between two consecutive locations in L
does not exceed a constant ∆tlimit, i.e., loci+1.t − loci.t ≤ ∆tlimit. This means that
locations are captured in a regular manner.
The generic architecture presented in Figure 2.1 allows us to model most (if not
all) relevant location privacy approaches. On iOS and Android for instance, the
stream of raw locations received by the location access protocol is initially kept
safe from the untrusted location-based service client (0). Then, the latter requests
access to location information to the operating system (1), either at run time or at
installation time. This request is forwarded to Alice in the form of a binary choice,
in order to draw her attention on the potential loss of privacy (2). Assuming she
4 http://www.schriever.af.mil/GPS
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi_positioning_system
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Fig. 2.1: Generic system architecture
accepts to grant access, the stream of raw locations is simply forwarded, unaltered,
to the requesting location-based service client (3), which might then propagate it to
its remote counterpart (4).
Yet finer-grained access protocols are both desirable and possible, which do not
merely block or forward all raw location information. Rather, such access protocols
should involve a parameterized alteration of the location information eventually pro-
vided to the untrusted location-based service and a more subtle interaction between
trusted and untrusted components of the system. Providing such a location access
protocol is precisely the problem we address in this paper.
2.3 The proposed architecture including ShareZ service
Our system-level architecture proposes a location access protocol that allows user
to share their locations with location-based services, via zones of interest (i.e., fre-
quently visited places by a user) of various granularities, in order control the level
of privacy loss incurred by this sharing. That is, the notion of privacy granularity
captures the accuracy-privacy duality inherent to sharing zones of interest: coarse-
grained zones offer lower accuracy but higher privacy than sharing fine-grained zones.
Figure 2.2 sketches the proposed architecture, the included service called ShareZ
as well as its location access protocol, which are assumed to be integrated into the un-
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derlying mobile operating system, as prescribed by our generic system architecture.
To illustrate the description hereafter, we assume that Alice is shopping in Paris and
wants to be notified when passing by a shop with special offers. For this, she relies
on a mobile application acting as the local client of some location-based shopping
service.
(0) ShareZ continuously computes zones of interests of various granularities using
raw locations;
(1) The location-based service client application requests location information in the
form of zone of interests;
(2) ShareZ asks Alice to choose the privacy granularity and the zones of interest to
share with that service;
(3) ShareZ pushes the selected zones with the chosen privacy granularity to the
service;
(4) The client forwards those zones to the server, which computes related contextual
information, i.e., coupons associated with special offers in our example;
(5) The server sends the contextual information with its period(s) of validity related
to the zones it received back to the client;
(6) The client pushes this contextual information to ShareZ, with the associated
zones;
(7) ShareZ monitors incoming raw locations and checks if they match some valid
contextual information according to its period(s) of validity;
(8) As soon as ShareZ receives a raw location positioned in a zone associated with
some contextual information, a coupon in our example, the latter is directly dis-
played to Alice by ShareZ;
(9) At this point, Alice might or not decide to act based on this information, e.g.,
use the coupon to benefit from some special offer. If she does, the location-based
service has finally the ability to precisely locate Alice, directly or indirectly. If she
however decides not to use the coupon, the service will never know that Alice was
in that area.
It is crucial to indicate that the Steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 are carried out at the instal-
lation of the location-based service client application on the mobile device of the
user. In addition, the user can update the zones of interests to this application at
any time.
One might of course argue that knowing Alice’s zones of interest is already an
important breach in her privacy. Note however that Alice has the ability to prevent
certain zones from being disclosed to the location-based service and to blur the
zones she accepts to share, based on the privacy granularity she chose. In addition,
a rather simple strategy that ShareZ can apply to further protect Alice’s privacy
consists in adding one or more fake zones to those passed to the service in Step 3.
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Fig. 2.2: The ShareZ location access protocol
Of course, such fakes zones are completely ignored during the location monitoring
in Step 7. Yet the location-based service has no way to distinguish real zones of
interest from fake ones (see research works in [5, 13]).
In Step 2, it is indicated that Alice must choose a privacy granularity as well as
the zones of interest that she wants to share with the location-based service. This
means that Alice expresses the maximum accuracy she accepts to reveal about her
location, which is also the minimum privacy. In our internal architecture, this trans-
lates into a level in the privacy tree. In terms of user interface, a map highlighting the
different privacy tree levels could be presented to Alice in order to let her choose this
maximum accuracy in a graphical manner. Since her choice may be not adapted to
the functionality of the location-based service, she can modify her choice at any time.
The main characteristics of the proposed architecture, including its service ShareZ,
and its location access protocol are summarized hereafter.
Local. The protocol minimizes the communication with the location-based service
client and hence drastically reduces the risk of location information leakage to re-
mote parties.
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Flexible. ShareZ allows users to set distinct privacy preferences for different
location-based services and for different contexts, e.g., one might use a certain pri-
vacy granularity while shopping and another one when jogging.
Adaptive. ShareZ constantly updates the zones of interest it manages, based on
the stream of raw locations received from the underlying location provider.
Encapsulated. ShareZ is the sole recipient of raw locations originating from the
location provider and the protocol never forwards them directly to mobile applica-
tions.
2.4 Privacy tree
At the heart of the architecture, more specifically in the service ShareZ, and its
concept of flexible privacy granularity lies the notion of privacy tree. In the following,
we first formally define what zones of interest are, as well as the notion of privacy
distance. We then introduce the notion of privacy tree and its significance when it
comes to support various privacy granularities.
2.4.1 Zone of interest
In order to precisely define a zone of interest, we must introduce other fundamental
definitions based on the definition of a user location (see Section 2.2) such as the
definitions of cluster and cluster group.
2.4.1.1 Cluster
Intuitively, a cluster gathers locations sharing several common characteristics in
terms of space and time. Let ∆dmax ∈ R be a constant representing a distance
(expressed in meters) and ∆tmin ∈ N be a minimum time threshold (expressed in sec-
onds). Moreover, we consider the two following functions: centroid({loc1, loc2, ..., locn}),
which computes and returns geographical coordinates that represent the centroid of
the set of locations passed as parameters (i.e., the barycenter of the locations) and
distance(loci, locj), which simply computes and returns an Euclidian distance be-
tween two locations passed as parameters.
We define a cluster l′ of L as a subsequence of consecutive locations of L, such
that l′ = 〈locsi , locsi+1 , . . . , locei〉. This subsequence must satisfy the two following
conditions:
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∀k ∈ {si+1, . . . , ei}, (2.1)
distance(centroid(locsi , . . . , lock−1), lock) ≤ ∆dmax
locei .t− locsi .t ≥ ∆tmin (2.2)
From this cluster, defined as l′, we can extract its centroid centroid = (φ, λ)
(φ ∈ R represents a latitude and λ ∈ R represents a longitude), which is simply the
barycenter of all φ and λ of the locations contained in l′. We can also compute the
radius of the cluster ∆r ∈ R, which is the maximum distance between the centroid
of the cluster and a location of the set of locations extracted from l′. Therefore a
cluster is a tuple c = (φ, λ,∆r, l′). The notation c.centroid is used to designate the
centroid of the cluster c. Hereafter, C = {c1, . . . , ci, . . . , cm} is the set of m clusters
associated with the user, based on her sequence of locations. It is important to note
that C must meet the following condition:
∀ci, cj ∈ C, ci.l′ ∩ cj.l′ = ∅ (2.3)
This first part of the clustering process is based on a well-known technique de-
scribed in [8] and presented as density-time cluster (DT cluster).
2.4.1.2 Cluster group
Intuitively, a group of clusters contains all the clusters that can be gathered iff there
exists an intersection between these clusters. Two clusters ci, cj ∈ C are gathered in
the same group of clusters g iff we have:
distance(ci.centroid, cj.centroid)
− (ci.∆r + cj.∆r) < 0 (2.4)
So a group of clusters(s) is defined as tuple g = (φ, λ,∆r, {c1, c2, · · · }), where
φ ∈ R represents a latitude, λ ∈ R represents a longitude, ∆r ∈ R represents its
radius in meters and the array of clusters from which g is formed. The centroid of
a group of clusters is represented by tuple (φ, λ), which is simply the mean of the
centroids of the clusters in g. Hereafter, G = {g1, g2, · · · } is the set of cluster groups
associated with the user, based on her set of clusters C.
2.4.1.3 Zone of interest
Intuitively, a zone of interest is a delimited zone that is frequently visited by a user
in everyday life. Let minV isitNb ∈ N be a constant representing the minimum
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number of visits and let visitThreshold ∈ N that is a maximum threshold of visits.
Moreover, let size(g) be a function that computes and returns the number of clusters
of the group passed as a parameter and let meanVisitNb(G) be a function that
computes and returns the mean number of visits among all the cluster groups passed
as parameters. The number, returned by meanVisitNb(G), frequently changes over
time depending on the mobility behavior of the user if we consider that the discovery
process works in a sequential manner. It is important to note that minV isitNb must
be equal to the value returned by meanVisitNb(G) until reaching the visitThreshold,
which is the maximum number of visits to transform a cluster group into a zone
of interest. A group of clusters g ∈ G becomes a zone of interest z iff it follows
Equation 2.5:
size(g) ≥ minV isitNb
| minV isitNb = meanV isitNb(G)
AND minV isitNb <= visitThreshold (2.5)
Formally, a zone of interest z is a tuple z = (φ, λ,∆r, g), where φ ∈ R represents
a latitude, λ ∈ R represents a longitude, ∆r ∈ R represents its radius in meters and
g the group of clusters. The centroid of z is represented by (φ, λ), which is simply
the centroid computed from group g. Hereafter, Z = {z1, z2, · · · , zn} is the set of
zones of interest associated with the user, based on her set of cluster groups G.
2.4.2 Privacy distance
The privacy distance is simply a cursor expressing the accuracy of the shared location
information, which perfectly illustrates the inherent tradeoff between accuracy and
privacy. With ShareZ, the user is responsible for setting this cursor. Let ∆da ∈ R
be a constant representing this accuracy (in meters): the greater ∆da, the higher
the location privacy offered by zones of interest respecting this privacy distance.
2.4.3 Privacy tree structure
Privacy trees follow a similar hierarchical structure as R-trees, which were introduced
by Guttman to index geo-located objects (i.e., leaves of the tree), by grouping and
representing them via minimum bounding rectangles at each hierarchical level [10].
In ShareZ, the zones of interest of a user are the leaves of her privacy tree and each
hierarchical level closer to the root covers a set of zones found at the lower levels,
as illustrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. So each level of the tree represents a different
privacy granularity.
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Fig. 2.3: Privacy tree – Spatial structure
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present a privacy tree based on five zones of interest. The
process of building this tree goes as follows. The first step consists in trying to
gather close zones by computing the smallest distance between two zones among
all of them. A group containing close zones gives birth to a new upper zone with a
new centroid. If a zone of interest cannot be gathered with another one, an upper
zone is created around it. For example, zone z3 has the same centroid as its upper
zone z2’. Note also that the radius of various zones found at a given privacy level
are not necessarily equal.
Since this process is realized sequentially in real time (i.e., each time that a new
user raw location is caught), it may take time to highlight all zones of interest of the
user. In this context and previously mentioned in Section 2.2, the minV isitNb and
the visitThreshold enable to discover zones of interest related to the user when she
starts using her mobile device. Since minV isitNb corresponds to the current mean
number of visits, this value is obviously 0 at the beginning. Then, minV isitNb
evolves over time until reaching the visitThreshold, which is the maximum number
of visits. If this mechanism was not included in the discovery process, the latter
would not be able to discover zones of interest of the user from the beginning.
2.5 Implementation of the architecture on a mobile device
The implementation of the architecture has an impact on the two main components
presented in Figure 2.2: trusted and untrusted components, i.e., the operating system
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Fig. 2.4: Privacy tree – Tree structure
including the service ShareZ and the location-based service respectively. In this
section, we present the key aspects of the implementation of this architecture on a
mobile device from the two following points of view: operating system and location-
based service.
2.5.1 On the operating system side
In order to implement our architecture at the operating-system level, we need to
create ShareZ as well as the application programming interface (API) that can
be used by developers to receive zones of interest of user and share contextual in-
formation. ShareZ is able to directly interact with the location provider in order
to discover the zones of interest of the user and update the related privacy tree.
The location provider, which gets location via GPS, WiFi or 3G/4G, provides the
stream of raw locations to ShareZ, which is necessary to update the privacy tree.
This service must also be able to store the privacy preferences set by the user for
each application she is using (e.g., the privacy distance, the zones of interest already
shared). In addition, this service must also memorize the contextual information,
provided by the location-based service, and display it when it is appropriate accord-
ing to the current location of the user and the validity period of the content. As
described in Figure 2.2, we consider that ShareZ is safe because it is included at
the operating system layer, which is also a trusted component. In order to prevent
some low level kernel attacks we could also implement a TrustZone technique to iso-
late critical data transactions but it is out of the scope of the paper. We assume that
both the operating system including ShareZ and the location provider are trusted
components. Moreover, there is no data alteration during the data sharing between
the trusted and untrusted components under the assumption that this exchange is
realized in a safe manner. The data sharing implementation is also out of the scope
of the paper.
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2.5.2 On the location-based service side
If this architecture is implemented at the operating system level, developers of
location-based services need to modify the way they obtain user locations. Their
code must change in accordance with the new API exposed by the operating system
library and, more specifically, by ShareZ. This is already the case when a new
version of the API of the operating system is released. Therefore, they must adapt
their location-based service to the protocol of the architecture. This has an impact
on the way to provide information to the user. In return, a location-based service
improves its level of respect for user location privacy. One limit of our architecture
is that it does not work with location-based service requiring frequent and precise
location updates such as running applications and personal navigation applications.
Regarding these specific cases, user should be able to share her raw locations, during
a limited period of time, in order to reduce her location privacy loss.
2.6 Location privacy ensured by the architecture
It is important to recall that we focus on location privacy only and not on other user
privacy issues. Location privacy also aims at enhancing user privacy. As explained
in the previous section, we assume that ShareZ is implemented at the operating
system level, which is considered as a safe and trusted component. Considering this,
we discuss two main privacy levels, both aiming at ensuring location privacy of the
user: at a low level with the privacy tree and at a high level with the architecture
protocol.
2.6.1 At the level of the privacy tree
At the privacy tree level, the structure of the tree itself enables to protect the location
privacy. With multiple levels of location privacy, computed from the zones of interest
of the user, the latter is able to select the most appropriate privacy distance for the
location-based service. This tree is frequently updated according to the user mobility
behavior. As a result, we cannot predict in advance its structure because it may
evolve over time according to the new or outdated zones of interest. In addition, the
privacy tree structure is only computed from the stream of user raw location, which
is only accessible at the trusted component level. It is also important to indicate
that we cannot prevent developers to use other way to obtain user locations such as
beacons for instance. However, it is not a privacy threat because there does not exist
a sufficient number of beacons used to locate users to extract a complete overview
of the mobility behavior of a user.
32 2 Location Privacy Architecture
2.6.2 At the level of the architecture protocol
At the architecture protocol level, the location privacy is mainly ensured by two
crucial steps: the sharing of zones of interest (Step 0 to 3 in Figure 2.2) and the
sharing of location-based content (Step 4 to 9 in Figure 2.2). Firstly, the sharing of
zones of interest (from ShareZ to the location-based service) protects the location
privacy of the user, because no raw locations are sent to the location-based service.
In addition, even if zones of interest of the lowest level of the privacy tree are shared,
they do not correspond to precise locations. The user can also decide the zones of
interest that she wants to share with the location-based service, that may reinforce
the location privacy. Secondly, the sharing of content, from the location-based service
to ShareZ, aims at preserving the location privacy of the user because the content
is gathered locally at the trusted component and only displayed when the current
location of the user is in the zone of interest linked to this content. Consequently,
the location-based service never knows the exact location of the user. However, if the
user must interact with the location-based service to use a specific offer, the latter
may infer the location of the user by linking the offer selected by the user with her
related zone of interest.
2.7 Evaluation
This section has two different goals: (1) presenting a generic location privacy indi-
cator according to space and time dimensions, and (2) comparing our privacy tree
solution to three other location privacy preserving mechanisms: Gaussian alteration,
sampling and spatial cloaking. It is important to indicate that we decide to assess
the low privacy level, which concerns the privacy tree, because it is the heart of our
architecture in terms of privacy preserving.
Firstly, we present the dataset we use for our evaluation, which is based on a
real life experiment carried out by Nokia between 2009 and 2011. Secondly, we
introduce the threat model as well as the privacy indicator. Further, we explain the
classification of the users contained in the Nokia dataset. Next, we detail the chosen
scenarios as well as the different blurring strategies we implemented. Finally, we
present and discuss the obtained privacy indicator results of our experiments.
2.7.1 Nokia dataset
For this analysis, we use a dataset provided by Nokia and containing real mobility
traces of users. This dataset was collected in the Lake Geneva region in Switzerland
(Europe) from October 2009 to March 2011. A Nokia N95 mobile device was given
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to all volunteers participating to the data collection campaign. The whole process
of this campaign is explained in detail in [16]. In addition, the data was of course
anonymized in order to preserve user privacy, i.e., the dataset does not allow to
infer the identity of the users who participated in this data collection campaign. To
summarize, the dataset contains 188 users. This data comes from different sources,
such as locations from GPS or GPS WLAN, phone and SMS logs, accelerometer,
application usage, etc. Although this data is rich and abundant, we only use the raw
location data coming from GPS or GPS-WLAN sources.
2.7.2 Threat model and privacy indicator metric
As already pointed out, we only focus in this paper on location privacy. In particular,
we do not distinguish cases where the user identity is already known by the location-
based service and the latter wants to discover her mobility pattern, from scenarios
where the user identity is not known and the location-based service is trying to
discover it based on her locations. Yet controlling the access to locations by location-
based services can have a significant impact on privacy as a whole in both cases.
We assume a threat model including a possible adversary represented by a
location-based service, which is an untrusted component as depicted in Figure 2.2.
This adversary wants to infer personal information related to a user based on her
locations received from the operating system layer. In this case, we consider that the
locations shared with the location-based service are critical as well as their accuracy.
Their accuracy inevitably influences the process used by the location-based service
to infer sensitive user data. Consequently, we propose a metric that is a privacy indi-
cator aiming at highlighting the degree of alteration of the user locations sent to the
location-based service. This alteration takes space and time dimensions. The privacy
indicator enables to compute this level of alteration and takes values between 0 and
1 included. The higher the value of the privacy indicator, the higher the protection
of the user locations sent. Conversely, the lower the value of the privacy indicator,
the lower the protection of the user locations sent.
Remember that in our generic architecture (Figure 2.1), the purpose of the loca-
tion access protocol is to alter raw locations of the form (φ, λ, t) in order to achieve
location privacy. The nature of this alteration depends on the location access pro-
tocol and can act on both the spatial dimension of locations, i.e., φ and λ, and on
their temporal dimension, i.e., t. To model this, we introduce function F as follows:
F (〈loc1, loc2, · · · 〉) 7→ {(z1, ∆t1), · · · , (zn, ∆tn)}
where zi = (φi, λi, ∆ri) represents the spatial alteration and ∆ti represents the
temporal alteration of the location information. It is important to note that these
alterations are computed in parallel with the computation of the blurred locations
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directly sent to a possible adversary, which is the location-based service in our
context. Both zi and ∆ti are used to compute our global privacy indicator, as shown
in Equation 2.6. That is, the global privacy indicator is the mean of the individual
privacy indicators of all these alterations.
Privacy =
1
n
×
n∑
i=1
Privacy(zi, ∆ti) (2.6)
Note that the number of (zi, ∆ti) tuples can significantly differ from the number
of raw locations, e.g., in ShareZ, the privacy tree is the actual result of alteration
function F . The calculation of the privacy of a single (zi, ∆ti) tuple is described
in Equation 2.7. This second Equation is the sum of the spatial alteration and
the temporal alteration where α and β are respectively factors of them and are
complementary, i.e., β = 1− α.
Privacy(zi, ∆ti) =
(α× Pspace(zi)) + (β × Ptime(∆ti))
(α + β)
(2.7)
The spatial alteration is presented in Equation 2.8, where the minimum between
the area of the zone and the maximum area, called zmax, is divided by this maximum
area. It means that, when this maximum area is reached, the user cannot lose more
privacy because her privacy is fully ensured.
Pspace(zi) =
min(Area(zi), Area(zmax))
Area(zmax)
=
min(zi.∆r
2, zmax.∆r
2)
zmax.∆r2
(2.8)
The time alteration is presented in Equation 2.9, where∆tmax is the time threshold
beyond which the user cannot gain more privacy. The equation is therefore the
division of the minimum between zi.∆t and ∆tmax by ∆tmax.
Ptime(∆ti) =
min(∆ti, ∆tmax)
∆tmax
(2.9)
2.7.3 User mobility behavior classification
We choose to classify users of the Nokia dataset according to their mobility behavior
in terms of distance in order to see if the latter might have an influence on the results
obtained for the different experiments that are explained in the next section. Among
the 188 users contained in the dataset, we started by selecting all the users having
GPS and GPS-WLAN data and found 184 users. Then, we decided to compute the
2.7 Evaluation 35
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0	to	20	km 20	to	80	km 80	to	200	km
Nu
m
be
r	
of
	u
se
rs
Radius	of	the	largest	zone	of	interest
Fig. 2.5: User mobility behaviors
average of all mean time difference between two successive locations of all users
in order to find an appropriate threshold. The latter was presented in the system
model in Section 2.2 as ∆tlimit. After computation, we find a mean of 568 seconds.
Consequently, we decided to set the value of ∆tlimit to 600 seconds, which indicates
that the locations are captured in a regular manner. We select all users having a
mean time difference lower than 600 seconds and obtain a final set of 161 users. The
tracking duration of all these users varies from less than 1 day to 567 days.
After exploring the radius of the largest zone of interest of each remaining user,
obtained with the privacy tree algorithm, we find three groups of users as described
in Figure 2.5. In order to illustrate our classification, Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 de-
scribe the mobility traces of users belonging to each group. To be more precise,
User 1 travels very long distances (i.e., a radius of the largest zone of interest of
approximately 180 km), User 2 travels medium distances (i.e., a radius of approx-
imately 60 km) and User 3 travels short distances (i.e., a radius of approximately
19 km) belonging to group 3, 2 and 1 respectively. In addition, Figures 2.9, 2.10 and
2.11 show the three different privacy trees obtained for each user. Concerning these
three users, their locations were taken during a time period of about 500 days.
2.7.4 Scenarios and blurring strategies
We consider two scenarios involving two distinct location-based services. The first
scenario focuses on a social network that offers various location-based discounts (e.g.,
travel discounts, shopping discounts, etc.) according to their space/time context. In
this context, we also consider that users select one offer per month on average. This
amount is called utility, which is the utility perceived by the user when she uses
the service. The second scenario concerns a green location-based mobile application
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Fig. 2.6: Mobility traces of user 1
Fig. 2.7: Mobility traces of user 2
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Fig. 2.8: Mobility traces of user 3
Fig. 2.9: Privacy tree of user 1 (7 zones of interest and 4 privacy tree levels)
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Fig. 2.10: Privacy tree of user 2 (10 zones of interest and 5 privacy tree levels)
Fig. 2.11: Privacy tree of user 3 (7 zones of interest and 5 privacy tree levels)
that provides train and public transportation schedules to users according to their
spatial and temporal context. The utility of this service is greater than the previous
because users read the location-based information on an average of two times per
day at least.
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Regarding these two scenarios, we explore the impact of different blurring strate-
gies applied to user locations. Furthermore, we also consider a case, i.e., worst case
used as a reference, where all user locations are sent to the location-based service
without any blurring strategy (i.e., spatial and temporal alterations are equal to 0 for
all sent locations). The four selected blurring strategies are the following: Gaussian
alteration, sampling, spatial cloaking and our privacy tree. The first three strategies
are carried out in an oﬄine buffered manner depending on the time window used
to obfuscate the raw locations. Above all, it is important to note that the spatial
cloaking technique is traditionally use to preserve the anonymity of users but we will
use it as a blurring technique applied to one user as explained in Krumm’s paper [14].
Gaussian alteration. The Gaussian alteration is a blurring strategy that con-
sists in altering a location by adding Gaussian random noise on the latitude and
the longitude of the original location. This Gaussian random noise depends on two
variables: the mean which is the value where the curve is at the top (e.g., the lat-
itude or the longitude of the original location) and the chosen standard deviation
that may be expressed in meters. This strategy only has an impact on the space
dimension of the location. In this context, each new location is spatially blurred
and, therefore, a spatial alteration is generated. Regarding the spatial alteration,
i.e., zi = (φi, λi, ∆ri), the centroid of the zone corresponds to the blurred location
and its radius is the distance between the blurred location and the original location.
However, the temporal alteration, i.e., ∆ti, is 0 because there is no temporal alter-
ation.
Sampling. The sampling strategy is a technique enabling to summarize several lo-
cations into a single location. In order to reach this goal, there exists different means
of sampling. For our experiments, we decide to sample according to a time window.
Consequently, we divide the user dataset into several sequences of locations. Each
sequence has a duration equal to the time window. Then, we summarize locations
of each sequence into a single location. We create a new location by computing the
mean of all the latitudes and the mean of all the longitudes. In this context, spatial
and temporal alterations are generated for each blurred location, which is computed
from one sequence of locations. Regarding the spatial alteration, the centroid of the
zone equals to the blurred location and its radius is the maximum distance between
the centroid of the blurred location and the farthest original location included in
the sequence used to compute the sample. In this context, the temporal alteration
corresponds to the duration between the first location and the last location of the
sequence used to compute the sample.
Spatial cloaking. As mentioned previously, spatial cloaking can be applied to
one user only (see [14]) and, in our experiments, we use it as a blurring technique
even if it is originally an anonymization technique. We assume that all zones of
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Strategy Spatial Alteration Temporal Alteration
None (worst case) No (real location sent) No (real timestamp sent)
Gaussian alteration Yes No (real timestamp sent)
Sampling Yes Yes (time window)
Spatial cloaking Yes/No Yes/No
Privacy tree Yes Yes (no timestamp sent)
Table 2.1: Overview of alteration strategies
interest of a user, as precise as possible, are sensitive regions. The spatial cloaking
works as follows: all user locations located in cloaked regions are deleted. In our im-
plementation of the spatial cloaking technique, we simply create cloaked regions for
each zone of interest of a user that must always contain the centroid of the related
zone of interest. If the radius of the cloaked region is very small, the centroid of the
cloaked region is obviously very close to the centroid of the zone of interest. Every
time a user enters in a cloaked region, the original locations are deleted and, spatial
and temporal alterations are created. Regarding the spatial alteration, the centroid
of the zone and its radius are the centroid and the radius of the cloaked region
respectively. The temporal alteration is the duration between the first location and
the last successive location deleted for a specific cloaked region considering that the
blurring process works in a sequential manner. For all remaining locations, which
are not located in a cloaked region, spatial and temporal alterations are equal to 0
because they are sent without any alteration.
Privacy tree. Section 2.4 already explains the creation of a privacy tree as well as
its different characteristics. It helps to blur user locations from the zones of interest
of the user and an aggregation technique to build the privacy tree. In the analysis,
we compute the alterations of all user’s zones of interest of each selected level of the
privacy tree (e.g. most precise, intermediate and less precise level explained below).
Spatial and temporal alterations are generated for each zone of interest shared.
Consequently, the spatial alteration corresponds to a zone having a centroid and a
radius equal to the centroid and the radius of the zone of interest previously created.
The temporal alteration is 1 (i.e., fully ensured) because no temporal information is
revealed with the zones of interest.
Table 2.1 summarizes the chosen blurring strategies. In next section, the param-
eters of all blurring strategies are indicated.
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2.7.5 Evaluation method, experimental settings and results
In this section, we present the experimental settings as well as the privacy indicator
results achieved for each group of users.
2.7.5.1 Evaluation method and experiment settings
In order to run all the following experiments explained below, we create a cocoa
application implemented in Objective-C containing the implementations of the four
blurring strategies as well as the calculation of the privacy indicator. For all experi-
ments, we chose a radius of zmax equal to 1000 meters under the assumption that it
is a sufficient radius from which users consider that their location privacy is spatially
ensured. This value is appropriate in highly dense urban areas but different radius
should be chosen in other contexts, especially when users frequently travel. We also
chose a ∆tmax of the duration of one day meaning that when this threshold is ex-
ceeded, users think that their location privacy is temporally ensured. Consequently,
when these two thresholds are exceeded, the location privacy is entirely preserved
and the privacy indicator is equal to 1. Finally, for all the experiments we consider
the factors α, i.e., spatial privacy factor, and β, i.e., temporal privacy factor, are
equal (i.e., 0.5 for both factors).
The parameters of each blurring strategies are chosen in order to highlight when
the privacy indicator results reach a maximum value, i.e., 0.5 or 1 depending on the
strategy. Concerning the Gaussian alteration strategy, we select several standard
deviations from 0.001 to 0.1 corresponding to different distance noise from approxi-
mately 120 to 11880 meters. Regarding the sampling strategy, we also take several
different durations for the time window: from 30 minutes to 8 months. About the
spatial cloaking strategy, we choose several different distances for the radius of the
cloaked regions: from 1000 to 1000000 meters. And finally, regarding the privacy
tree, three levels of privacy are taken into account: the most accurate, i.e., the level
of the leaves of the tree (i.e., the zones of interest of a user), the intermediate level
(i.e., approximately the mean between the most accurate level and the less accurate),
and the level of the root node, which is the less accurate level. During an experi-
ment, if a user has a privacy tree with only one level, we consider that the privacy
indicator of the intermediate and that of the level of the root node also correspond
to the level of the leaves. In addition, if a user has a privacy tree with two levels, the
privacy indicator of the intermediate level is equal to that of the level of the leaves.
User clusters are discovered with ∆dmax of 60 meters and ∆tmin of 900 seconds (i.e.,
15 minutes). To highlight the zones of interest, we consider a visitThreshold of 10.
Finally, it is also important to mention that the zones of interest of the privacy tree
are generated with the same parameters for all the users.
42 2 Location Privacy Architecture
2.7.5.2 Results
The privacy indicator results obtained for each user group according to each blurring
strategy are shown in Figures 2.12, 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15. The ”worst” scenario for
which all locations are sent without any blurring strategy is not indicated in the
diagrams because the privacy indicator is equal to 0. To begin, we can clearly see
that the privacy indicator results are very close for all groups of users in Figures 2.12
and 2.13, unlike Figures 2.14 and 2.15. Regarding the spatial cloaking strategy for
a radius of 100000 meters, the obtained privacy indicator results are different for
each user group. This difference is explained by the fact that user groups have
different travel distances. About the privacy tree, the privacy indicator results show
indeed that they are different for the intermediate level. This difference can be easily
explained: if a user travels long distances, the created privacy tree is automatically
larger than that of a user travelling medium distances. Consequently, the alterations
of the users travelling long distances are most significant than those of users moving
over short distances. We observe the same if we compare the results obtained for
medium and small distances of the intermediate level of the privacy tree.
In Figure 2.12, we can see that it is impossible to reach a privacy indicator result
greater than 0.5 for a Gaussian alteration. This is explained by the fact that there is
no temporal alteration when this strategy is used, unlike other blurring strategies.
Figure 2.13 shows we can reach a suitable protection from a sampling with a time
window duration of approximately 2 days. However, it seems to be rather unreal-
istic to send user locations every 2 days or more. Regarding the spatial cloaking
strategy in Figure 2.14, the larger the radius of the cloaked regions, the higher the
privacy indicator results. It also means that when 1 is reached, all user locations are
contained in one large cloaked region. This strategy is interesting because it pro-
tects the sensitive regions of the user according to a specific radius distance around
them. Concerning the privacy indicator results obtained for the privacy tree (see
Figure 2.15), the most precise level (i.e., at the original zones of interest level of the
users) already provides good results because they are around 0.5. These good results
are explained by the non-disclosure of the temporal information. The results of the
intermediate level strongly depend on the radius of the computed zones of interest
of the intermediate level of the privacy tree. Then, the obtained results for the less
precise level are very high, i.e., close to 1, because this level (i.e., at the root level of
the privacy tree) mainly exceeds or is close to 1000 meters, which is the radius of the
maximum area zmax of the space privacy (see Equation 2.8). Although the spatial
cloaking strategy offers a good spatial and temporal protection, this strategy does
not include a structure containing several encapsulated privacy levels. The privacy
tree is a structure with various privacy levels, which makes it flexible. To conclude,
the privacy tree strategy is an appropriate approach to protect location privacy of
the user.
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According to these results, if we resume the two scenarios described at the begin-
ning with the two location-based mobile applications, we can now argue that the
privacy tree is an appropriate blurring strategy to ensure location privacy. More
specifically, we lose less privacy by only allowing a certain level of accuracy/privacy
especially when the utility of the application is not high (i.e., in the case of the
social network). In addition, thanks to the privacy tree we can also decide to lose
more privacy for the green application, which is more useful for us (i.e., high utility),
compared to the social network that is considered as less useful (i.e., low utility).
2.8 Related work
In the following, we discuss two research subjects included in our work: location
protection strategies, and privacy architectures and frameworks.
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2.8.1 Location protection strategies
There exists various strategies that enable to protect locations, such as mix-zones,
spatial cloaking, perturbation, aggregation and many others as described in [8]. As
presented in [8, 11, 14, 15], some of these strategies focus on anonymization (i.e.,
the impossibility of linking a user and an action) and others on location blurring
or obfuscation (i.e., hiding a location). To begin with the anonymization strategies,
Beresford and Stajano introduce the concept of mix-zone in [4] to achieve anonymiza-
tion. In a mix-zone, precise locations of users are not computed. This guarantees
the privacy of the user in this area and the anonymity of her moves from one zone
to another zone thanks to a pseudonym mechanism. More specifically, when a user
enters in a mix-zone, her pseudonym changes and the third party application does
not obtain precise locations during her moves in the zone. Another technique helping
to spatially anonymize a user is known as spatial cloaking [20]. If a user is located
in a zone with at least k other users, the entire area is returned and not her precise
location. This strategy is based on the k-anonymity concept. However, although
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these anonymization strategies are well-known, they should not be used alone but
complemented by other blurring strategies [24].
Other strategies aim at blurring locations through alteration techniques, which
are used to modify the location by adding some noise to the coordinates of the
location, typically Gaussian noise. In [2], authors present various spatial approaches
including affine transformations, random perturbation as well as aggregation. In [19],
a family of geometric data transformation methods (GDTMs) are introduced. The
aggregation strategy enables to gather some close locations into a single one. For
example, the clustering process can help to reach this goal as seen in [8], where
several clustering algorithms are described such as density-joinable cluster, density-
time cluster and time-density cluster. In our work, a density-time is used in order
to find clusters at the beginning of our process. In doing so, we rely on a blurring
strategy, aggregation more specifically.
To end this section, there also exist other strategies consisting in sending fake user
locations. Kido et al. introduce this concept by presenting an anonymous commu-
nication technique based on the sending of false locations with the true location of
the user as demonstrated in [13]. In [5], Bindschaedler and Shokri present a model
to generate fake user locations to protect user location privacy. Their model is based
on statistical metrics quantifying geographic and semantic aspects of the mobility
of users.
2.8.2 Privacy architectures and frameworks
There basically exists two types of frameworks and architectures aiming at protect-
ing user privacy: decentralized ones, where components are confined to the mobile
device, and centralized ones, where components may be the mobile device and on
some remote server [11]. In [17], Mokbel et al. introduce a framework called Casper,
which is entirely centralized. The goal of Casper is to allow users to use location-
based services without disclosing their location data. This framework consists of
two distinct components: a location anonymizer and a privacy-aware query pro-
cessor. The location anonymizer constantly receives user locations from the mobile
device and blurs them using a spatial cloaking technique. It is important to note
that the location anonymizer is not on the mobile device but on a remote server.
Then, the blurred location is sent to the privacy-aware query processor, which en-
ables to handle location-based requests such as ”Where is the nearest restaurant?”.
This last component is also located on a remote server. In [18], Myles et al. present
LocServ, a middleware acting as a unifying location service. This location service
relies on a remote server that collects user locations from different sources, as well
as user privacy requirements, and provides answers to location requests from appli-
cations. The main goal of LocServ is to protect user locations gathered by various
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tracking systems. Users must subscribe to the location server LocServ and indicate
their privacy preferences expressed with rules. Unlike the previous middleware, user
anonymity is achieved by using multiple identifiers for one user in LocServ. In [9],
a decentralized architecture, called Prive, is presented. Prive enables to preserve
the anonymity of users using a decentralized version of k-anonymity. Although the
architecture of Prive is decentralized, there are a certification server where users
need to be registered as well as a centralized pseudonym service. The goal of Prive
is also to answer to requests like ”Where is the nearest hospital?”, while protecting
user anonymity. In [12], Hong and Landay present Confab, a framework for privacy-
sensitive ubiquitous computing applications. Its goal is to facilitate the development
of privacy-sensitive applications by taking into account user privacy preferences. The
architecture is composed of infospaces linked to users or things, e.g., an infospace
for a specific user and another for a room. An infospace contains static informa-
tion (e.g., user name, user address, etc. . . ) and dynamic information extracted from
different sensors (e.g., temperature). The architecture may be centralized, i.e., an
infospace is managed by a remote server, or decentralized, i.e., an infospace is hosted
on the user mobile device. As presented in the paper with three use cases, locations
may be shared during a specific duration (i.e., time-to-live flag) and according to
a pre-defined location levels (i.e., street level, room level, city level). In [7], Fawaz
and Shin present LP-Guardian, a framework that helps to ensure location privacy.
LP-Guardian takes into account the tracking context: background or foreground
mode. For instance, when locations are caught in background, LP-Guardian is able
to capture the location object being in the process of creation and blur it in or-
der to protect the user. On the contrary, when the tracking is in foreground, the
user may be notified in order to choose an appropriate location sharing option, e.g.,
hiding the place, revealing it during the application session, as well as revealing
it always. In this case, it is not a binary choice as in a standard architecture, de-
scribed in Figure 2.1, but it is also not a personalized option provided according
to the behavior of the user, because the offered choices are not generated on the
basis of the user locations. In addition to the blurring option, anonymization may
always be enabled or disabled according to the context. Amini et al. offer a system
called Cache´, described in [1], enabling to pre-fetch and store locally location-based
content (i.e., weather forecast data, bus schedule data, etc. . . ) from various sources
(e.g., web services) and for multiple areas. These areas must be pre-defined by the
user and are regions of interests of the user. Beresford et al. introduce MockDroid
in [3], which is a modified version of Android operating system enabling to change
personal content shared with an application. It is an interesting way to make users
aware that a large amount of personal data is shared with applications or services.
Users are able to find a adapted tradeoff between privacy and service functionality
they want to use. Finally the last remaining research to present is FINE, a frame-
work proposed by Shao et al. in [21]. This framework enables to mainly ensure the
confidentiality of location-based service data and user location privacy, and provide
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a fine-grained access control in the location-based service system. A cloud server is
mandatory because it executes location queries and is a bridge between the location-
based service provider and the users. By using a specific and adapted encryption
technique, the framework ensures the confidentiality of data shared. The user must
decide the range of location she wants to query but there is no information regarding
how this range is chosen by the user. The context of FINE is not the same as our
work because the location-based service provider is considered as a remote entity
and not as a component of the user mobile device.
When comparing the above architectures and frameworks to ShareZ, LP-
Guardian is close to our solution in the sense that it also offers a personalized
location privacy protection per application. However, its blurring strategy is quite
different from ours, which relies on the concept of a privacy tree. Our blurring ap-
proach is constantly adapted to the user behavior in order to offer appropriate levels
of location privacy protection for each specific location-based service. Furthermore,
in the architectures presented above, most of them are centralized and need a remote
server to work. Although Confab framework enables to share locations according to
different location levels that seems to be pre-defined according to the context (e.g.,
different location levels in a building related to a work place). Our blurring solution
is obviously not pre-defined because the privacy tree is updated over time. Unlike
Cache´, our solution automatically computes user’s zones of interest in real-time from
user raw location data. Moreover, we propose an approach per location-based ser-
vice that the user wants to use, and not an approach that catches location-based
content from different sources. To finish with MockDroid, even if this approach is per
application, the privacy preferences are limited and also not automatically adapted
to the user mobility behavior.
2.9 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a novel system-level architecture providing fine-grained
control over their location privacy to mobile device users. Our solution consists in
a system-level architecture, which includes a service ShareZ, relying on a loca-
tion access protocol that is strictly local. Our approach also offers a flexible blur-
ring technique that is a privacy tree. Rather than forwarding all user locations to
location-based services, ShareZ only shares her zones of interest, according to her
privacy preferences. A quantitative location privacy indicator was also introduced
and used in order to compare our solution to more traditional blurring approaches.
The results indicate that the privacy tree, built from the user zones of interest, is a
valuable structure to flexibly protect user privacy, as it enables to meet the trade-
off between privacy and accuracy on a per-service and per-user basis. Future work
could be focused on a real implementation of this architecture on a real mobile device
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in order to analyze several performance criteria and measure the tradeoff between
location-based functionality and location privacy. Since the privacy tree is already
implemented in Objective-C, we could implement the architecture on Apple iOS
devices by modifying the operating system layer, which is the most challenging part
of this possible future work.
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Abstract The proliferation of mobile devices and location-based services (LBS) is
strongly challenging user privacy. Users disclose a large volume of sensitive informa-
tion about themselves to LBS. Indeed, such services collect user locations to operate
and can thus use them to perform various inference attacks. Several privacy mecha-
nisms and metrics have been proposed in the literature to preserve location privacy
and to quantify the level of privacy obtained when these mechanisms are applied
on raw locations. Although the use of these metrics is relevant under specific threat
models, they cannot anticipate the level of location privacy on the sole basis of the
altered location data shared with LBS. Therefore, we propose a location privacy
estimator that approximates the level of location privacy based on spatio-temporal
uncertainties resulting from location alterations produced when a location privacy
preserving mechanism is applied on user raw locations. This estimator also takes
into account spatial-temporal user privacy parameters. We also describe the com-
putation of the spatio-temporal uncertainties through the sampling, the Gaussian
perturbation as well as the spatial cloaking. Finally, we compare the results of our es-
timator with those of the success of two localization attacks. The findings show that
our estimator provides reasonable or conservative estimates of the location privacy
level.
3.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, we have observed a privacy paradigm shift. Following the
constant increase of mobile device users and location-based services (LBS), user
sensitive data is not only shared with friends and acquaintances, but also with com-
panies, which provide these services. However, users are not always aware of this
privacy issue and they often do not have enough information to properly assess risks
and benefits of the use of LBS [12]. We are in a privacy paradox as described in [3].
In this paper, Barnes discusses about privacy issues in a context involving teenagers
and social networks. A user can reveal a lot of personal information about herself on
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a social network. This user obviously thinks that her data is adequately protected
according to the privacy settings she chooses. She takes care about her privacy and
does not want to disclose her private information to people she does not know on this
social network. However, her personal data can be sold to third parties or explored
for a variety of goals (e.g., profiling, targeted advertising) by the social network itself
meaning that there is probably no privacy any more. Analyzing user information on
social network is not the only way to obtain personal data about users. For instance,
we can easily extract sensitive user information by exploring the metadata of user’s
photos shared online and performing attacks on them as demonstrated in [21]. There
also exist other subtle ways to infer user’s personal information, such as analyzing
user’s locations collected by a LBS. In the context of location privacy, Krumm [14]
describes the main computational threats. According to these threats, various infer-
ence attacks can be performed by an adversary to reveal user sensitive information,
such as home place, gender, tastes and much more as indicated in [8]. In order to
deal with a privacy threat, user locations must be protected by using an adapted
location privacy preserving mechanism. These mechanisms belong to different types
of location alterations, such as location obfuscation, location perturbation, location
confusion and location suppression as described in detail in [6]. A large number of
location privacy metrics, presented in the literature, can accurately evaluate the
level of protection provided by different location privacy preserving mechanisms by
taking into account precise threat models as well as specific inference attacks per-
formed by an adversary. To the best of our knowledge, there is no metric that can
estimate the level of location privacy on the sole basis of the altered locations sent
to a possible adversary. In addition, existing metrics do not take into account spatial
and temporal privacy choice of the user.
To address this issue, we propose a spatio-temporal estimator enabling to ap-
proximate the level of location privacy and that only takes as input spatial and
temporal uncertainties generated when a location privacy preserving mechanism is
applied on the raw data in order to alter and protect them. Moreover, the estima-
tor is user-oriented because it takes into consideration privacy choice of the user as
parameters or could automatically define them by exploring the mobility behavior
of the user. We consider that extracting spatio-temporal uncertainties from location
alterations is crucial to estimate the level of location privacy. In the context of a
stream of locations, most of location privacy preserving mechanisms, which modify
the space dimension of a location, can also have an impact on the time dimension
of the location(s) of this stream. Consequently, it is crucial to take into account
these two types of uncertainties in the computation of a location privacy estimate.
In order to properly evaluate this estimator, we compare its results and those of
the performance of two localization attacks according to specific location privacy
preserving mechanisms applied on user raw locations. This comparison enables to
highlight if our privacy estimator can reasonably estimate the privacy level by only
analyzing uncertainties resulting from the alterations produced after the application
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of a protection mechanism on raw data. For the experiments, we use a Nokia dataset
containing real mobility traces of 185 users as precisely described in [16]. We choose
three types of location privacy preserving mechanisms presented in [8] and [13]: the
sampling, the Gaussian perturbation and the spatial cloaking. We also decide to
evaluate the success of the two following localization attacks: the discovery of the
most frequently visited places of a user (i.e., user’s zones of interest) and the dis-
covery of user’s home place. This paper has three main contributions: presenting a
new spatio-temporal location privacy estimator, describing the computation of the
spatio-temporal uncertainties resulting from location alterations and evaluating our
estimator with real user traces.
The paper is structured as follows. We start by describing the definitions and
modeling of the main entities of our work in Section 3.2 providing the foundation
to introduce the location privacy estimator in Section 3.3. Section 3.3.1 presents
how spatial and temporal uncertainties are computed after applying three types of
location privacy preserving mechanism on raw locations. In Section 3.4, we present
in detail the evaluation as well as the obtained results in the context of localization
attacks. Section 3.5 provides an overview of the existing location privacy metrics and
highlights the links between these metrics and our estimator. Finally, we summarize
the most relevant findings and present the future work in Section 3.6.
3.2 Definitions and modeling
This section describes the definitions and modeling of the main entities required to
introduce the location privacy estimator.
3.2.1 User and raw locations
We consider a user who moves in a two dimensional space and owns a mobile de-
vice. This device enables to obtain raw locations via an embedded Global Position-
ing System (GPS) or a WiFi Positioning System (WPS) in order to locate itself.
The history of the successive raw locations of the user stored in the device is a
sequence L = 〈loc1, loc2, · · · , locn〉, where loci = (φ, λ, t) is a 3-item tuple represent-
ing a unique location in which φ, λ ∈ R are respectively a latitude and a longitude
and t ∈ N is the time when the location was captured. We use the notation loc.φ,
loc.λ and loc.t to designate specific parts of loc below. In order to ensure that
locations are mostly caught in a regular manner, the duration between two suc-
cessive locations in L does not exceed a constant ∆tlimit. Let loci and loci+1 ∈ L,
loci+1.t− loci.t ≤ ∆tlimit.
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3.2.2 Location privacy preserving mechanism, altered
locations and spatio-temporal location uncertainties
A location privacy preserving mechanism is applied on the raw locations of a user
in order to protect them and to ensure her location privacy. There exist two main
mechanisms to preserve user location privacy: anonymizing the identity of a user
and altering the sequence containing user raw locations before sharing them with
third-party entities such as LBS. In this paper, we only focus our attention on the
second mechanism. Following this, we introduce a function called protect(L) that
modifies the sequence of user raw locations passed as a parameter by using a specific
location privacy preserving mechanism. This function returns an altered sequence
of locations that are sent to a third party entity, which can be seen as an untrusted
component. This sequence is called La = 〈loca1 , loca2 , . . . , locam〉. Applying a loca-
tion privacy preserving mechanism on the sequence containing all raw locations L
also generates spatial and temporal location uncertainties, which vary depending on
the chosen mechanism. We define a zone z that describes a spatial location uncer-
tainty, expressed by a 3-item tuple z = (φ, λ,∆r) where φ, λ ∈ R represent a latitude
and a longitude respectively and ∆r ∈ R represents the radius of the zone. We also
introduce ∆t ∈ N that is a duration representing a temporal location uncertainty.
Therefore, a spatio-temporal location uncertainty, called u, is a 3-item tuple includ-
ing z and ∆t as well as the number of raw locations of L affected by an alteration,
simply called nb, such as u = (z,∆t, nb). In the following sections, we sometimes
use the notation u.z, u.∆t and u.nb to designate specific parts of u. Finally, we
introduce a function called uncertainties(L) that returns a sequence containing all
the uncertainties computed when the location privacy preserving mechanism was
applied on the sequence L. The output of this function is a sequence U containing
all uncertainties such as U = 〈u1, u2, · · · , um〉. It is important to note that the size
of U can differ from the size of La and also the size of L. The computation of un-
certainties only depends on the location privacy preserving mechanism applied on
the sequence of raw locations and how the mechanism operates. The beginning of
the next section will present how spatial and temporal uncertainties are computed
in the context of three location privacy preserving mechanisms.
3.3 Location privacy estimator
This section describes both the computation of spatio-temporal uncertainties and
the location privacy estimator. The first part is necessary to introduce the estimator,
which takes as input the spatio-temporal uncertainties.
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3.3.1 Computation of spatio-temporal uncertainties
There exist various location privacy preserving mechanisms that are described in
the following papers [2, 7, 8]. Amongst them, we only consider the three following
mechanisms such as the sampling, which will be performed in two ways, i.e., accord-
ing to a time window (TW) and a specific number of locations (LN), the Gaussian
perturbation as well as the spatial cloaking. All these mechanisms firstly affect the
spatial dimension of a location and can also have an impact on the temporal di-
mension of a location or a subsequence of locations if we consider the context of a
location stream. All new locations mentioned in the explanation below are obviously
considered as the altered locations of the location sequence La sent to a LBS. Dur-
ing the use of a LBS, the first three strategies are carried out in an oﬄine buffered
manner depending on the time window used to obfuscate the raw locations.
3.3.1.1 TW sampling
The sampling according to a time window is a location privacy preserving mecha-
nism enabling to summarize a subsequence of successive locations occurring during
a specific period of time into a single new location. In a concrete implementation, we
divide the entire user raw location sequence into several location subsequences and
compute new locations according to them. The latitude of the new location is sim-
ply the mean of all latitudes of the original locations of the subsequence and, in the
same manner, the longitude of this new location is the mean of all longitudes of the
original locations. Concerning the timestamp of the new location, we consider that it
corresponds to the timestamp of the location being in the middle of the subsequence
of successive locations, i.e, median value. Consequently, this location privacy pre-
serving mechanism generates both space and time alterations. We introduce tw ∈ N
being the duration of the time window. We also consider a subsequence Lsubi ∈ L
of successive raw locations such as Lsubi = 〈loc1, loc2, . . . , locj〉. This subsequence is
a TW sampling subsequence iff the two following conditions are met:
• locj.t− loc1.t <= tw
• locj+1.t− loc1.t > tw
Then, the new location locai computed from the subsequence Lsubi containing j
raw locations is a tuple that includes the following elements:
• locai .φ = 1j ×
∑j
i=1 loci.φ
• locai .λ = 1j ×
∑j
i=1 loci.λ
• locai .t = loci/2.t
Concerning all spatio-temporal uncertainties ui produced with the TW sampling,
we generate an uncertainty for each new location. The centroid of the spatial al-
teration ui.z corresponds to the new location and its radius ui.z.∆r is the distance
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between the new location and the farthest raw location of the subsequence. The tem-
poral alteration ui.∆t is the duration between the last and the first raw locations of
the subsequence. The number ui.nb of raw locations affected by the mechanism is
equal to the size of the subsequence Lsubi . Let a function called distance(loci, locj),
which computes and returns the distance between the two locations passed as pa-
rameters. In addition, let a function called farthest(locr, 〈loc1, loc2, . . . , locn〉), which
finds and returns the farthest location of the sequence of locations passed as a pa-
rameter from a given reference location locr. The several items below describe the
previous explanations with the subsequence of raw locations Lsubi introduced before.
• ui.z.φ = locai .φ
• ui.z.λ = locai .λ
• ui.z.∆r = distance(locai , farthest(locai , Lsubi))
• ui.∆t = locj.t− loc1.t
3.3.1.2 LN sampling
The sampling according to a number of successive locations is a location privacy
preserving mechanism enabling to summarize a specific number of locations into a
single new location. In a concrete implementation, we create several subsequences
having the same number of successive locations and we summarize each subsequence
into a single one new location. The latitude and the longitude of the new location
is computed in the same manner as mentioned above for the TW sampling. The
timestamp of this new location also corresponds to the timestamp of the raw location
being in the middle of the subsequence of locations. Consequently, both space and
time alterations are also generated when this mechanism is applied.
3.3.1.3 Gaussian perturbation
The Gaussian perturbation mechanism modifies each location of the sequence of the
user raw locations by bringing spatial noise to its latitude and longitude. The latitude
and the longitude of the raw location are changed according to two parameters: a
mean and a standard deviation, which are the latitude or the longitude of the raw
location and a value that may be expressed in meters respectively. Consequently,
this location privacy preserving mechanism only affects the spatial dimension of the
original location because the timestamp of each altered location remains unchanged.
We introduce ∆dφ and ∆dλ ∈ R corresponding to two distances (i.e., spatial noise)
randomly generated and added to the latitude and the longitude respectively in
order to spatially blur the original location. Each location loci, contained in the
sequence of user raw locations L, generates a new altered location that is sent to
the untrusted component and noted locai as follows:
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• locai .φ = loci.φ+∆dφ
• locai .λ = loci.λ+∆dλ
• locai .t = loci.t
In this context, the spatial alteration is computed for each new location such as
the centroid of the zone ui.z is locai and its radius is the distance between the locai
and the raw location loci. The temporal alteration ui.∆t is equal to 0 because the
timestamp of the new location remains the same. The number ui.nb is equal to 1
because the perturbation only affects one raw location. The spatial and temporal
alterations generated are summarized below:
• ui.z.φ = locai .φ
• ui.z.λ = locai .λ
• ui.z.∆r = distance(locai , loci)
• ui.∆t = locai .t− locai .t = 0
3.3.1.4 Spatial cloaking
As presented in [13], Krumm introduces an implementation of the spatial cloaking
algorithm that can be applied on a single user’s location dataset. In Krumm’s paper,
an ambiguity is created around a sensitive location (i.e., user’s home place in the
paper) by computing a specific cloaked region containing the user’s home place and
deleting all user raw locations being recorded in this region in order to protect the
privacy of the user. A cloaked region is a zone defined by a centroid and a radius.
The sensitive location is not the center of the computed cloaked region but it is
only contained in this region. Consequently, it is more difficult to find the original
sensitive location for an adversary in this case. In our implementation, we do the
same around all zones of interest found for a user, which are obviously her sensitive
areas. By applying this location privacy preserving mechanism on user raw data,
we only delete sensitive locations occurring in a cloaked region without altering
the previous or successive raw locations that are not located in cloaked regions.
Consequently, all locations being in the sequence La of altered locations and sent to
a LBS will be raw, such as locai = loci.
Spatial and temporal uncertainties are generated for the deletion of the raw
locations being in the cloaked regions. Let C the set containing k computed
cloaked regions and C[i] a cloaked region in which the raw locations of the sub-
sequence Lsubi = 〈loc1, loc2, · · · , locj〉 are located. Raw locations are sent to a LBS,
consequently, we also compute uncertainties for these raw locations. In the following
description, (1) describes the uncertainty of the deletion of raw locations and (2)
presents the uncertainty of a raw location. The number ui.nb of the first uncertainty
is equal to the number of raw locations deleted and contained in Lsubi while the
number of the second uncertainty corresponds to 1.
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• (1) 〈loc1, loc2, · · · , locj〉 ∈ C[i]
– ui.z.φ = C[i].φ
– ui.z.λ = C[i].λ
– ui.z.∆r = C[i].∆r
– ui.∆t = locj.t− loc1.t
• (2) loci /∈ C[i]
– ui.z.φ = locai .φ
– ui.z.λ = locai .λ
– ui.z.∆r = distance(locai , locai)
– ui.∆t = locai .t− locai .t
3.3.2 Estimator
The location privacy estimator takes as input all the uncertainties obtained when
a location privacy preserving mechanism is applied on the sequence of raw loca-
tions L and generates the altered sequence of locations La as described in Section 3.2
and 3.3.1. Since an uncertainty has spatial and temporal dimensions, the estimator
includes the privacy evaluations of these two dimensions. A top-down approach is
chosen to present the estimator. As detailed in Equation 3.1, the final result of this
estimator is the sum of each location privacy estimate Privacy(ui) related to each
spatio-temporal uncertainty ui contained in the sequence U multiplied by the num-
ber of raw locations affected by an alteration. Finally, the sum is divided by the
total number of raw locations n of L.
Privacye =
1
n
×
n∑
i=1
(Privacy(ui)× ui.nb) (3.1)
The computation of the estimate of the location privacy of a single spatio-temporal
uncertainty Privacy(ui) is described in Equation 3.2. This second equation is the
sum of spatial and temporal location privacy estimates of the uncertainty multiplied
by their respective factor (i.e., α for the spatial location uncertainty and β for the
temporal location uncertainty) and finally divided by the sum of these two factors
in order to normalize the final result. These two factors must be chosen according
to the importance of the spatial and the temporal dimensions for the user. If a user
considers that her spatial privacy is more important than her temporal privacy, α
could have more weight than the temporal factor β, knowing that β must be always
equal to 1− α.
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Privacy(ui) =
(α× Pspace(ui.z)) + (β × Ptime(ui.∆t))
α + β
(3.2)
The location privacy estimate of the spatial uncertainty Pspace(ui.z) is presented in
Equation 3.3, where the minimum between the area of the zone ui.z and the area of
a zone that we consider as a maximum area called zmax is divided by this maximum
area zmax. It means that, when this area is reached, the user cannot lose more privacy
because her privacy is fully ensured when this maximum area is reached.
Pspace(ui.z) =
min(Area(ui.z), Area(zmax))
Area(zmax)
=
min(ui.z.∆r
2, zmax.∆r
2)
zmax.∆r2
(3.3)
The location privacy estimate of the temporal uncertainty Ptime(ui.∆t) is pre-
sented in Equation 3.4, where ∆tmax is a time threshold beyond which the user
cannot lose more privacy. The equation is therefore the division of the minimum
between ui.∆t and ∆tmax by ∆tmax.
Ptime(ui.∆t) =
min(ui.∆t,∆tmax)
∆tmax
(3.4)
The two values, zmax and ∆tmax, should also be chosen by the user who is able to
know when she considers that the spatial and temporal dimensions of her privacy
are considered as entirely ensured. These two values could also be automatically
determined by studying the mobility behavior of the user.
3.4 Experiments and results
In this section, we present the chosen approach to evaluate the reliability of the
location privacy estimator in the context of localization attacks. To reach this goal,
we observe the correlation between the evolution of the privacy level predicted with
the estimator and the evolution of the success of the chosen localization attacks.
In the next sections, we first present the dataset used for the experiments, the
localization attacks as well as our findings at the end.
3.4.1 Dataset
We select a dataset provided by Nokia that contains real mobility data traces col-
lected in Switzerland (Europe) from October 2009 to March 2011. The collecting
process of this campaign is explained in detail in [16]. This dataset consists of real
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data traces of 185 users including GPS location data, GPS WLAN location data,
SMS, calls and several other data. Since the duration of the data collection varies
from one user to another, i.e., from less than one day to more than 500 days, we
decide to only retain 103 users of this dataset who met the following conditions. A
user must have a sequence of raw locations captured during a period of at least 300
days and a ∆tlimit (defined in Section 3.2) of 600 seconds on an average meaning
that the locations are captured in a frequent manner.
3.4.2 Localization attacks
From an adversary viewpoint, an inference attack aims at discovering sensitive in-
formation based on user locations. In our context, the adversary is the untrusted
component of the mobile device, i.e., a LBS. The data, which is used as input to
perform the attack, is the user locations sent to the LBS after applying a location
privacy preserving mechanism on raw data. Various threats and inference attacks
are presented in [8, 13, 14, 20]. We select two different localization attacks [20]
having different goals: discovering zones of interest of a user and discovering user’s
home place. We describe in detail their goal, the way they operate as well as the
quantification of their success in the next sections.
3.4.2.1 Discovering user’s zones of interest
This first localization attack is performed by an adversary that wants to highlight
all the most frequently visited places, i.e., zones of interest, of a user based on her
locations sent from the trusted component, i.e., operating system, to the untrusted
component, i.e., LBS. The zone of interest discovery process is entirely based on an
algorithm described in this paper [15], with the sole exception that the recent aspect
of a zone is not taken into account. In order to calculate the success of this attack,
we first compute the reference set of user’s zones of interest that is obtained when
this attack is performed on user’s raw data. Consequently, we decide to quantify
the success of this attack as the discovery area percentage of the reference set by
comparing it to that obtained with the altered sequence of locations. Firstly, we
consider a set Zr containing all reference zones of interest of the user obtained with
the sequence L. Secondly, we introduce Zb that is a set containing all user’s zones of
interest computed from the sequence La. Finally, we compare Zr and Zb to evaluate
the success of this inference attack. More specifically, we compute the discovery area
mean of all discovery areas linked to the reference zones of interest of the user as
described in Equation 3.5. In this Equation, we consider that Zr contains n reference
zones of interest such as Zr = {zi, zi+1, · · · , zn} and Zb has m zones of interest such
as Zb = {zj, zj+1, · · · , zm}. We simply use zi and zj below to refer a zone of Zr and
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a zone of Zb respectively. The result of the success of this attack is a value between
0 (i.e., no zone is discovered) and 1 (i.e., all zones are discovered) included.
successIA(Zr, Zb) =
1
n
×
n∑
i=1
discoveredAreaSum(zi, Zb) (3.5)
Equation 3.6 enables to compute the sum of all discovered areas of a specific
reference zone of interest zi by comparing it with all possible zones of interest of Zb.
discoveredAreaSum(zi, Zb) =
m∑
j=1
discoveredArea(zi, zj) (3.6)
Then, we compute the discovered area percentage of a reference zone, also scaled
from 0 to 1, in Equation 3.7. For this computation, we take into account if there
exists a discovered area between a reference zone of interest and a zone of interest of
Zb. Four cases are taken into consideration in order to compute this discovered area
percentage. Firstly, if there is no intersection or inclusion between the reference zone
and one of the zones of Zb, the discovered area percentage equals 0. Secondly, in the
case where there exists an intersection between the reference zone and one of the
zones of Zb, the discovered area percentage is equal to the area of the intersection
divided by the area of the reference zone. Thirdly, in the case where one of the
zones of Zb is fully included in the reference zone, we also compute the discovered
area percentage as mentioned previously. And fourthly, if the reference zone is fully
included in one of the zones of Zb, the discovered area percentage corresponds to the
area of the intersection divided by the area of the zone of Zb because the discovery
precision is reduced. Since the zone of interest discovery algorithm includes a merging
of clusters before the zone of interest discovery, there is no overlap amongst all
discovered user’s zones of interest. Considering this, we do not need to manage cases
where a same specific area of a reference zone is covered by two zones of Zb. Hence,
we can summarize these four cases in two cases only as detailed in the Equation 3.7
below.
discoveredArea(zi, zj) =
{
Area(zi)/Area(zj), if zi ⊂ zj
Area(zi ∩ zj)/Area(zi), otherwise
(3.7)
3.4.2.2 Discovering user’s home place
For this localization attack, an adversary wants to discover the user’s home place.
Two techniques are used to perform this attack. The first technique is based on
the discovery of user’s zones of interest with the process explained in the previous
section, while the second technique focuses on one heuristic. Regarding the first
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technique, we use the user’s zones of interest because the user’s home place is ob-
viously one of them. We start by computing the set containing all user’s zones of
interest, then we search the home place amongst all of them by highlighting the
most likely visited zone of interest of the set during a specific time slice, i.e., from
8:00 PM to 6:00 AM the next day. The second technique is inspired by a heuristic
called last destination, which is described in [13]. Last destination heuristic consists
in computing the last destination visited by a user, i.e., at the end of the day. In
our implementation, this place is discovered during the time slice starting at 0:00
AM and ending at 4:00 AM. The output of the second technique used is also a zone
defined by a centroid and a radius. In order to evaluate these two inference attacks
related to the user’s home place, we compute a reference user’s home place zone zi
with the user raw locations L. Similarly, we also extract zj, which is the user’s home
place computed from the altered sequence of locations La. We compute the success
of these inference attacks by using Equation 3.7 in order to evaluate the discovery
percentage between the reference zone zi and the other computed zone zj.
3.4.3 Experimental settings and results
In the previous sections, we presented all the key elements used for the experiments.
We now describe the experimental settings as well as the main findings.
3.4.3.1 Experimental settings
Regarding the location privacy estimator, we first choose equal factors for the com-
putation of the privacy of the spatial and temporal uncertainty meaning that α
and β have the same weight for all users, i.e., both are equal to 0.5. Secondly, we
consider that the radius of zmax equals a value of 1000 meters indicating that the
user considers that her spatial privacy is fully ensured when this radius is reached
or exceeded. This value is determined according to the dataset because users mainly
move in cities or areas where a sufficient number of individuals are living. In addi-
tion, we select a value of 24 hours for ∆tmax, also meaning that her temporal privacy
is entirely ensured if this duration is exceeded. Thirdly, several parameters are se-
lected for each location privacy preserving mechanism. Regarding the TW sampling,
we select 68 values for the time window ranging from 5 minutes to 5 days. About
the LN sampling, we choose 24 values ranging from 10 locations to 2500 locations
per sample. Concerning the Gaussian alteration, 16 standard deviation values are
selected ranging from 0.0001 (i.e., about 12 meters) to 0.05 (i.e., 5948 meters ap-
proximately). And finally, for the spatial cloaking, we take 6 values ranging from
100 meters to 10000 meters for the radius of the cloaked region. Regarding the lo-
calization attacks, we select the following parameters for the user’s zone of interest
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discovery: ∆dmax equals 60 meters and ∆tmin is 900 seconds (i.e., 15 minutes). A
value of 6 visits is chosen for the visitThreshold in order to highlight the frequent
user’s zones of interest. We found these values by exploring the Nokia dataset. The
time slices used for each inference attacks are described in the previous section. To
conclude, the chosen location privacy preserving mechanisms are those described in
Section 3.3.1.
3.4.3.2 Results
For each selected parameter of each location privacy preserving mechanism, we first
compute the mean of the success results of all users for each localization attack.
Then, we display the evolution of the privacy level according to the evolution of the
mean of the success results of all localization attacks in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. In
the four graphs, each dot corresponds to a specific parameter that evolves from the
lowest value to the highest value of the range of the parameters of each protection
mechanism described in the previous section. These graphs allow us to see the evo-
lution trend between the results of our location privacy estimator and the success
of the attacks. Regarding the Gaussian perturbation in Figure 3.2 on the left, the
maximum result given by the location privacy estimator is 0.5 because the temporal
uncertainty is equal to 0. The best results are obtained with the TW sampling and
the LR sampling because the curves show a negative linear correlation between the
success of the attacks and the privacy estimator results. Regarding the Gaussian
perturbation and the spatial cloaking, we observe exponential decay curves meaning
that our privacy estimator is pessimistic. In the context of Gaussian perturbation,
the performance of the localization attacks declines relatively quickly because the
added spatial noise has a high impact on the detection of the zone’s of interest.
In the context of spatial cloaking, the performance of the localization attacks de-
clines sharply because all zone’s of interest are considered as cloaked regions. Even
if Gaussian perturbation and spatial cloaking results present less accurate estimates
than those of TW and LR sampling, the obtained privacy estimates are conservative
in that they do not give a false sense of location privacy. This means that there is
no outlying curve (i.e., exponential curve) or outlier results such as a high success
probability of the localization attacks and a high location privacy estimate at the
same time.
3.5 Related work
Estimating location privacy is the central aspect of this paper. Therefore, this related
work presents a classification of existing privacy metrics found in the literature and
the possible links between them and our estimator at the end.
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Fig. 3.1: TW (left) and LR (right) sampling results.
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Fig. 3.2: Gaussian perturbation (left) and spatial cloaking (right) results.
3.5.1 Error-based metrics
To begin with the first category, Hoh and Gruteser use two main location privacy
metrics to evaluate a path perturbation algorithm they propose in [9]. The first lo-
cation privacy metric, called mean location privacy, computes the accuracy of the
estimation of each location contained in a user’s path by an adversary (i.e., the
expectation of distance error). It takes into account the difference between correct
and estimate locations as well as the probability of occurence of the estimate loca-
tion. In addition to this first metric, they also consider a second metric, called mean
location error aiming at evaluating the quality of service provided. Basically, this
metric helps to compute the location accuracy difference of each user’s paths (i.e.,
between the original and the observed location). In [19], Shokri et al. introduce a
new location privacy metric, called distortion-based metric. It evaluates the level of
distortion of a reconstructed trace of a user. The latter is obtained by applying the
reverse of the location preserving mechanism used to generate the observed trace.
The metric takes into account the probability of each possible reconstructed trace
as well as the sensitivity of the locations in terms of space and time because it may
directly have an influence on the user privacy. Shokri et al. also introduce a frame-
work for the analysis of location privacy preserving mechanisms including a metric
to evaluate the user’s location privacy in [20]. This metric, called correctness, enables
to quantify the correctness of the attack by computing the expected estimation error
of the distance between the true expected result and all the results contained in the
estimate distribution, which is the output of an attack. Moreover, other error-based
metrics are presented in [6, 17, 18].
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3.5.2 Uncertainty-based metrics
In [4], Beresford and Stajano use a metric computing the level of anonymity ensured
by a mix-zone by using the entropy. To summarize, an adversary is confronted with
a mapping issue including old and new pseudonyms taken by users in a mix-zone.
The entropy enables to compute the level of uncertainty in the mapping set and
quantify the number of users that we are not able to distinguish from each other.
Hoh et al. also introduce a privacy level measure called mean time to confusion
in [11]. It highlights the tracking time from which an adversary is no longer able to
find the next location sample with a sufficient certainty. In [5], Cheng et al. present
a framework enabling to control the location uncertainty aiming at preserving user
privacy. They also build a model and queries helping to reach this goal and introduce
two means of quantifying privacy. The first is the size of uncertainty region due to
the fact that the larger the region size, the higher the privacy. The second is based on
the location of the user and its link with sensitive regions such as an hospital or other
sensitive places related to the user. More formally, it computes the ratio between
the area of sensitive regions discovered (i.e., the intersection between the sensitive
regions and the area of the uncertainty of a location) and the area of the uncertainty
of a location. The higher the ratio, the lower the privacy. Finally, Ardagna et al.
present a metric called relevance that represents the relative accuracy loss of the
location when a location obfuscation is applied on a raw location in [1, 6]. This
metric only takes into account the geometric uncertainty generated by a location
obfuscation mechanism without defining the adversary’s goal and knowledge.
3.5.3 Score-based metrics
Hoh et al. evaluate the degree of privacy protection with two metrics in the context
of traffic monitoring in [10]. They consider that an adversary could try to infer the
user’s home and they evaluate the privacy obtained for different sampling frequen-
cies. The first metric focuses on the effectiveness of the detection by computing the
home identification rate (i.e., the number of correct estimated homes out of the total
number of correct homes) and the second metric computes the false positive (i.e., the
number of incorrect estimated homes out of the total number of estimated homes).
In [8], Gambs et al. evaluate the impact of different sanitization mechanisms on dif-
ferent means aiming at reaching the same adversary’s attack. More specifically, the
attack relates on detecting the user’s clusters. In order to evaluate this impact, they
use well-known metrics called precision and recall. In their analysis, the precision
is the number of correct points of interest divided by the total number of points of
interest returned by an attack and the recall is the number of area detected divided
by the total number of areas.
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To finish, there also exist other metrics such as k-anonymity and differential
privacy-based metrics as discussed in [6]. In this classification, our location privacy
estimator could clearly belong to the uncertainty-based category. The existing met-
rics mainly take into account the spatial dimension to compute the privacy while the
temporal dimension is equally important and can also be affected by a location pri-
vacy preserving mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, there is no user-oriented
location privacy metric using spatio-temporal uncertainties resulting from spatial
and temporal alterations applied on user raw locations.
3.6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have presented a location privacy estimator taking into account
spatial and temporal uncertainties, generated when a location privacy preserving
mechanism is applied on user raw data, as well as user privacy preferences. We also
introduce how to generate spatial and temporal uncertainties according to three
existing privacy mechanisms. We chose to evaluate it by comparing the results of
our estimator and those of the success of two localization attacks. This compari-
son showed that our estimator provides reasonable or conservative estimates of the
location privacy level. Future work could focus on implementing other location pri-
vacy preserving mechanisms and other localization attacks in order to have a better
overview of the behavior of the estimator. Then, we could also try to automatically
adapt zmax and ∆tmax to the mobility behavior of each user. Another interesting
work could be to add a weight to each uncertainty according to the degree of impor-
tance of the raw location(s) affected by an alteration in order to see if it increases
the accuracy of the results of the estimator. And finally, a last challenge could be to
adapt the computation of the location privacy with our estimator in realtime during
the use of a LBS on a mobile device.
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Abstract Mobility prediction is becoming one of the key elements of location-based
services. In the near future, it will also facilitate tasks such as resource management,
logistics administration and urban planning. To predict human mobility, many tech-
niques have been proposed. However, existing techniques are usually driven by large
volumes of data to train user mobility models computed over a long duration and
stored in a centralized server. This results in inherently long waiting times before
the prediction model kicks in. Over this large training data, small time bounded user
movements are shadowed, due to their marginality, thus impacting the granularity
of predictions. Transferring highly sensitive location data to third party entities also
exposes the user to several privacy risks. To address these issues, we propose Mo-
biDict, a realtime mobility prediction system that is constantly adapting to the
user mobility behaviour, by taking into account the movement periodicity and the
evolution of frequently visited places. Compared to the existing training approaches,
our system utilises less data to generate the evolving mobility models, which in turn
lowers the computational complexity and enables implementation on handheld de-
vices, thus preserving privacy. We test our system using mobility traces collected
around Lake Geneva region from 168 users and demonstrate the performance of our
approach by evaluating MobiDict with six different prediction techniques. We find
a satisfactory prediction accuracy as compared to the baseline results obtained with
70% of the user dataset for majority of the users.
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Fig. 4.1: Traditional Prediction Systems vs. MobiDict. The process on the top
depicts the traditional mobility prediction approach, while the process chain shown
at the bottom gives an overview of our technique.
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, we have seen a rapid proliferation in the number of applications of-
fering location-based services. Popular applications such as Google Now,1 collect and
utilise sensitive data such as, location history, agenda and contact list, to infer and
assist users in everyday activities. Another well-known application, Moves2 enables
to automatically identify the transportation mode from collected data and display
relevant information on the fly, such as the number of burnt calories. On the similar
lines, Google Maps is equipped to predict where the user wants to go next based
on the location history.3 As evident from the above examples, mobility prediction is
becoming a key paradigm of location-based services.
Problem. The services described above, demand a large volume of data in order
to provide relevant mobility predictions. Existing works in this domain utilise more
than 70% of the entire dataset, exclusively for the training purpose [1, 10, 21] as
depicted in Figure 4.1 under conventional approach. The duration of the datasets,
used in the literature usually lasts for more than a year, which amounts for a con-
siderable time, explicitly for model training [19, 34]. This results in a substantial
waiting time until the model is able to produce usable predictions in real deployment
scenarios.
Another issue associated with learning on a large dataset is the shadowing effect
on small user movements that appears insignificant, but affects the granularity of
predictions. Existing works attempting to address the above problem link user be-
haviour with forecasting models, which on the hindsight only results in statistical
1 Google Now: https://www.google.com/intl/fr/landing/now/
2 Moves: https://www.moves-app.com.
3 Google Maps Predictions: https://www.searchenginejournal.com
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prediction models without truly capturing the inherent nature associated with user
movements [8].
Collecting a substantial quantity of user locations also leads to a privacy issue.
A malicious entity can infer sensitive information related to the user, making it
relatively easy to discover a particular place by using simple heuristiques [12] and
identifying the user [6]. The algorithmic cost of making predictions on a mobile de-
vice in a real deployment scenario is relatively high due to the expensive ensemble
techniques, combined with complex and extreme learning models, which makes it
essential to have a centralized server [14].
Contributions. The fundamental goal of our approach is to restrict the amount
of data required for training the mobility models, to small time windows usually
lasting for a couple of weeks. Our solution analyzes the substantive user mobility
behavioural changes in realtime and incorporates the associated changes to adapt
the length of the time window required for training. We explore the evolution of
the frequently visited places by the user according to the time and the associated
periodicities among those places as a means to quantify user behaviour and couple
it with the prediction process to give rise to quick realtime predictions as shown
in Figure 4.1 under proposed approach. This process takes place in realtime, over
sequential location data that is operational on a mobile device, thus ensuring that
no personal location data is transferred to the location-based services. However,
in order to utilise these services, only the predicted locations can be shared to
maintain the utility/privacy tradeoff space. More specifically, the paper makes the
three contributions listed hereafter.
• We propose MobiDict, a mobility prediction system on realtime sequential data
in order to forecast user location. This system adapts user mobility model con-
stantly, according to the user behavioural changes. Consequently, utilising con-
siderably less data as compared to the conventional approaches of formulating
predictive models and achieving satisfactory prediction accuracy.
• The lower computational complexity, resulting due to the lesser data involved
leads to implementation on hand held devices feasible. Thus, eliminating the need
to transfer highly sensitive user raw data to third party entities and ensuring
user privacy. This enables to avoid the usual long and strenuous training period
involved in generating the prediction models, obtaining quicker predictions.
• The reactive zone of interest computation scheme, incorporated in MobiDict,
helps to model the mobility behaviour, restricted to small time periods as com-
pared to modelling on long duration data, where the true nature of user behaviour
is lost. This enables to make predictions during those small periods with higher
accuracies as compared to the conventional approaches.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses research ef-
forts similar to ours and Section 4.3 presents our system model and introduces some
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formal definitions and notations used in the paper. Then, Section 4.4 describes
our approaches of quantifying user behaviour. In Section 4.5, we present the dif-
ferent prediction techniques used in the MobiDict system. Section 4.6 presents
MobiDict as a whole, showing how the elements presented in the two previous
sections fit together to make up the complete system. We discuss the results of a
thorough experimental evaluation of our approach in Section 4.7, based on mobility
traces collected on our campus by Nokia Research, from 184 users, between October
2009 and March 2011. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes the paper by sketching future
research directions around MobiDict.
4.2 Related work
We breakdown the literature review in areas concerning mobility modelling, and
mobility prediction.
A domain of works apply sequential mining to extract frequently visited regions
with mean travel time, to formulate the mobility models [4, 26]. The above ap-
proaches rely on clustering visits to form a visit region. We reviewed several location
based clustering works [2, 9, 12, 18, 33]. As opposed to their approach of analysing
the entire dataset to cluster the individual regions, we form the models by obtaining
the zones in realtime, and characterising the mobility behaviour, dependent on the
evolution of the number of zones with time. There exists several studies regarding
stream data clustering including real-time analysis (see [5, 16]) but they fail to re-
alistically monitor the evolution of the zones according to time. Other domain of
this work falls under modelling the movements as a whole, such as the continuous-
time random-walk (CTRW) [25], Levy-flight nature [29] and daily activity analysis
and dissimilarities within them as presented in [17]. Although the above models aid
in predicting human mobility, the mobility models derived by oﬄine analysis are
computationally expensive to be applied to raw location data thus not feasible for
making swift online predictions.
Detecting periodicity in time series data is a widely studied problem to predict
trends in the data stream. [28] computes the periodicity by analysing the user’s
visit frequency of places and aggregating total time spent at those places followed
by applying Fourier transform to this series. This knowledge is used to predict
the users next visit as shown in [3, 24]. However, the analysis are based on the
computations on the complete dataset, as opposed to our work in real time location
log preprocessing and retrieving non-stationary and non-frequent periodic patterns
lasting only for small time intervals. We did not find existing literature to formulate
prediction models in realtime based on periodicities, whose instances may be shifted
or distorted.
4.3 System Model 75
We focus the literature review regarding prediction techniques that first formu-
late a mobility model and consequently use it to make predictions. More specif-
ically, prediction tasks that address the task of forecasting the next user move
based on the users current location. The results of the works, based on this tech-
nique [8, 8, 15, 21], show that it is possible to attain accuracies in the range of
60-80%. Several approaches have been used to make the predictions, ranging from
Markov based predictors, neural networks, dynamic bayesian schemes, decision trees
having several tradeoffs as compared to each other for next place prediction as sum-
marised in [22, 27]. The learning based predictors fall under the category of predictive
modelling, association analysis and cluster analysis. The next place predictions de-
rived using the above approaches by having a trained model mapped to 70% of the
dataset are presented in the works of [1, 30, 31]. [7] discusses several approaches for
learning over sequential data including sliding window methods, conditional random
fields and graph transformer networks. Further, Kalman filter based prediction ap-
proaches cannot be applied to non-stationary data, involves higher complexity and
thus results in higher latency as discussed in [20]. Our approach falls under learning
over streaming location data using a recurrent sliding window technique where we
adapt the window length for training depending on the mobility behaviour.
4.3 System Model
Hereafter, we introduce our system model, together with formal definitions and no-
tations used in the paper.
User and Locations. We assume a moving user carrying a mobile device whose
locations are tracked by Global Positioning System (GPS) and/or Wi-Fi positioning
system (WPS). The device regularly receives user’s raw location logs as a sequence
L = 〈loc1, loc2, . . . , locn〉, where loci = (φ, λ, t) is a 3-item tuple representing a loca-
tion in the format (latitude,longitude,timestamp). In the rest of the paper, we use
the notation loc.φ, loc.λ and loc.t for the tuple elements.
Zone of Interest. Everyday activities of a user might consist of some location
points that she might find useful or spend considerable amount of time. A Zone of
Interest (ZOI) is a similar concept that depicts a region encapsulating several of
these points. A ZOI is not strongly bounded to any location due to the temporal
constraints. It begins when the human activity at a location is initiated and ends
when the activity decays. At this stage the ZOI is tied up to the relocated location.
User Mobility Model. Collecting real-life mobility data of users, which is com-
plex, yields mobility traces of individuals. Statistical analysis of these trajectories
unfolds hidden patterns to turn this raw data into mobility knowledge. This results
76 4 MobiDict
in abstracting away from the cluttered data and discover general movement patterns
respective to individuals. Simply put, mobility models are these generalisations of
movement patterns representing a user.
4.4 Mobility behaviours
4.4.1 Zone of Interest Evolution
This section highlights the complete process of discovering the ZOIs and their evo-
lution which forms an integral part of the user mobility behaviour.
4.4.1.1 ZOI Discovery
The discovery of ZOIs can be divided into three distinct steps. We read the user
dataset sequentially so as to simulate the realtime streaming of user locations.
Cluster Discovery. A cluster intuitively contains, locations having common spa-
tial and temporal characteristics. ∆dmax ∈ R and ∆tmin ∈ N represents a distance
in meters and a minimum time threshold respectively. The two following functions
are considered: centroid(〈loc1, loc2, . . . , locn〉) computing and returning the centroid,
which maps the individual locations into the geometrical centroid based on the set
distance, and distance(loci, locj), which computes and returns the Euclidian distance
between the two locations loci and locj.
We consider a subsequence l′ of L that contains n successive locations, such that
l′ = 〈locsi , locsi+1 , . . . , locei〉. This subsequence l′ becomes a cluster iff the following
conditions 4.2 and 4.2 are satisfied:4
∀k ∈ {si+1, . . . , ei}, (4.1)
distance(centroid(locsi , . . . , lock−1), lock) ≤ ∆dmax
loclei .t− loclsi .t ≥ ∆tmin (4.2)
From this cluster, defined as l′, we can extract its centroid centroid = (φ, λ) that
is the barycenter of all φ and λ of the locations contained in l′, in which φ ∈ R is
a latitude and λ ∈ R is a longitude. We can also compute the radius of the cluster
∆r ∈ R that is the maximum distance between the centroid of the cluster and a
location of the set of locations extracted from l′. We define a cluster as a 4-item
tuple c = (φ, λ,∆r, l′). The notation c.centroid is used to designate the centroid of
4 This clustering process is inspired by a technique called DT cluster and presented in [12].
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Fig. 4.2: ZOI Construction from Cluster of Location Points.
the cluster c. Hereafter, C = {c1, . . . , ci, . . . , cm} is the set of m clusters associated
with the user, based on her sequence of locations. It is important to note that C
must meet the following condition 4.3:
∀ci, cj ∈ C, ci.l′ ∩ cj.l′ = ∅ (4.3)
This first part of the clustering process is based on a well-known technique de-
scribed in [12] and presented as density-time cluster (DT cluster).
Conditions 4.2 and 4.2 do not guarantee pairwise disjointness of clusters that is
in turn used to form cluster groups as explained further.
Cluster Group. A cluster group includes all the clusters that can be assembled
iff an intersection exists between these clusters. Thus, two clusters ci, cj ∈ C are
included in the same cluster group g iff the next condition in Equation 4.4 is met:
distance(ci.centroid, cj.centroid)
− (ci.∆r + cj.∆r) < 0 (4.4)
A cluster group is a 4-item tuple g = (φ, λ,∆r, {c1, c2, ...}), where φ ∈ R, λ ∈ R,
∆r ∈ R, {c1, c2, . . .} ∈ C are latitude, longitude, radius and array of clusters consti-
tuting g respectively. The centroid of the cluster group is defined by (φ, λ), being the
mean of all the centroids of the clusters included in g. The following set G contains
all the discovered cluster groups, such as G = {g1, g2, . . .}.
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ZOI. A ZOI is a frequently and recently visited zone by a user in everyday life.
We introduce two constants visitThreshold ∈ N and maxTimeDuration ∈ N rep-
resent a maximum threshold of visits and a maximum duration threshold between
two dates respectively, and a variable called minV isitNumber ∈ N, which repre-
sents a minimum number of visits. Then, size(g) is a function that computes and
returns the number of clusters of the cluster group g, meanVisitNumber(G) is a
function computing and returning the mean number of visits amongst the set of
all cluster groups G and timeDuration(G) is a function that returns the duration
between the current date of the system and the last visited date of the cluster group
contained in G. meanVisitNumber(G) returns values that dynamically change over
time according to the mobility behaviour of the user due to the realtime nature
of the process. minV isitNumber is equal to the value returned by meanVisitNum-
ber(G) until reaching the visitThreshold, which is the maximum number of visits
that converts a cluster group into a ZOI. A cluster group g ∈ G is transformed into
a ZOI z iff the conditions of Equations 4.5 and 4.6 are satisfied:
size(g) ≥ minV isitNumber
| minV isitNumber = meanV isitNumber(G)
∧ minV isitNumber <= visitThreshold (4.5)
timeDuration(G) <= maxTimeDuration (4.6)
A ZOI z is formally, a four item tuple z = (φ, λ,∆r, g), where φ ∈ R, λ ∈ R,
∆r ∈ R and g are the latitude, longitude, radius and the cluster group becoming a
ZOI respectively. The tuple (φ, λ) is the centroid of z computed from group g. The
set Z is finally the set of ZOIs of the user, such that Z = {z1, z2, · · · , zn} as shown
in Figure 4.2.
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4.4.1.2 ZOI Evolution
A user’s ZOIs may change over time and space. Figure 4.3 shows an example of
ZOI updates occurring over time for a certain user having location data of more
than 500 days. We see a surge of ZOI updates at the beginning, minor variations
intermediary and attains a flat tail towards the end. Monitoring this trend of ZOI
evolution according to time reflects the changing user behaviours. Thus the number
of ZOIS and their evolution can be used to quantify user mobility behaviour.
4.4.2 Periodicity of Movement
Human mobility is characterised by a high degree of periodicity. Detecting these
periodic behaviours can assist to generate quick predictions, evading the complex
training procedure. However, one of the challenges is to identify periods that do
not repeat precisely at the same times, in addition to having multiple interlaced
patterns in the non-stationary time series. As a result, standard period estimation
techniques such as autocorrelation or Fourier transform cannot be directly applied.
We describe the steps involved to accurately detect the movement periodicity below.
Uniform Location Sampling. One of the fundamental drawbacks of the peri-
odicity detection algorithms is the prerequisite that the incoming location stream
should be uniformly sampled. However, location logs coming in at non uniform rate
is common in communications due to imperfect geolocation sensors or network un-
availability to stream logs online. When the sampling is nonuniform, a common
technique is to resample/interpolate the signal onto a uniform grid. We use semi-
variance interpolation on the incoming stream using moving average construction.
In a nutshell, the semivariance conceals the incoming data stream about the spa-
tial variance at a specified distance. We find that Gaussian model provides accurate
fitting to the missing data after calculating the semivariance. The semivariance along
with Gaussian model allows to model the similarity between points in a filed as a
function of changing distance. The semivariance can be mathematically expressed
in Equation 4.7 as:
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δh =
1
2Nh
∑
Nh
(R.
√
(δx. cosθ)2) + δ2y)
2 (4.7)
where δh is maximum distance separation among the location logs, Nh are the num-
ber of points separated by the distance h. The semivariance is than the sum of
the squared difference between these values. To calculate the distance, we utilise
equirectangular distance approximation, which is faster as compared to the Harver-
sine formula. In addition, as the distances traversed are usually small, the perfor-
mance is superior compared to great circle distance approximation.
Dealing with Non Stationary data. Applying signal processing techniques,
directly to estimate the user movements and periodicity to non-stationary data puts
forth several challenges. The interpolation step is followed by taking the first differ-
ence of the streaming interpolated location logs. This step brings forth the trends
present in the movement data by exposing the variance for further processing. Next,
in order to estimate the magnitude of day-to-day variations, log transform is applied
to the series. The rolling variance applied to the logged series, results in a series of
constant variance.
Periodicity Estimation. For the final step of the periodicity detection, we com-
pute the rolling autocorrelation over the precessed stream. Next, we calculate the
Power Spectral Density (PSD) to get the candidate periods and feed them into the
autocorrelation estimator so as to rectify false alarms resulting due to the spectral
leakage. The robust autocorrelation routine results in the computation of statisti-
cally significant period(s) contained in the non-stationary and noisy location stream.
The complete processing chain is shown in Figure 4.4. Through this process, we are
able to detect weekly periodic patterns. We focus on estimating short repetitive pat-
terns and detecting larger periods such as holiday vs. non holiday pattern is beyond
the scope due to the data limitations we impose.
The above two demeanours, i.e., evolution of ZOIs and movement periodicities,
serve as a basis to decipher user mobility behaviours, which play a key role to alter
the realtime model formulation and assist in prediction.
4.5 Mobility Predictors
In this section, we describe the different families of prediction techniques used to
forecast the next user location. We specify the procedure involved in training these
predictors in the context of mobility forecasting. In the plethora of predictor options
available, we select the ones that have been already proved successful for spatiotem-
poral prediction by published works [11, 21]. The starting time at a ZOI and the
total spent duration serve as input features to the prediction techniques. The pre-
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diction task is then modelled to perform one-step-ahead forecasting on the basis of
available data gathered in a time window.
Mobility Markov Chain. A Mobility Markov Chain (MMC) model is described
by a state-transition matrix including the user’s ZOIs, which are the states, and all
the transitions amongst them. These transitions, collected during a training period,
feed the model. We assume a set S of n states discovered at a current time t such
that S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} knowing that S = Z. This set of states is the baseline
to build the matrix. Then, by exploring the user’s raw locations, we can extract a
sequence of vectors V , where one vector contains two successive states, visited by the
user such that V = 〈(s1, s2), (s2, s2) . . . , (s1, sn)〉. The matrix is then filled according
to the sequence V by computing the transition probability of each vector included
in V . The transition probability to move from si to sj is expressed in Equation 4.8
as follows:
psi,sj = P (sj|si) (4.8)
Then, the predicted next state is the most likely state snext found on the basis
of all computed transition probabilities of the matrix line of the current state sc as
expressed in Equation 4.9:
∀si ∈ S : predsnext = argmax(psi,sc , psi+1,sc , . . . , psn,sc) (4.9)
Figure 4.5 shows the creation of a MMC model of a user as well as the state-
transition matrix based on the evolution of the ZOIs of a user. Unlike the 1-order
Markov chain, which is described above, the 2-order Mobility Markov Chain is
slightly different, as the previous state is also taken into account in the predic-
tion process, which increases the prediction accuracy as presented in [13].
Classification Based Learning. Predicting the next location can be viewed
as a classification task, where the training and the discrete output class consist of
the currently computed and active ZOIs according to the user behaviour. This set
consists of permanent zones and temporary zones that may vanish with time. Thus,
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every learnt model bounded by a particular time instant consists of ZOIs that may
not be active in prediction models formulated at another time instant. We employ
an elementary 1-NN based classifier that uses a training point closest to the query
point to predict the output label. If Xi = {{xp}, {xt}} is the input vector consisting
of permanent and temporary zones {xp} and {xt} respectively, the training set con-
sists of {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ...(xn, yn)}, where yi is the next zone, traversed according
to the time series sequence. Thus, the task here is to determine ynew for xnew that
is performed by finding the closest point xj to xnew, w.r.t. the euclidean distance.
Artificial Neural Network. In the ANN model, the training patterns are highly
dependent on the training window length to model the forecasting as predictive
regression problem. Each pattern will consist of the number of ZOI movements
recorded in the training window. pattern1 = x1, x2, ...xn, pattern2 = x2, x3, ...xn+1
correspond to the number of input nodes, where each node represents a pattern
collected for a day, thus training the model using the sliding time window approach.
The model consists of one output node and the number of nodes in the hidden layer
is determined empirically. The 3 layered feed-forward neural network with back
propagation can be represented in Equation 4.10 as below:
yi = f(g((
∑
j
wij.inj)− θj)) (4.10)
where wij is the weight vector, θ is the bias, inj is the input layer representing the
movement patterns for a day.
Recurrent Neural Networks. Recurrent neural networks have a memory layer
that is advantageous to model long term time series data, by assisting the inputs to
be correlated with input/output pairs, which even lie beyond the current window
length. Similar to the previous description, we use a three layered architecture where
the hidden layer is recurrently connected to itself. The network can be represented
in Equation 4.11 as below:
yi = w2.σ(w1.x
i + wrh
i−1) (4.11)
where σ is a non-linear transfer function, here, we use sigmoid function. w1, w2 are
the connecting weights and wr are the recurrent weights.
Fourier Extrapolation. We also test MobiDict with Fourier extrapolation,
which is capable of deconstructing the time series as a polynomial base, with
bounded randomness and a cyclic component. The frequency domain, due to its
nature, transforms the time bounded user visits in time domain into fixed cycles.
The extrapolation yields a de-noised copy of the movements observed in the history.
Thus performing prediction over a time window of t time units. Here, the high fre-
quency components are used to estimate movements over regular ZOIs and the low
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frequency components, to predict irregular user movements restricted to small time
bounds.
We implement the above machine learning prediction techniques using PyBrain [32]
and the MMC models are generated within a Cocoa application where the entire
realtime process is implemented.
4.6 The MobiDict System
In this section, we present the MobiDict prediction system design and illustrate
how the mobility behaviours are coupled with the predictors to produce the next
location prediction in realtime. The overview of our approach is presented in Fig-
ure 4.1, which depicts the fundamental elements involved in our system. As described
in Section 4.4, we present two approaches to quantify user behaviour. Due to the
nature of MMC, movement periodicity cannot be directly integrated into the model,
thus we base MMC only on the ZOI evolution aspect. However, in case of the other
machine learning techniques, we involve the periodicity associated with the move-
ment within the evolving ZOIs. We perform a systematic evaluation of MobiDict
by testing it with all the described prediction approaches to analyse the prediction
accuracies. We now describe how the MMC and the machine learning based sys-
tem individually integrate the respective mobility behaviours to produce next place
predictions. The common goal being, formulation of a robust predictive system on
streaming location data.
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4.6.1 MMC-based System
A Mobility Markov Chain model only depends on the states and the transition
probabilities amongst them. This property bears similarity with the evolving ZOIs of
the user over time representing the behaviour. Therefore, to implement MobiDict,
we combine the evolution of ZOIs with the creation of the user’s MMC model.
Figure 4.5 presents an intuitive description of what is a ZOI significant update,
which basically triggers the adaptation of the user model every time there is a new
significant update. This preserves the relevance of the user mobility model.
Figure 4.6 shows the successive training windows, the ZOI updates and the up-
dates of the mobility model. The training window is initiated when there is a sig-
nificant ZOI update and ends when a certain threshold is exceeded. An update is
considered as significant when either a new ZOI is added to the ZOI set or removed
from it under the assumption that this set contains more than one ZOI. At each
update, the user’s MMC model is rebuilt according to the entire state sequence S
that is updated in realtime by taking into account user’s raw locations. As seen in
Figure 4.3, many updates are sometimes accumulated, in such cases, the mean time
between two updates is used to compute the threshold of the training window. The
next expected update is triggered by adding the mean time between all the past
updates umean. The next threshold tnext can be formally expressed in Equation 4.12
as below, in which datec is the current date of the system:
tnext = datec + umean +
umean
2
(4.12)
If this threshold is exceeded without having detected the expected significant up-
date, the training window is interrupted. At the end of the training window, the
MMC model is also updated in order to take into account the entire state sequence
collected during the window as well as the one formulated during previous training
windows.
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4.6.2 Machine Learning-based System
The system should take into consideration the recent movement histories and the
associated periodicities in order to produce an updatable mobility model. The prob-
lem can be formulated as a non-stationary time series prediction, where the model
needs to be retrained according to variations in the incoming data stream. In our
case are the user movements and the variations are linked to changing periodicities.
We empirically determine that the model accuracy is affected for an autocorrelation
index change of 0.2 and greater. This serves as a trigger for periodic and incremen-
tal model retraining, where the batch size consists of movement histories, with the
changed periodicity bounds.
We first describe the realtime processing chain, as shown in Figure 4.4 to estimate
the changing periodicities. As described in Section 4.4, we perform Fourier analysis
that expresses the function, as summation of individual periodic elements. Further,
we compute the power spectral density to find the strength at each frequency, and
only the dominant frequency components are selected. The periodogram highlights
the periodicities lasting for short and medium terms, on the other hand, autocorrela-
tion is suitable for large period detection. We combine the approaches so as to filter
out harmonics and get refined candidate periods. This can be formally expressed in
Equation 4.13 as below:
P (
Ck
N
) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√N
N−1∑
n=0
x(n).e
−j.2pi.c.n
N
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, c = 0, 1...
N − 1
2
(4.13)
where Ck are the strength encodings at a given frequency k, x(n) are the spectral
coefficients associated with the sinusoids and N is the total number of strength
encodings at a particular frequency.
We track the periodicity continually, following the above approach. Regarding
the training phase, as depicted in Figure 4.7, the ZOI evolution is tracked to form a
feature vector representing the movements across them. The other features consist
of the starting time and stay time at a particular zone. The extracted feature vectors
are fed to the predictors described in Section 4.5. The periodicity feature is tracked
to monitor if it changes by 0.2. At this point, the training reinitiates to reform the
mobility model, taking the new periodicities, thereby adapting to current behaviour
of the user.
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Fig. 4.8: Realtime Evaluation Scheme.
4.7 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we demonstrate the experimental results of our approach based on
the Nokia data set [19] consisting of mobility traces, collected from 184 users in
Switzerland from October 2009 to March 2011. The participants consisted of uni-
versity students and employees with a mean duration of 14 months comprising of
more than 10 million location points. Amongst the users of this dataset, we only
select 168 of them having a dataset duration of at least 30 days.
4.7.1 Experimental settings
Here, we describe the selection of users from the dataset, as well as the choices
made, behind the algorithmic parameters. In order to obtain the ZOIs of a user, we
set a value of 60 meters for ∆dmax, 900 seconds for ∆tmin to cluster the individual
locations with respect to space and time. The visitThreshold parameter is set to
6 visits and the maxTimeDuration of 3 months. In order to determine the above
parameters, we analyse the complete dataset to compute the average of the mean
number of visits of all cluster groups of each user per month. This choice was based
on selecting users having a dataset duration of at least 30 days. In order to simulate
realtime incoming data, we read the data-points sequentially according to the logged
timestamps.
4.7.2 Real-time Evaluation Scheme
Figure 4.8 describes the evaluation approach, followed to compute the prediction
accuracy over time for each user. This scheme shows the successive training windows,
as well as the consecutive evaluation windows. In the case of the 1-order and 2-order
MMC, this trigger is a significant update about the set of the user’s ZOIs, while in
the case of the other learning based approaches, we rely on a significant change in
the autocorrelation index, representing the user periodicity. It is important to note
that all the information collected during the previous training windows is also taken
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Fig. 4.9: Evolution of ZOIs and Prediction Accuracy Over Time of 2 Users
According to 1-order and 2-order MMC.
into account for the next training windows. The evaluation window commences at
the very first trigger, which is when the first two ZOIs of a user are computed.
During a training window, the model analyses the user’s movements to construct a
user specific mobility model according to the techniques described in Section 4.5.
The MobiDict system is evaluated with respect to each family of predictors. At
the beginning of the every new training window, the prediction accuracy result is
computed. As the evaluation metric, we consider the prediction accuracy, which is
the fraction of samples for which the model successfully predicts the next location
during the evaluation window.
4.7.3 Results and Discussion
We evaluate the performance of MobiDict by comparing it against the accuracy
obtained by using the conventional approach of formulating a model, trained on
70% of the dataset and evaluated on the rest. The resulting accuracy that we use
for baseline comparison for all the predictor families is shown in Table 4.1. We also
compare our baseline results with the results obtained by existing works on the same
dataset and achieve similar accuracies with the same feature selection techniques.
Figure 4.9 depicts the evolution of the user’s ZOIs and the prediction accuracy
computed with the 1-order and 2-order MMC prediction technique over time. We
consider two different users to deeper describe the results obtained. They are con-
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Fig. 4.10: Evolution of Cumulative Time Window Length and Prediction Accuracy
Over Time of 2 users According to 1-order and 2-order MMC.
tained in the Nokia dataset having different dataset durations, i.e., more than 350
days for the first user and more than 500 days for the second user.
We obtained higher prediction accuracies with 2-order MMC as compared to 1-
order MMC for majority of the users as also depicted in case of these two users.
This is mainly due to the fact that, 2-order MMC takes into account the current
user’s state and the previous state to search the next state in the model, improving
the quality of the predictions. We also observe that, when the number of ZOIs has a
sudden shift, the accuracy does not necessarily decrease with this drastic variation.
For instance, at the end of the evolution of the number of ZOIs of user 2 (i.e.,
from point 4 to point 5), there is an increase of two zones, however, the prediction
accuracy is not significantly affected for both the MMC. With the decrease of two
zones (i.e., from point 3 to point 4 for user 1), the accuracy of 2-order MMC increases,
while that of the 1-order decreases. Here, we assume that some variations may
sometimes require longer training periods to obtain relevant MMC model according
to the changes, as the predictions are strongly linked to the transition probabilities
contained within them.
In Figure 4.10, cumulative training window lengths are depicted according to the
accuracy and the evolution of user movements according to time. We see, a clear
trend in the number of days taken to compute the predictions at a specific time.
With the considered two users, we observe that, there is no absolute requirement
to use a large amount of data to obtain satisfactory prediction accuracies with
the MMC prediction technique, because, with less than 100 days, we can obtain
accuracy of more than 0.5. Regarding the entire dataset analyses, 34% of users
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Technique Accuracy (%)
1-order MMC 57.19
2-order MMC 61.66
1-NN 59.28
ANN 60.85
RNN 72.79
Fourier ext. 63.87
Table 4.1: Baseline Results.
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Fig. 4.11: Variation of Accuracy with Time and Movement Periodicity.
reach a satisfactory accuracy with less than 100 days. We also assume that this is
closely linked to the quality of the information, i.e., transitions between 2 or more
states, included into the model during the training windows. In addition, it is also
important to note that, in realtime and for the MMC techniques, we use raw data
without any refinement, which could affect the quality of the user’s mobility model.
Next, we analyse the effect of movement periodicities, on the accuracies of the
learning based predictor families. As shown in Figure 4.11, we see a clear correlation
between the periodicity and the accuracy of classification, neural networks and the
Fourier based approach. However, we also see that, recurrent neural network has no
visible impact of user periodicities except for the minor variations. We observe this
trend for majority of the users across the dataset. The main reason being, RNN’s
blend the input vector at the current state (i.e., the movement histories) with the
previously learnt state vector to yield a new state. Thereby, taking the entire history
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Percentage of days
Prediction technique <=20% >20% & <=60% >60% Number of satisfactory users
1-NN 168 0 0 101
ANN 103 65 0 129
RNN 37 131 0 149
Fourier ext. 65 103 0 112
1-order MMC 137 17 14 93
2-order MMC 62 41 65 142
Table 4.2: Dataset Analysis.
into account before making a prediction, thus effectively combining high level di-
rection with low level modelling. This results in high accuracy, which is maintained
stable with time. On the other hand, the classification and neural network based
approach weigh the current state higher than the past depicting very high correla-
tion with periodicity. As, with respect to Fourier extrapolation, since the individual
frequency components are contribute to forecasting, the higher the periodicity the
better is the accuracy.
Above&Baseline
Below&Baseline
18 days 82 days 134 days 169 days 213 days 370 days
Time
Fig. 4.12: Comparison of MobiDict Accuracy for Individual Predictors against
Baseline Accuracies (example of one user).
Next, we evaluate the running accuracy difference between MobiDict for all the
predictors against the baseline accuracy at each training model update as shown in
Figure 4.12. As we see, the accuracies are in general lower than the baseline accu-
racies however, in most of the cases, accuracies are greater than 50%. After update
3, the accuracies of 2-MMC, ANN, RNN and Fourier based predictors are often
higher as compared to the baselines. Regarding 1-order MMC technique, although
the baseline result is not very high compared to the other techniques (i.e., 57.19%),
the prediction accuracy results of the 1-order MMC model are mainly far from it. In
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addition, we note that the 2-order MMC accuracy results are fairly satisfactory re-
maining higher than the baselines for most of the time. The high baseline accuracies
may also result due to the overfitting of the model when looking directly at the 70%
of the dataset as compared to realtime training. Realtime training and prediction
involve higher stochasticity in the time bounded noisy data that is not the case when
formulating a prediction model over the complete dataset. We further evaluate the
total number of users in the entire dataset providing accuracy levels higher than
50% as summarised in Table 4.2. We indicate the number of users having prediction
accuracy greater than 50% in terms of total percentage of days. We observe that
RNN yields the maximum number of satisfactory users whose accuracy is greater
than 50% (and lower than 60%), making it an ideal predictor to be integrated in
MobiDict.
Further, we approach the problem concerning the computational complexity of
learning approaches by analysing the cost involved at the training time. This com-
plexity is directly linked to a quadratic equation that involves inverting a kernel
matrix having a complexity of order n3, where n is the size of the training data [23].
The training time to arrive at an optimal solution depends on the technique used,
but generally has the order of n2. Thus, the baseline complexity is 0.7 ∗ D where
D is the total number of data-points collected. Therefore, the complexity in our
case is Nup ∗ n3 where, Nup is the total number of updates. Further, n in our sys-
tem represents the data-points included in the individual training windows, i.e.,
n = tn1 + tn2 . . . + tnN , since we account for the user behaviour, which is constant
for some time periods. Consequently, the total number of data-points will be lower
than D, thereby having a lower complexity. The same goes for the training time.
4.8 Conclusion
With the growing ubiquity of location-aware mobile devices, the ability to analyse
and predict mobility on a large scale is becoming possible, opening new opportunities
but also posing new challenges. Furthermore, with mobile devices becoming more
powerful every day, it becomes possible to compute mobility predictions locally,
i.e., without resorting to backend servers. Yet traditional approaches to mobility
prediction rely on processing large datasets on powerful backend servers. This makes
mobility prediction quite tedious and slow. In addition, such centralized approaches
come with a major location privacy concern, threatening the success of widespread
adoption of location-based services in the coming days. This enforces a real need to
restrict computations involving sensitive user data on a local mobile device.
To address these issues, we introduce MobiDict, a realtime mobility prediction
system, to provide swift next place predictions. Our approach couples the prediction
system with dynamic user mobility behaviours to restrict the data required for
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model training to short durations as opposed to conventional training approaches.
This achieves accuracies exceeding 50% for about 40% of the users contained in the
dataset for 2-MMC and RNN predictors. We also examine periods where our system
accuracy, even exceeds the baselines. Thus exhibiting that large amount of training
data is not an absolute requirement to produce viable next place predictions. We
also evaluate the computational cost associated with our approach and theoretically
validate the feasibility to operate on a mobile device.
We observe that certain family of predictors are more suited for particular mobility
behaviours. Our future work will be an attempt to have an ensemble approach in the
system to select a suitable predictor in realtime according to behavioural changes,
to attain higher accuracies. We will also focus on quantifying the computational cost
of the approach on an actual mobile device to confirm our hypothesis. Another area
will be to optimise the process so as to have fewer number of model updates that
will intern contribute to the cost.
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Abstract Location prediction and location privacy has retained a lot of attention
this recent years. Predicting locations is the next step of Location-Based Services
(LBS) because it provides information not only based on where you are but where
you will be. However, obtaining information from LBS has a price for the user be-
cause she must share all her locations with the service that builds a predictive model,
resulting in a loss of privacy. In this paper we propose ResPred, a system that allows
LBS to request location prediction about the user. The system includes a location
prediction component containing a statistical location trend model and a location
privacy component aiming at blurring the predicted locations by finding an appro-
priate tradeoff between LBS utility and user privacy, the latter being expressed as
a maximum percentage of utility loss. We evaluate ResPred from a utility/privacy
perspective by comparing our privacy mechanism with existing techniques by using
real user locations. The location privacy is evaluated with an entropy-based confu-
sion metric of an adversary during a location inference attack. The results show that
our mechanism provides the best utility/privacy tradeoff and a location prediction
accuracy of 60% in average for our model.
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, predicting future locations of users has become an attractive topic
for both the research community and companies. Location prediction can boost the
creation of new Location-Based Services (LBS) in order to help users in their daily
activities. For example, a LBS could send personalized information to users, such
as the menu of different restaurants the users could like in the vicinity of a location
in which they will probably be at a specific time, e.g., Monday between 11:30 am
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and 12:00 pm. In order to obtain future locations of a user, a LBS needs to build a
predictive model containing spatial and temporal information. However, this leads
to a first location privacy issue because the user must send all her raw locations to
a third-party entity as described in Figure 5.1 (a). In this architecture, the LBS,
which can be a possible adversary, is installed on the mobile device of the user and
gathers all user locations. To preserve location privacy, the idea is to create a location
predictive model in a trusted component that can be stored at the operating system
level of the mobile device. In this context, the trusted component itself will provide
the future locations of the user to the LBS as depicted in Figure 5.1 (b). Even after a
large number of requests performed by the LBS, it should not be able to reconstruct
the entire predictive model of the user but may have a good partial view of her
model. As a result, this is a undeniable second location privacy issue. It has been
demonstrated in the literature that sharing accurate locations has a real cost for a
user because a potential adversary cannot only discover a lot of sensitive information
related to the user but also identify her by just performing simple location attacks
as described by Krumm in [13]. In addition, the authors of [19] show that a few
number of user’s locations only might highly compromise the location privacy of a
user.
Because of the availability of different positioning systems on mobile devices, LBS
are very convenient for daily activities. Consequently, users cannot completely avoid
using LBS. However, users must know that it is fundamental to preserve their privacy
when they are using LBS. Currently, users can only enable or disable the access to
locations for specific applications and sometimes reduce the precision of the locations
obtained with a positioning system. These options depend on the operating system
itself. These simple choices are not adapted to the context of our work because
we want to preserve the location privacy of the user at a higher level, which is a
location prediction level. In order to protect raw locations of a user, some existing
Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) can be applied, such as spatial
perturbation, spatial cloaking, sending dummy locations as well as spatial rounding,
as discussed in [1, 6, 9, 12, 13]. Nevertheless, these mechanisms may quickly decrease
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the utility level of a LBS as the level of protection increases, up to the point when
the LBS becomes unusable.
In this paper, we present a privacy preserving location prediction system called
ResPred, res and pred mean respect (i.e., respect the privacy of users) and prediction
respectively. This system allows LBS to request future location of users. For instance,
a LBS can display information containing future public transportation departures
located in the vicinity of the predicted location returned by ResPred on the mobile
device of the user in advance. Figure 5.1 (c) presents the ResPred system that
contains two components: one component focuses on the location prediction and the
second on the location privacy. We assume that the ResPred system is created at the
operating system level of the mobile device and that the ResPred system and the
positioning system are trusted. The system includes a location prediction component
based on a statistical location trend model and a location privacy component helping
to blur the predicted locations by finding an appropriate tradeoff between the LBS
utility and the user privacy preference expressed as a maximum percentage of utility
loss. We also assume that the LBS is untrusted, which indicates that it is a possible
adversary. As depicted in Figure 5.1 (c), the LBS requests the future location of
the user by indicating a time duration between the current time and the time of
the desired predicted location and the system returns a predicted location that
will be found by exploring the location trend model and protected by our LPPM.
The predicted location is more specifically transformed according to the required
utility level of the LBS and the maximum utility level that the user is willing to
sacrifice in order to protect her location privacy. We evaluate our system from a
utility/privacy perspective, which is the crucial aspect of our approach. In addition,
we compute the location prediction accuracy of the location trend model. We chose
real mobility traces coming from two datasets, the PrivaMov dataset described in [3]
and a private dataset collected by a researcher in Switzerland. The first part of the
utility/privacy evaluation consists in assessing the utility level of our LPPM and
two other well-known mechanisms described in the literature, namely the rounding
and the Gaussian perturbation. The second part of the utility/privacy evaluation
focuses on the measurement of the confusion level of an adversary performing a
location attack on the received predicted locations from the ResPred system. The
metric used to evaluate this confusion level is based on the well-known Shannon
entropy. The results show that our location privacy preserving mechanism provides
the best utility/privacy tradeoff compared to the other evaluated mechanisms as well
as a good location prediction accuracy for the analyzed users. The contributions of
this paper are listed below.
• We describe a system, called ResPred, allowing LBS to request future location of
a user.
• We present a statistical model containing location trends of a user per time slice,
helping to extract short, mid and long-term predicted locations.
• We describe a LPPM enabling to reach an appropriate utility/privacy tradeoff.
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• We use real user locations to assess the performance of our system and, more
specifically, its two components.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 5.2 we begin with the description of
the system model containing the formal definitions used in the paper. Section 5.3
presents the problem addressed in this paper, while the ResPred system is described
in Section 5.4. Then, we present the evaluation of the system from a utility/privacy
perspective in Section 5.5. In addition, we also evaluate the location prediction
accuracy of the location trend model of the ResPred system. We detail the closest
work to the two main subjects of this paper in Section 5.6, which are the location
privacy as well as the location prediction. Finally, we highlight the most important
findings of the paper and discuss future work in Section 5.7.
5.2 System model
This section focuses on describing the key definitions used to present our system.
In order to facilitate the analysis of locations of a user, the time is discretized. We
also introduce Regions Of Interest (ROIs) on which the location predictive model
is based. Finally, we present the threat model that describes the context used to
evaluate the location privacy.
5.2.1 User and locations
We consider that a user moves on a geodesic space and owns a mobile device that is
able to detect her locations as well as when they are captured via a positioning sys-
tem, e.g., GPS, WiFi or radio cells. A location is described as a triplet loc = (φ, λ, t)
where φ and λ are the latitude and longitude of the location in the geodesic space,
and t is the time when the location was obtained from the positioning system.
Locations are formally represented as a sequence L = 〈loc1, loc2, · · · , locn〉. A subse-
quence of successive location of L is described as follows lsubi = 〈loc1, loc2, · · · , locm〉
in which the first location of this subsequence is noted lsubi .locfirst and the last lo-
cation is lsubi .loclast. We can express the latitude, longitude and time of a location
loci by directly writing loci.φ, loci.λ and loci.t respectively.
5.2.2 Temporal discretization
In order to discretize time, we compute n slices generated according to the chosen
temporal granularity and time span, e.g., every 20 minutes during one week. A
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time slice is a triplet defined as follows ts = (tstarting, tending, index) where tstarting
(Monday - 7:00 am) and tending (Monday - 7:20 am) represent the starting time and
ending time of the time slice and index is its unique identifier ranging between 1
and n (n represents the total number of computed time slices). For instance, if
we generate all time slices having a duration of 20 minutes during a period of 1
week, we will obtain 504 time slices. All the possible time slices are represented as
a sequence called timeslices, such that timeslices = 〈ts1, ts2, · · · , tsn〉. In addition,
we introduce a function called convert(〈loc1, loc2, · · · , locm〉) translating a sequence
of one or several successive locations into a sequence of one or several successive
time slices called timesliceTab, m being the total number of location(s) to convert.
This sequence is described as follows: timesliceTab = 〈ts1, ts2, · · · , tsn〉 in which n
is the total number of successive time slices.
5.2.3 Regions of interest
A region of interest (ROI) is defined as a circular area visited by a user during a
certain period of time, which is a quadruplet of the form roi = (φ, λ,∆r, visits).
Items φ and λ are the coordinates of the center of the ROI in a geodesic space. ∆r is
the radius of the ROI and visits is a sequence of subsequences of L such that visits =
〈lsub1 , lsub2 , · · · , lsubm〉 in which each subsequence of successive locations is contained
in L such that ∀lsubi ∈ visits, lsubi ⊂ L and lsubi .loclast.t < lsubi+1 .locfirst.t. Each
visit of a ROI has a duration equal or greater than a threshold, called ∆tmin, such
as ∀lsubi ∈ visits, lsubi .locm.t − lsubi .loc1.t ≥ ∆tmin. In addition, all locations of the
visits are contained in the ROI spatially described by the first three items of it, i.e.,
latitude, longitude and radius. The set containing all ROIs of a user is noted as
follows: rois = {roi1, roi2, · · · , roin}. The last and important characteristic of the
ROI is that there is no spatial intersection between ROIs. This means that, if two
ROI candidates intersect during the discovery process of ROIs, they will be merged
and a new ROI is created from these two ROI candidates.
5.2.4 Threat model
We consider a threat model that takes into account a honest but curious adversary
in the form of a LBS using ResPred. The LBS will try to infer future locations of
the user based on a location history gathered by requesting ResPred. This location
history contains all predicted locations sent by ResPred and consists in its unique
background knowledge on which the location attack will be performed. This history
is not complete because we consider that the LBS will not request ResPred con-
stantly but a limited number of times in a random manner during a certain time
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slice or by following the usual use of the LBS by the user, e.g., everyday at the end
of the afternoon. The honest but curious behavior of the LBS also means that it
will not try to break the sharing protocol or obtain the location predictive model
of the system ResPred. In addition, we consider that the LBS always gives adapted
parameters to its service to the ResPred system, more specifically the values of the
parameters ∆tfuture and ∆rutility as depicted in Figure 5.1 (c) or Figure 5.2.
5.3 Problem statement
Considering that a LBS wants to estimate the future location of a user, it needs
to create a predictive model of the user. In order to reach this goal, the LBS will
constantly collect locations of the user to update her model as shown in Figure 5.1
(a). However, the location privacy of user is entirely compromised because all her
raw locations are regularly shared with the LBS. This means that all sensitive in-
formation related to the user is given to a third-party entity. For example, the LBS
can discover the following sensitive information related to the user from her raw
locations: her home and work places but also her likes and dislikes about religion
and/or politics.
The first solution is to delegate the creation of the predictive model to a service at
the operating system level that we consider as trusted, as shown in Figure 5.1 (b). In
this context, the only service that has access to the raw locations of the user coming
from the positioning system is the dedicated service. The latter provides predicted
locations to the LBS that needs them to operate properly. Although the location
privacy of the user is increased in this context, there is still a location privacy issue
about the predicted locations shared with the LBS. Because of all the predicted
locations gathered by the LBS, the latter can always infer precise location habits
of the user, especially when it is requesting the trusted service for the same future
time every day for instance.
Consequently, the challenge is to protect as much as possible the location privacy
of the user in the context of the sharing of her predicted locations with a LBS.
Although there exist various LPPMs in the literature, they do not necessarily meet
the utility requirement of a LBS. This means that they can easily compromise the
proper functioning of the LBS until reaching the point it becomes unusable for the
user. For example, the location information provided by the LBS can be inaccurate
or simply erroneous because the precision of the prediction has been made too low
by the LPPM. As a result, the user might stop using the LBS. As discussed in
the introduction, our approach consists in building a system, including a location
predictive model as well as an adapted LPPM, that takes into account the utility
requirement of the LBS and the utility/privacy tradeoff expressed by the user as
indicated in Figure 5.1 (c) or Figure 5.2.
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Fig. 5.2: ResPred system overview
5.4 System overview
As described in Figure 5.2, ResPred contains two components. The first component
focuses on location prediction, while the second component relates to location pri-
vacy. Consequently, the first component is responsible for the prediction of the future
location of the user and includes her predictive location model, called location trend
model. The second component aims at protecting the predicted location computed
by the first component and uses a LPPM called utility privacy tradeoff LPPM.
A request of a LBS consists in asking where a user will be in the future. As
described in Equation 5.1, the LBS requests the future location by specifying the
time duration expressed by ∆tfuture in seconds from the current time, e.g., 7200
seconds (2 hours) from now. The LBS also indicates its required utility ∆rutility
that allows it to operate properly. For instance, if a LBS must call a taxi for a user
in advance, the LBS will indicate an utility of a short distance in meters, such as
500 meters. A long distance could compromise the use of the taxi service itself and
the related LBS because it could display inaccurate information to the user. The
returned value is a location expressed by a pair locpredicted = (φ, λ).
locpredicted = predictLoc(∆tfuture, ∆rutility) (5.1)
To summarize, ResPred will answer the following question: Knowing the user will
need some location-based information within ∆rutility meters in ∆tfuture seconds from
now, where will be the user?
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Fig. 5.3: From ROIs to location trend model
5.4.1 Location prediction component
The location prediction component contains a predictive model that represents the
location trends of a user organized per time slice. As mentioned in Section 5.2, time
is discretized into time slices during a given period of time, such as 504 time slices
during one week (i.e., the duration of one time slice is 20 minutes). A location trend
model is an array in which each cell contains all the possible ROIs or successive
ROIs visited during a specific time slice. Figure 5.3 describes the creation process
of the location trend model. Firstly, the ROI discovery process enables to discover
all the ROIs of a user by analyzing the raw locations of the user. Secondly, all raw
locations are marked with a specific ROI and a specific time slice as specified in the
Temporal and spatial matching step. This step helps to pre-process the locations for
the creation of the location trend model. Finally, we discover the structure of the
location trend model in which we collect all the ROIs or successive ROIs visited
during each time slice. Since the location trend model is a statistical model, each
visited ROI or successive visited ROIs stored for a given time slice have a visit
counter. This enables to highlight the location habits of the user per time slice, i.e.,
the ROIs or successive ROIs that are the most visited by the user during a time slice.
In addition, this allows the component to find the predicted locations to answer the
LBS requests.
As depicted in Figure 5.2, the location trend model will have to solve the follow-
ing request expressed in Equation 5.2 and return a temporary predicted location
tmpLocpredicted. The latter is not the final predicted location sent to the LBS at the
end of the process because tmpLocpredicted must be protected by the LPPM of the
location privacy component.
tmpLocpredicted = predictLoc(loccurrent, ∆tfuture) (5.2)
In order to find the tmpLocpredicted, the location prediction component starts by
searching the target time slice corresponding to the time slice that includes the
future time computed by adding the ∆tfuture duration to the current timestamp,
i.e., loccurrent.t. After having found this target time slice, the location trend model is
analyzed to find the location trends corresponding to the target time slice expressed
as ROI(s). The tmpLocpredicted is a triplet such as tmpLocpredicted = (φ, λ,∆r). Item
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∆r is a radius that is the accuracy of the temporary predicted location. There are
two cases now to compute the items of the tmpLocpredicted. Firstly, if the analysis
highlights that the most likely visited location in the target time slice corresponds
to one ROI, the temporary predicted location has the same latitude, longitude and
radius as those of the ROI. Secondly, if the analysis shows that the most likely
visited locations are two or several successive ROIs, the component merges all the
ROIs into one single ROI and computes a new latitude, a new longitude and a
new radius, which correspond to the items of the tmpLocpredicted. In addition, it is
important to note three specific location prediction scenarios that can occur during
the prediction process. The best scenario is that the component finds the most likely
ROI or successive ROIs to compute the tmpLocpredicted by exploring the location
trends of the target time slice. Secondly, it can happen that all ROIs or successive
ROIs have the same visit counter value. In this context, the last visited ROI or
successive ROIs are used to compute the tmpLocpredicted. Finally, it is also possible
that there is no ROI or successive ROIs recorded for the target time slice. For
this unique and specific problem, the component explores previous time slices until
finding a visited ROI or successive ROIs to compute the tmpLocpredicted.
5.4.2 Location privacy component
The goal of the location privacy component is to protect as much as possible the tem-
porary predicted location found by the location prediction component. The LPPM
that will be applied on the tmpLocpredicted depends on two aspects: the LBS util-
ity ∆rutility given by the LBS and the user privacy preference given by the user
expressed as a maximum utility loss percentage ∆pmaxUtilityLoss. This means that
the LBS can provide useful and relevant information in a radius, which is the LBS
utility in meters, around a reference location. Beyond this distance, there is no guar-
antee that the LBS is able to operate properly or to provide a reliable information
to the user. For example, if the LBS is an application of a taxi company and asks a
predicted location, at the end of day when the user usually requests the LBS for a
taxi, in order to anticipate the user’s request, the LBS will indicate a close utility in
meters in order to not be far from the user in a future time. The maximum utility
loss is expressed as a percentage that clearly indicates the maximum utility that the
user is willing to sacrifice in order to protect her location privacy. Consequently, its
value is a percentage ranged between 0 included and 1 not included. 0 is included
and means that the user simply does not want to lose any LBS utility. 1 is not
included because this would mean that the LBS cannot work properly if this value
is reached. Equation 5.3 describes the request handled by the component including
the LBS utility ∆rutility and the maximum utility loss percentage ∆pmaxUtilityLoss.
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Fig. 5.4: Computing new coordinates when the radius of the reference zone is
adjusted, i.e., greater or smaller than the radius of tmpLocpredicted
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Fig. 5.5: Three possible random generations of new coordinates (position x in
black) according to a high maximum utility loss percentage
locpredicted = protect(tmpLocpredicted, ∆pmaxUtilityLoss, ∆rutility) (5.3)
The location privacy preserving mechanism works in the following manner. The
component firstly creates a reference zone zoneref that has a latitude and a longitude
corresponding to those of the tmpLocpredicted and a radius equals to the LBS utility
∆rutility.
The goal of the component is now to change the latitude and the longitude of
the tmpLocpredicted by computing new coordinates. The component will create a new
zone, called zonenew, which is a zone having the new generated latitude and longitude
as coordinates and a radius equals to the LBS utility ∆rutility. In order to compute
these new coordinates, the component firstly generates a random angle that indicates
the direction of the new coordinates. Then, a latitude and a longitude are generated
randomly in the direction of the angle between 0 and a threshold value corresponding
to the case where there cannot have any intersection between zoneref and zonenew,
i.e., 2×∆rutility. Now the component must check if the protected percentage of the
zoneref is not greater than the maximum utility loss percentage indicated by the
user, i.e., pmaxUtilityLoss. In order to check this condition, the component computes the
area of the intersection between the reference zone zoneref and the new zone zonenew.
The area of this intersection is divided by the area of the zoneref in order to obtain a
revealed percentage prevealed, which is shared with the LBS. Finally, the component
computes the protected percentage that is equal to: pprotected = 1−prevealed. The new
coordinates are validated only if pprotected is lower or equal to the maximum utility
loss percentage given by the user. If it is not the case, new coordinates are generated
until meeting this condition. When this condition is met, locpredicted is created with
a latitude and a longitude corresponding to the new coordinates and is sent to the
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LBS. Therefore, there is a clear link between the utility that the user is willing to
lose and her location privacy because the greater the pmaxUtilityLoss, the better the
user protects her location privacy. Equation 5.4 summarizes the checking of this
condition. The function area enables to compute the area of the elements passed as
parameters.
1− area(zoneref ∩ zonenew)
area(zoneref )
≤ ∆pmaxUtilityLoss (5.4)
This means that the location privacy component tries to find an appropriate
tradeoff between LBS utility and the location privacy preference chosen by the user.
In order to illustrate the process, Figure 5.4 depicts the impact of the change of the
radius of the reference zoneref in the case where the tmpLocpredicted has a radius
greater than ∆rutility and in the case where tmpLocpredicted has a radius smaller than
∆rutility. The tmpLocpredicted is the gray circle, the zoneref is the gray circle with the
dotted lines and the dark circle is the zonenew. The center of the zonenew corresponds
to the location that is sent to the LBS by ResPred. The letters r indicate the zone
that is revealed to the LBS, while the letters p describe the zone that is protected.
In addition, Figure 5.5 depicts three possible random generations of new coordinates
according to a maximum utility loss percentage that is really high. The resulting
value of the process of this component is the predicted location locpredicted, which is
also returned to the LBS as described in Equation 5.3 and in Figure 5.2.
5.5 Evaluation
The main goal of the evaluation is to assess our system from a utility and a location
privacy perspective. In order to reach this goal, we ran several experiments taking
into account different LBS scenarios and different LPPMs including our mechanism
and existing ones. In addition, we also compute the location prediction accuracy of
the location trend model.
5.5.1 Dataset
We chose real user locations of two datasets: PrivaMov dataset described in [3] and a
very detailed dataset of one user. From these two datasets, we extracted locations of
users that were captured via different positioning system such as GPS, radio cells as
well as WiFi. We performed an analysis in order to select the best users of PrivaMov
for our evaluation. This selection was based on the quality of the user datasets. This
quality was assessed by computing the percentage of hours during one day having at
least one location, called daily percentage later. In order to properly fill the location
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trend model, we need very rich user datasets without important gaps in terms of
days. More specifically, a user is selected if the average of all her daily percentages is
greater or equal to 0.4, if her dataset duration in terms of days was greater or equal
to 30 days and lower than 250 days and if all weekdays (from Monday to Sunday)
have at least one daily percentage. Seven users only of the PrivaMov dataset met
all these conditions. Consequently, we evaluated eight users in total, i.e., seven users
from PrivaMov and one user from the private dataset. The average of the duration
of all evaluated user datasets is 115 days and the average of the number of locations
of all evaluated user datasets is 7’580’391.
5.5.2 LBS scenarios
We decided to define two LBS scenarios for the evaluation. The first scenario is a
public transportation LBS that provides next departure information of bus, metro
and train in advance. The information is displayed on the mobile of the user just
before the usual checking of the public transportation departures by the user. The
second scenario is a taxi LBS that calls a taxi in advance for the user by following
the usual use of the service by the user. We assume that the LBS knows the usage
habits of the service by the user but it does not obviously know the location of the
user in the future. That is why these two LBS must use our ResPred system to
obtain it. As depicted in Figure 5.2, an LBS can request a user’s location in the
future, e.g., 2 hours from now. For each scenario, we chose an array of target time
slices for which the predicted locations must be computed. The parameters of these
two LBS scenarios are defined in Section 5.5.4.
5.5.3 Existing location privacy preserving mechanisms
In order to properly assess the LPPM of our system, we selected two existing LPPMs
from the literature. We compare them with our mechanism from the utility/privacy
perspective whose metrics are detailed in Section 5.5.6. We chose the spatial round-
ing presented in [1, 13] as well as the Gaussian perturbation described in [2]. The
spatial rounding works with a grid that discretizes the space in which the user is
moving. The mechanism transforms raw coordinates of a location into new coordi-
nates corresponding to the nearest vertex of the square or rectangle that is a grid’s
cell in which the raw location is. The spatial Gaussian perturbation is a mechanism
that adds spatial noise to the latitude and the longitude of a raw location according
to a certain mean and a standard deviation. All these parameters are presented in
the next section.
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Parameter/LBS scenario Public transportation LBS scenario Taxi LBS scenario
LBS utility distance 1000 meters 500 meters
Number of target time slices 10 4
Number of prediction requests 100 100
Time slice distribution of prediction requests Randomly or evenly distributed
Table 5.1: List of parameters used for each LBS scenario
5.5.4 Experimental settings
The experimental settings of the utility/privacy evaluation as well as location pre-
diction accuracy evaluation are detailed in this section.
5.5.4.1 ROI discovery
In order to discover the ROIs of a user, we use a specific part of a discovery process
of Zones of Interest (ZOIs) described in [14]. The ∆dmax is equal to 60 meters and
∆tmin has a value of 10 minutes. We follow the creation process of clusters, which
are called ROIs in this paper, without creating any cluster groups or ZOIs similarly
to [14]. After discovered all clusters, we merge them if an intersection occurs between
two clusters and we repeat this merging process until reaching a stable cluster set
in which there is no more intersection. We do not filter out the ROIs that are not
frequently and/or not recently visited because we want to keep a high number of
ROIs describing the mobility of the user, in order to properly fill the location trend
model.
5.5.4.2 Location trend model
The location trend model is created with time slices having a duration of 20 minutes
during a period of one week, resulting in 504 time slices for one week. We chose this
time slice duration by exploring the entropy level of each time slice cell of the
location trend model and finding that it was the best time slice duration for the
location prediction goal. We used the entropy level because it highlights the level of
uncertainty to find one single ROI for a time slice cell.
5.5.4.3 LBS scenarios
A scenario corresponds to a specific type of LBS as described in Table 5.1: the public
transportation LBS and the taxi LBS. Firstly, each LBS has its own utility distance
and a specific number of target time slices. For example, the target time slices of
the public transportation LBS are in the morning, i.e., from 7:00 to 7:20 am, and at
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the end of the afternoon, i.e., from 5:00 to 5:20 pm, every working day. Regarding
the taxi LBS, the target time slice are in the evening Thursday from 10:00 to 10:20
pm, Friday from 11:00 to 11:20 pm, and Saturday from 4:00 to 4:20 pm and from
11:00 to 11:20 pm. We distribute the total number of location prediction requests,
called frequency in Table 5.1, which are 100 in total, per target time slice for each
LBS scenario. The distribution of the total number of location prediction requests
can be equal for all the target time slices, i.e., 10 (100 divided by 10) for each target
time slice. Or the process can also randomly distribute the 100 predicted location
requests per target time slice meaning that some time slices can have more predicted
locations than others. These scenarios are the same for all evaluated users.
5.5.4.4 Location privacy preserving mechanisms
As mentioned previously, we chose two LPPMs: the grid-based rounding and the
Gaussian perturbation in addition to our proposed LPPM. For the utility privacy
tradeoff LPPM included in ResPred, we selected four values for ∆pmaxUtilityLoss:
0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. Regarding the grid-based rounding, we decided to have a
difference of 0.005, 0.05 and 0.5 between two successive latitudes or longitudes to
create each cell of the grid. The values of the grid-based parameters are ranged from
approximately 380 to 38000 meters. Finally, we chose 4 standard deviations that
are 0.0005, 0.005, 0.05 and 0.5 for the Gaussian perturbation, the mean being the
latitude or the longitude of the raw location. The values of the Gaussian perturbation
parameters are ranged from approximately 55 to 66500 meters.
5.5.5 Location prediction accuracy
We decide to evaluate the location prediction accuracy of the location trend model
by performing the following steps. Firstly, the dataset of each user must be divided
into two datasets according to the total number of locations: a training set of 60%
and a test set of 40%. We discover the ROIs and we create the location trend model
of a user with her training dataset. Secondly, the evaluation process is the following:
we start by selecting 200 unique locations in the test set. For each selected location
of the test set, we convert its timestamp into a target time slice. Then, we find
the most likely visited ROI or successive ROIs of the target time slice by exploring
the location trend model, which is the same process explained in Section 5.4.1. We
consider that the prediction is correct for this location only if the latter is contained
in the ROI or the merged ROI computed from the successive found ROIs. If there is
no ROI for the target time slice, we simply do not take the prediction into account.
At the end, we compute a ratio that is the number of correct predictions out of the
number of predictions that returned a value after having explored the model.
5.5 Evaluation 109
5.5.6 Utility/privacy metrics
The metrics presented in this section enables to evaluate the utility as well as the
location privacy of all predicted locations of a user shared with a LBS and, conse-
quently, to highlight the LPPM that gives the best utility/privacy tradeoff.
5.5.6.1 Utility metric
The utility metric allows us to evaluate if a predicted location sent to the LBS meets
the utility requirement of the LBS given at the beginning of the process by the LBS
itself. We define a reference zone zoneref that has a center corresponding to the
center of the tmpLocpredicted and a radius that has the value of ∆rutility. We also
create a zone to check zonetoCheck having a center that is the coordinates of the
predicted zone locpredicted and a radius equals to the value of ∆rutility. The utility
is validated if there is an intersection between the zoneref and the zone to check
zonetoCheck. Equation 5.5 describes the two possible results of the utility metric.
resutility =
{
0, if zoneref ∩ zonetoCheck = ∅
1, otherwise
(5.5)
Then we compute the utility average of a target time slice by dividing the num-
ber of predicted locations that meet the utility condition by the total number of
predicted locations sent to the LBS for this target time slice. Finally, we calculate
the average of the utility results obtained for all the target time slices in order to
obtain the utility result of the scenario.
5.5.6.2 Location privacy metric
The location privacy metric corresponds to a metric that evaluates the degree of
confusion of an adversary, the LBS in our case, during a location attack on the
predicted locations received from ResPred. The metric is based on the Shannon
entropy that can compute a level of uncertainty as described in [16]. As mentioned
in Section 5.2.4, the location attack performed by an adversary consists in trying
to discover one location amongst all of the predicted locations sent by ResPred
for a specific target time slice considering that the adversary knows how the time
is discretized in our location trend model. The goal of a LPPM is to confuse the
adversary in order to reduce its probability of finding one single location for a target
time slice. In order to compute the location privacy, we will create a grid that
discretizes the space and compute the density proportion pdensity of each visited cell
of this grid. The density proportion pdensity is the number of predicted locations out
of the total number of predicted locations visited per visited cell of the grid during
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(a) Temporary predicted location
(raw)
(b) Gaussian perturbation
(parameter: 0.005)
(c) Rounding mechanism
(rounded to 2 decimals)
(d) Utility privacy tradeoff LPPM
(parameter: 0.9)
Fig. 5.6: Visual description of the impact of the different LPPMs on a temporary
predicted location
the target time slice. Each cell of the grid is a rectangle of approximately 100 meters
per 180 on an average, i.e., a difference of 0.001 between two successive latitudes
or longitudes. Equation 5.6 describes the computation of the location privacy for a
specific target time slice in which i is the index of the ith visited cell by the user, n
is the total number of visited cells by the user during the target time slice. A low
entropy result means a low confusion of the adversary, while a high entropy result
means a high uncertainty.
reslocationPrivacy = −
n∑
i=1
pdensityi log2 pdensityi (5.6)
Finally, we compute an average result for each scenario in the same way as for
the utility metric (described at the end of the previous section).
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LPPM/Result Utility result Location privacy result
Utility privacy tradeoff LPPM 1.0 2.81
Grid-based rounding 0.62 0
Gaussian perturbation 0.50 2.78
Table 5.2: Utility / location privacy results
5.5.7 Results
The average of the location prediction accuracy of the location trend model for all
evaluated users is equal to 60%. In addition, we obtain a minimum and a maximum
location prediction accuracy of 16% and 90% respectively.
Regarding the utility/privacy tradeoff evaluation, we firstly compute the average
of the utility results of all LBS scenarios per user and, secondly, we calculate average
utility results of all users. We do exactly the same for the location privacy results.
The results are summarized in Table 5.2. We can clearly see that our LPPM, i.e,
the utility/privacy tradeoff LPPM, has the best utility/privacy tradeoff because the
utility result and the location privacy result reach the highest values. This means
that our LPPM meets the LBS utility requirements and is also able to protect the
location privacy of the user according to her privacy preference. Although the Gaus-
sian perturbation has also a high location privacy result, a reasonable utility result
is not reached. The location privacy result of the grid-based rounding is equal to
0 indicating that the adversary has no confusion because the modified locations,
i.e., predicted locations, are always the same for a target time slice. The Gaussian
perturbation has the advantage of blurring the location via a single parameter ex-
pressing a distance, while the grid-based mechanism requires the creation of a grid
that can take a substantial time and its exploration before being able to blur a loca-
tion. Although our mechanism must check a location privacy condition, it computes
the new coordinates within a reasonable time.
Finally, we can see the blurring impact of the different LPPMs on a temporary
predicted location in Figure 5.6. In Figure 5.6 (a), we can see the center as well
as the radius of a temporary predicted location, both depicted with a marker and
a circle. In Figure 5.6 (b) and (d), 100 new locations, depicted with new markers,
are created according to the corresponding LPPM. Regarding the rounding, the
coordinates have only been rounded to two decimals in the figure but in the context
of the evaluation with a spatial grid, we would have obtained 100 times the same
location because the structure of the grid is fixed and the nearest location is always
the same for a single location to blur.
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5.6 Related work
The related work below tackles the two main subjects of the paper that are the
following: the description of existing LPPMs as well as the different predictive models
presented in the literature that are used to compute future user locations.
5.6.1 Location privacy preserving mechanisms
In a location prediction context, we consider that we need to protect the predicted
location that is sent to a LBS as mentioned in Section 5.3. To reach this goal,
there exist various mechanisms to protect the predicted location, such as applying a
spatial perturbation [1, 2, 6], using a spatial cloaking mechanism [9], sending dummy
locations [12] or using a rounding mechanism [1, 13].
Applying a spatial perturbation enables to spatially modify a location as men-
tioned by several authors in [2, 6]. As described in these papers, we can add spatial
noise to the coordinates of a location. However, the more noise is added to the lo-
cation sent to the LBS increases, the more the LBS utility decreases in our context
because a LBS may provide information that is not related to the raw predicted
location, depending on the level of protection. In the case of the spatial cloaking
presented by Gruteser and Grunwald in [9], the predicted location should only be
sent if the user is considered as k-anonymous, meaning that the user cannot be
distinguishable from at least k − 1 other users. This technique is unfortunately not
realistic in our context and not easy to implement especially in the case where the
mobility models of users are not centralized or shared in a common server. As de-
tailed in [12], sending dummy locations is interesting in order to add noise if and
only if multiple predicted locations can be sent to a LBS. However in our system,
it is impossible to use this LPPM because only one predicted location must be sent
to a LBS as an answer to a predictive request supported by ResPred. Utilizing a
rounding mechanism, as described in [1, 13], can be considered because the pre-
dicted location is changed into a new location corresponding to a nearest reference
point. If we consider that space is discretized and described with multiple reference
points (the vertices of each cell of a grid for instance), the mechanism consists in
modifying a location into a new location corresponding to the nearest reference ver-
tex of the cell in which the location is as indicated in the papers cited previously.
Cryptography techniques could be also used to protect locations sent to third parties
as mentioned in [10] but our work is not focused on this kind of privacy/security
strategies. To summarize and according to the best of our knowledge, there is no
LPPM that can find an appropriate tradeoff between the utility and the privacy in a
location prediction context. For our utility/privacy evaluation, we chose the closest
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LPPMs to our work, that are the rounding and the spatial perturbation as detailed
in the previous section.
5.6.2 Location prediction requests and models
As detailed in the complete survey in [10] or in [5], various techniques exist to predict
future locations of users. In the literature, there exist different location predictive
models for different types of location prediction requests, such as predicting a fu-
ture location based on a time duration [11, 15], predicting the next location that
will probably be reached by a user [7, 8, 18], etc. Some location prediction-based
papers focus on other location-based predictive requests, such as the prediction of
the staying time in a particular ROI or when the user will reach or leave a ROI [8],
the prediction of the number of users reaching a specific zone [4] and much more.
Other remaining works are focused on range queries that enable to identify if one
or multiple user(s) will be in a specific area during a specific time window. In [17],
the authors describe a way to prune an order-k Markov chain model in order to
efficiently compute long-term predictive range queries.
The main focus of our paper, in terms of prediction, is to comnpute a future
location of a user based on a time duration from the current time. In the literature,
it is shown that some predictive models can work better for near location predictions
and others are more suited for distant location predictions. In [11], the authors
present a hybrid prediction model for moving objects. For near location predictions,
their model uses motion functions, while for distant location predictions, their model
computes the predicted location based on trajectory patterns. The structure in which
they store the trajectory patterns of a user is a trajectory pattern tree. However, they
do not evaluate their model with real mobility traces. Their predictive model is close
to our location trend model because they use the notion of patterns based on spatial
clusters to fill their model. Nevertheless, the structure of their final model is clearly
not the same as ours because they create a trajectory pattern tree. Sadilek and
Krumm propose a method to predict long-term human mobility in [15] up to several
days in the future. Their method, which can highlight strong pattern of users, uses
a projected eigendays model that is carefully created by analyzing the periodicity of
the mobility of a user as well as other mobility features. This work highlights that
it is crucial to extract strong patterns for long-term predictions. The location trend
model we propose in the ResPred system is close to the model presented by Sadilek
and Krumm. However, our model is different in that it is based on ROIs and not on
raw locations and takes less features into account.
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5.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a system called ResPred that enables to compute pre-
dicted locations of a user for LBS. This system contains two components. The first
component focuses on location prediction by including a predictive model based on
location trends expressed as ROI(s). The second component aims at protecting the
location privacy of the user by finding an appropriate tradeoff between a utility
specified by the LBS and a location privacy preference indicated by the user that is
expressed as a maximum utility loss percentage. The results clearly show that our
LPPM provides the best utility/location privacy tradeoff compared to two other
existing LPPMs. In addition, the location trend model is promising if we look at the
location prediction accuracy results, especially in the context of location prediction
according to a certain time duration in the future. Future work will consist in ex-
tending the evaluation to more users by finding a dataset having rich user datasets,
which is a real need for the research community. We will also design other inference
attacks in order to evaluate the location privacy and maybe compare the comput-
ing cost of the different LPPMs. And finally, we will compare the location trend
model to other existing close models for similar requests regarding short, mid and
long-term location predictions.
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Abstract Analyzing mobility behavior of users is extremely useful to create or
improve existing services. Several research works have been done in order to study
mobility behavior of users that mainly use users’ significant locations. However, these
existing analysis are extremely intrusive because they require the knowledge of the
frequently visited places of users, which thus makes it fairly easy to identify them.
Consequently, in this paper, we present a privacy-aware methodology to analyze
mobility behavior of users. We firstly propose a new metric based on the well-known
Shannon entropy, called spatio-temporal entropy, to quantify the mobility level of a
user during a time window. Then, we compute a sequence of spatio-temporal entropy
from the location history of the user that expresses user’s movements as rhythms.
We secondly present how to study the effects of several groups of additional variables
on the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy of a user, such as spatio-temporal,
demographic and mean of transportation variables. For this, we use Generalized
Additive Models (GAMs). The main strength of GAMs is that they are not only
interesting to predict a response variable, but also to understand the effects of co-
variables on this response variable. The results firstly show that the spatio-temporal
entropy and GAMs are an ideal combination to understand mobility behavior of
an individual user or a group of users. We also evaluate the prediction accuracy
of a global GAM compared to individual GAMs and individual AutoRegressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models. These last results highlighted that the
global GAM gives more accurate predictions of spatio-temporal entropy by checking
the Mean Absolute Error (MAE). In addition, this research work opens various
threads, such as the prediction of demographic data of users or the creation of
personalized mobility prediction models by using movement rhythm characteristics
of a user.
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6.1 Introduction
Studying mobility behavior of users is a key element to understand how they usually
move and what are the events that can influence their behavior. We can study mo-
bility trends from a user point of view with her own movements or from a population
point of view with multiple users’ movements. This mobility analysis can be useful
for several goals: for example, studying the movements of a population through a
city to adapt transportation modes and mobility paths. It can also be very helpful
to predict mobility behavior of a user from other users’ movements having common
characteristics. However, studying mobility behavior can be extremely intrusive and
lead to a location privacy issue.
In the literature, mobility behavior has been analyzed by computing user daily
patterns amongst her locations that obviously reveal her most significant places as
described in [3, 4, 9, 12]. For example, the most common places studied in mo-
bility analysis can be home and work places because users usually spend a large
amount of time in them. However, such analysis is highly intrusive because it is
highlighting the most significant places of a user, i.e., where she spends most of her
time. Consequently, it should be possible to find the identity of a user from these
significant places. For example, in [2], De Montjoye et al. demonstrate that only 4
spatio-temporal points are sufficient to uniquely identify 95% of the users of the
dataset they used for their research. All these findings indicate that it is crucial
to find a new methodology to analyse the mobility behavior of a user or multiple
users by only analyzing their rhythm, without necessarily studying their significant
visited locations.
In order to reach the goal of this mobility behavior analysis that takes care of the
location privacy of users, we propose a new methodology based on the extraction
of movement rhythm of a user from her location history. To do so, we compute
a spatio-temporal entropy sequence that describes the mobility of the user during
several time windows of the same duration, e.g., one hour. Then, we analyze the
effects of different variables on this rhythm to better understand the way the user
moves. These variables can belong to various categories and are strongly linked to
the availability of data of the chosen dataset we use: spatio-temporal variables (e.g.,
day of the week, hour of the day, max distance travelled) and demographic variables
(e.g., gender, age-group, working-profile, sport exercise frequency). We use a dataset,
called Breadcrumbs, that has been collected in the Lake Geneva region (Switzerland)
at the Lausanne campus. We choose Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) as a
support to understand a mobility behavior because they are not only interesting to
predict a response variable, but also to understand what kind of co-variables can
affect this response variable. In our context, we obviously use the spatio-temporal
entropy as the response variable of the GAM because its value reflects the mobility
level of a user during a specific time window. Hence, the sequence of spatio-temporal
entropy of a user describes her movement rhythms.
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In order to evaluate the prediction accuracy of the GAMs for our research analy-
sis, we train one global GAM with 60% of the spatio-temporal entropy sequence of
all the users of the dataset, and check the prediction obtained for the 40% remaining
sequence of all of them. We individual AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average
(ARIMA) models for each user with 60% of their dataset and compare the Mean
Absolute Errors (MAEs) and the Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSEs) obtained
of each user for these two different models. We also compare the MAEs and the
RMSEs obtained for individual GAMs compared to those resulting of the use of the
global GAM. We observe that there is not a significant difference between individual
GAMs and the global GAM in terms of accuracy and that the global GAM is more
accurate than the individual ARIMA models if we compare the MAE results. In
addition, the results show that it is possible to observe the effect of variables on
the mobility of a user or a group of users in a privacy-aware manner by using the
spatio-temporal entropy only as a response variable.
This research work has two main contributions:
(1) Proposing a new methodology to analyze mobility behavior of users in a privacy
preserving manner;
(2) Describing a new entropy-based metric to quantify the level of mobility of a user
that expresses users’ movements as rhythms.
The roadmap of this paper is the following. In Section 6.2, we present the overall
privacy-aware methodology to analyze mobility behaviors. Then, in Section 6.3,
we present how we build the spatio-temporal entropy sequence of a user from her
location history. In Section 6.4, we describe the entire analysis of the mobility using
GAMs, ARIMA models and the results obtained with these two types of predictive
models. Section 6.5 details the related work. And finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 6.6 and present future work.
6.2 Proposed methodology
As mentioned in the introduction, the goal of this research work is to analyse the
mobility behavior of a user or a group of users in a location privacy preserving
manner, i.e., without extracting sensitive places frequently visited by a user, such as
her home place, work place and favorite other places. In order to be more precise,
we want to analyze the mobility behavior of the users according to variables that
can affect it.
The first challenge is to convert the location history of a user into a rhythm. This
latter must describe the evolution of the level of mobility of a user over time. To do
so, we create a metric based on the well-known Shannon entropy in order to quantify
the level of mobility of the user at a certain time and through space. This crucial
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step must be done for the entire location history of the user in order to obtain a
sequence of spatio-temporal entropy that represents a time series. Parallel to this
first step, it is also important to collect several variables that we want to explore
during the next step, which is the mobility analysis. These variables can belong to
different categories (e.g., spatio-temporal, demographic and mean of transportation
variables) will be used to see their influence on the evolution of the spatio-temporal
entropy. For example, these variables can be the day of the week, the maximum
speed of the user during the time window, if a user has a job during the week, etc. . .
The second challenge is now to analyze the mobility behavior of a user or a group
of users. Hence, we must evaluate how the user or the users usually move(s). To
do so, we decide to user Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) that are extremely
interesting for this work because these models can not only predict a response vari-
able, which is obviously the spatio-temporal entropy, but also measure the effects of
co-variables on this response variable. A GAM can be formally noted as follows in
Equation 6.1. Let Y be the spatio-temporal entropy variable and X1, ..., Xm a set
of co-variables. β0 is the intercept and fj, j = 1, . . . ,m are smoothed functions. We
consider that we have n observations, such that {(yi, x1,i, . . . , xm,i)}ni=1 Finally, εi is
a random error.
yi = β0 + f1(x1i) + . . .+ fm(xmi) + εi (6.1)
6.3 From locations to a spatio temporal entropy sequence
This section presents how we can compute the spatio-temporal entropy sequence
from a location history of a user. Firstly, we describe how is captured the location
history of the user, and secondly, we detail its transformation into a sequence of
spatio-temporal entropy.
6.3.1 Location history
In order to collect the location history of a user, we consider that a user owns a mobile
device being able to capture its location at any time via the use of an embedded
postitioning system. In addition, this user is moving on the surface of the earth and
can use different means of transport. A raw location of the user captured by the
mobile device has the following notation: loc = (φ, λ, t) in which φ is a latitude, λ
is a longitude and t is a timestamp representing when the location was caught on
the mobile device. Consequently, the location history of a user can be expressed as
the following sequence of n locations: L = 〈loc1, loc2, · · · , locn〉.
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Fig. 6.1: Grid structure supporting the computation of the spatio-temporal entropy
sequence
6.3.2 Spatio-temporal entropy sequence
To compute the spatio-temporal entropy sequence of a user based on her location
history, we firstly need to create a spatial grid to discretize the space in which
the user is moving. The space is divided into a 2-dimensional space in which the
position of each cell in this grid is described as a pair (i, j). We also note n and m
the numbers of cells along the x-axis and along the y-axis respectively. We divide
the time duration of the location history of the user into T time windows having
the same period of time, e.g., 3600 seconds (one hour). Figure 6.1 depicts the state
of the grid for two successive time windows. Then, we compute the time proportion
ptwki,j for each visited cell of the grid by the user during the specific time window twk,
in which k is the kth time window computed.
Before describing the entropy computation of a specific time window, we detail
the computation of the time proportion below.
Time proportion computation.
The computation of a time proportion pi,j spent in a cell (i, j) of the grid visited
by the user during a specific time window is linked to all successive locations visited
in this cell during this specific time window. In order to support our explanation,
Figure 6.2 presents the context of time proportion computation of two or three
visited cells of the grid.
This part aims at explaining the four different cases that we can encounter when
we must compute the time proportion of visited cells during a time window twk by
a user. The first case describes a simple case in which we can consider that the user
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spent the entire time window twk in the cell (2, 2). In the second case, we assume
that the user was in cell (2, 2) since the beginning of the time window twk and then
in the cell (3, 3) until the end of twk. The time spent between the second location
and the third location is equally distributed between (2, 2) and (3, 3). The third
case is similar to the second case. However, the time spent between the first location
and the second location is equally distributed between (1, 1) and (2, 2). Finally, the
fourth case is the combination of the last two cases.
In order to formally describe the four cases, we introduce the following elements
below. Firstly, we introduce a first new sequence of locations Ltwk that contains the
successive locations visited by the user during the time window twk, which is obvi-
ously a subsequence of the location history of the user L. Secondly, we introduce a
second new sequence of locations Li,jtwk containing all successive locations belonging
to the same cell that are visited during the time window twk, which is obviously a
subsequence of the location history of the user Ltwk . Finally, if the subsequence of
locations Li,jtwk contains more than one location, there are four specific cases de-
scribed in Equation 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 below in order to illustrate the four specific
cases described below. For sake of simplicity, we add .f or .l to the subsequences
introduced above in order to identify the first or the last location(s) of them respec-
tively. We also assume that Li,jtwk .f corresponds to locb in the sequence Ltwk and
Li,jtwk .l corresponds to locc in the sequence Ltwk . In addition, we define tstwk and
tetwk as the starting and ending timestamp of the time window twk respectively.
First case: if Ltwk .f is equal to Li,jtwk .f and if Ltwk .l is equal to Li,jtwk .l.
ptwki,j =
(tetwk − Li,jtwk .f) + (Li,jtwk .l − Li,jtwk .f) + (tetwk − Li,jtwk .l)
tetwk − tstwk
(6.2)
Second case: if Ltwk .f is equal to Li,jtwk .f and if Ltwk .l is not equal to Li,jtwk .l.
ptwki,j =
(tetwk − Li,jtwk .f) + (Li,jtwk .l − Li,jtwk .f) + ((locc.t− locc+1.t)/2.0)
tetwk − tstwk
(6.3)
Third case: if Ltwk .f is not equal to Li,jtwk .f and if Ltwk .l is equal to Li,jtwk .l.
ptwki,j =
((locb−1.t− locb.t)/2.0) + (Li,jtwk .l − Li,jtwk .f) + (tetwk − Li,jtwk .l)
tetwk − tstwk
(6.4)
Fourth case: if Ltwk .f is not equal to Li,jtwk .f and if Ltwk .l is not equal to Li,jtwk .l.
ptwki,j =
((locb−1.t− locb.t)/2.0) + (Li,jtwk .l − Li,jtwk .f) + ((locc.t− locc+1.t)/2.0)
tetwk − tstwk
(6.5)
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Fig. 6.2: Time proportion ptwki,j computation for a specific time window twk
If there is no location in the cells of the grid visited by the user during the time
window, i.e., in Ltwk , the entropy of this time window takes the simple value of ”NA”.
Spatio-temporal entropy computation.
Finally, the entropy computation of a specific time window is detailed in Equa-
tion 6.6. This equation indicates that the entropy is a percentage ranged between
0.0% and 100.0%.
entropytwk = −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
ptwki,j log2 p
twk
i,j
log2(n×m)
× 100.0 (6.6)
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Fig. 6.3: Spatio-entropy sequence detailed for one user during 3 days
At the end of this process, we must obtain a sequence of T entropies that describe
the movement rhythm represented by the spatio-temporal entropy sequence of the
user. Figure 6.3 (on the left) describes the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy
of a user of the data collection campaign Breadcrumbs during three days. We can
observe stationary (when the entropy is equal to 0.0%) and non-stationary periods
(when the entropy is greater than 0.0%). In addition, Figure 6.3 (on the right) de-
picts the distribution of the spatio-temporal entropy during these three days for the
same user. We notice a high number of low entropy levels, this makes sense because
a day of a typical human usually contains a large number of stationary periods
per day, especially the users of the data collection campaign Breadcrumbs who are
mainly students (more information about Breadcrumbs is available in Section 6.4.1).
6.4 Mobility behavior analysis and prediction
We present in this section how it is possible to analyze mobility behavior of one user
(a group of users) through the evolution of her (their) spatio-temporal entropy and
additional variables that could help to better understand her (their) behavior. The
dataset used is called Breadcrumbs and contains real mobility traces of users. For this
research work, we use three categories of variables that are detailed in Section 6.4.2:
spatio-temporal variables, demographic variables and mean of transport variables.
We first describe the dataset Breadcrumbs we used and the variables we chose
for this work. Then, we demonstrate how it is possible to see the effects of these
variables on a user’s or users’ movements expressed as an entropy rhythm with the
use of Generalized Additive Models (GAMs). Finally, we detail how we can predict
this rhythm and what is the prediction accuracy we can obtain by using two types of
models: GAMs and AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models.
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6.4.1 Breadcrumbs dataset
Breadcrumbs dataset1 has been collected during a data collection campaign that
started at the end of March 2018 and finished at the end of June 2018 in the Lake
Geneva region, at the University campus of Lausanne more specifically (Switzer-
land). We asked the participants (we called them users) to install an iOS application
in order to record their location history during a period of three months. Most users
were full-time students. The reason why we decided to launch this data collection
campaign was to obtain rich user datasets having a rich density in terms of location
tracking: at least one location per hour in the best case. In addition, we wanted to
obtain a ground truth of points of interest validated by the users themselves. For this
specific research work, we selected 48 users having very rich location history with
only 3 days without any location. The duration of the selected user datasets is be-
tween 31 and 34 days. Because the data collection campaign was in progress during
the period of this analysis, we could only obtain this dataset duration. The added
value of this dataset, compared to existing datasets, is that there is a higher location
frequency tracking per day and also various additional variables that indicate de-
mographic and mobility characteristics related to the users, such as transportation
means used, age group, and much more.
6.4.2 Selected variables
As mentioned in the previous section, we also collected various additional data about
demographic and mean of transport characteristics of the users of the Breadcrumbs
data collection campaign. Moreover, we computed several spatio-temporal variables
in addition to the spatio-temporal entropy for each time window analyzed for each
user. Below, you find the description of each selected variables for our research work
and their possible values.
Spatio-temporal variables (computed for each time window):
• tsnb: Number of the time window (over one week)
• maxdistance: Maximum distance travelled by the user during the time window
• meanspeed: Mean speed of the user during the time window
• maxspeed: Maximum speed of the user during the time window
• campus: It the user is at the campus (No: 0 / Yes: 1)
• hourNb: Hour of the day (from 1 to 24)
1 Breadcrumbs Data Collection Campaign was a collaborative work of three research laborato-
ries: Distributed Object Programming Lab (http://doplab.unil.ch), Information Security and
Privacy Lab (https://people.unil.ch/kevinhuguenin/) and Business Information Systems and
Architecture Lab (https://wp.unil.ch/bisa/)
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• night: If the current is part of the night (night period: from 20 pm to 7 am)
• dayNb: Day of the week (from 1 to 7)
• prevdayNb: Previous day number of the current day of the week
• nextdayNb: Next day number of the current day of the week
• weekend: If the day is a weekend day (No: 0 / Yes: 1)
This first group of variables is generated for each computed time window. As
mentioned in Section 6.3, if there is no location during a time window, the spatio-
temporal entropy is equal to ”NA”. Similarly, the spatio-temporal variables of a time
window also have a value equal to ”NA” if there is no location is captured during
this time window.
Demographic variables (for each user analyzed):
• gender: Gender of the user (Male: 0 / Female: 1)
• age group: Age group of the user (Between 18 and 21 years old: 0 / Between 22
and 27 years old: 1 / Between 28 and 30 years old: 2 / More than 30 years old: 3)
• working profile: Working profile of the user (Studying full-time: 0 / Studying
part-time :1 / Working part-time (less than 80%) :2)
• job: If the user has a job during the week (No: 0 / Yes: 1)
• university: The university of the user (UniCampus1: 0 / UniCampus2: 1 / UniOut-
sideCampus1: 2 / UniOutsideCampus2: 3 / OtherUniversities: 4)
• section: Section of the user (Bachelor: 0 / Master: 1 / PhD: 2 / Other section: 3)
• living parent s home: If the user lives at her parents’ home (No: 0 / Yes: 1)
• parent s home location: The location of the parents’ home of the user (Other: 0
/ Near the campus: 1)
• family status: Family status of the user (Single: 0 / Free union: 1 / Married: 2 /
Divorced: 3 / Other: 4)
• sport exercises frequence: Sport activity frequency of the user (Less than 1 hour:
0 / Between 1 hour and 5 hours: 1 / More than 5 hours: 2)
• student association: If the user is the member of a student association (No: 0 /
Yes: 1)
• smoking cigarettes: If the user smokes cigarettes (No: 0 / Yes: 1)
• seasonal allergies: If the user has seasonal allergies (No: 0 / Yes: 1)
• diet: The diet of the user (Diversified and not necessarily organic: 0 / Diversified
and most of the time organic: 1 / Vegetarian: 2 / Vegan : 3 / Unspecified: 4)
Mean of transport variables (for each user analyzed):
• car week: If the user uses a car during the workweek (from Monday to Friday)
• car weekend: If the user uses a car during the weekend
• public transportation week: If the user uses public transportation during the
workweek
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• public transportation weekend: If the user uses public transportation during the
weekend
• bike week: If the user uses a bike during the workday
• bike weekend: If the user uses a bike during the weekend
• taxi week: If the user uses taxi during the workday
• taxi weekend: If the user uses taxi during the weekend
• walking week: If the user walks during the workday
• walking weekend: If the user walks during the weekend
6.4.3 Analyzing mobility behavior
Below, we present the results obtained for the analysis of mobility behavior from
the point of view of one single user and from the point of you of a group of users.
It is very important to indicate that the duration of each time window computed
for each user is equal to 1 hour. The cells of the grid, used to compute the spatio-
temporal entropy sequence, are generated by adding a latitude/longitude difference
of 0.0025. This means that the difference between two latitudes is approximately 278
meters and the difference between two longitudes is approximately 188 meters on
an average for all cells of a common grid for the 48 users. This very short duration
is very flexible and enables to study seasonal movements: for example, every hour
during one day, every day during one week, and for other seasonal scales depending
on the entire dataset duration of a user.
6.4.3.1 From one user point of view
We observe firstly the impact of two seasonal variables on the mobility behavior of
users of Breadcrumbs dataset individually. More specifically, our goal is to see how
the spatio-temporal entropy is evolving at a scale of one day and at a scale of one
week. To do so, we build an individual GAM for each user, which is described in the
following Equation 6.7, in which yi is the response variable, i.e., the spatio-temporal
entropy, β0 is the intercept and εi the random error. s(hourNb, k = khour) is a
smooth function of the number of hour of the day and s(dayNb, k = kday) is a smooth
function of the number of day of the week, in which k is a smoothing parameter
representing the number of knots over the study period. Figure 6.3 suggests that we
use the Gamma family distribution for individual user spatio-temporal entropy.
yi = β0 + s(hourNb, k = khour) + s(dayNb, k = kday) + εi (6.7)
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Fig. 6.4: Different mobility behavior of three users according to seasonal variables
Figure 6.4 describes an analysis of three different users of the Breadcrumbs dataset
(User 1 is at the top, User 2 is in the middle and User3 is at the bottom). We can
see on the left side, the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy according to the
hours of one day, and on the right side, the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy
according to the days of one week. On the left side of the figure, if we look at the
sub-figure of the User 2 in the middle, the entropy constantly increases and rapidly
decreases after (maybe when the user reaches the campus) during the morning. We
observe that there are two peaks, in this same sub-figure, that could potentially
highlight lecture breaks and the end of the day is relatively calm and constant.
On the right side of the figure, the three sub-figures clearly show different weekly
mobility behavior, the week of User 2 in the middle is very regular compared to
User 1 and User 3 for example. In addition, Figure 6.5 highlights the significance of
the smooth co-variables for each user by looking at the p-value. Unsurprisingly, the
co-variable hourNb is significant for all users, whereas dayNb is only significant for
User 1 and User 3.
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User 1
User 2
User 3
Fig. 6.5: Significance of the smooth terms for the three users
Finally, Figure 6.6 shows the formula and the results of a more complex GAM
applied on the data of User 1. We can clearly note that, by seeing the p-value of
the co-variables, the spatio-temporal entropy decreases when the User 1 is at the
campus. The p-values of the smooth terms are computed with a Wald test, while a
test of Fisher (F -test) is used to compute the p-values of the parametric coefficients.
Figure 6.7 depicts the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy for every hour day
after day. From this figure, we can highlight different types of mobility per day, Day 3
and Day 4 are very regular compared to the other. It is possible that User 1 stayed
at home or at a fixed location during the days analyzed of her dataset. Interestingly,
the weekend and the night does not necessarily shave an influence on the user’s
behavior. Regarding the night, it is maybe due to the fact that the night period is
tagged during a long duration (from 20 pm to 7 am) and that a user can move a
lot during this period at home, especially if she is working late. The Figure 6.6 also
shows that the hours of Saturday (Day 6) have a specific influence on the evolution of
the spatio-temporal entropy. We also observe a high effect of the maximum distance,
the maximum speed and the mean speed on the spatio-temporal entropy.
6.4.3.2 From multiple users’ point of view
This second analysis focuses on the mobility behavior of a group of users and, most
specifically, the variables that can have an influence on their mobility. For informa-
tion, the distribution of the spatio-temporal entropy of the 48 users also follows a
Gamma distribution, as for each individual user of the dataset. Figure 6.8 enables to
see the influence of the spatio-temporal, demographic and means of transport vari-
ables of the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy of the 48 users of the Bread-
crumbs dataset. When we see different number for the different variables studied
(as.factor(variablename)nb), this means that the variable is a factor with different
levels. From this figure, we are now able to highlight the co-variables that have an
influence on the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy for the 48 users. Before
talking about the results, we purposely removed some co-variables because some of
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Fig. 6.6: Additional co-variables added in GAM formula for User 1
their options were underrepresented. Indeed, the 48 users were too homogeneous to
analyze all demographic variables, such as age group, working profile and family
status. Hence, Figure 6.8 depicts the results that are summarized below:
• Being at the campus (campus 1), using a taxi during the weekend (taxi weekend 1),
walking during the weekend (walking weekend 1) and doing a sport activity at
a high frequency (sport exercices frequence 2) decrease the spatio-temporal en-
tropy;
• Using a taxi during the week (taxi week 1), walking during the week (walk-
ing week 1), studying in a university that is not located at the campus (uni-
versity 4), being in a master section (section 2) and having a specific diet (diet 2)
increase the spatio-temporal entropy.
Interestingly, the results show that co-variable dayNb has a negative influence
on the evolution of the spatio-temporal entropy. All these indicators give us good
insights to better understand the way a specific population is moving. These results
also indicate that both demographic and means of transport co-variables can influ-
ence our mobility behavior. Further work should be done to study the behavior of
specific demographic groups with GAMs to explore them at a finer scale.
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Fig. 6.7: Spatio-temporal evolution day after day for User 1
6.4.4 Predicting mobility behavior
In order to evaluate GAMs from a prediction perspective regarding the mobility of
users, we decide to compare the prediction accuracy between GAMs and AutoRe-
gressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models.
The GAMs predict a variable based on the value of the co-variables given, while
the ARIMA models predict a variable based on its past values and its past variance
according to three parameters p, d and q. Parameter p is the number of autoregressive
terms, parameter d is the number of seasonal differences and parameter q is the
number of seasonal moving average terms. For our research work, we entirely delegate
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Fig. 6.8: Summary of the global GAM of 48 users
the selection process of these three parameters by using a specific R function called
auto.arima() of the forecast package. An ARIMA model can be formally described
as the following Equation 6.8.
yt′ = µ+ φ1yt−1 + . . .+ φpyt−p − θ1et−1 − . . .− θqet−q (6.8)
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Fig. 6.9: Global GAM formula trained with 60% of the dataset of the 48 users
In this equation, µ is a constant, φ1yt−1+ . . .+φpyt−p are the autoregressive terms
and θ1et−1 − . . . − θqet−q are the moving average terms. yt′ is the integrated part
with a certain difference noted d, such that:
• if d = 0, yt′ = yt (no difference)
• if d = 1, yt′ = yt − yt−1 (first difference)
• if d = 2, yt′ = (yt − yt−1)− (yt−1 − yt−2) (second difference)
• . . .
6.4.4.1 Evaluation process
For this evaluation, we decide to compare the prediction accuracy of a global GAM
with all user data, individual GAMs for each user and individual ARIMA models
for each user. We firstly split the datasets of the users into two parts, the first part
contains 60% and the second part 40% of the entire dataset of one user. We train
the global GAM (having the formula depicted in Figure 6.9) with the aggregation of
the first part of all user datasets and the individual GAMs (formula in Figure ). and
ARIMA models with each individual first part of the users. Then, we try to predict
the remaining 40% part of each user dataset with the global GAM and the individual
GAM and ARIMA model linked to the each user. It is important to indicate that
individual GAMs do not include demographic and means of transport variables of
users, whereas the global GAM includes them.
For this comparison, we compute the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the Root
Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of each predicted user set compared to the real values
of the last 40% remaining of the dataset of each user. These two measures are
complementary because the first metric highlights the absolute average magnitude
of errors, whereas the second metric shows the standard deviation of these errors
and gives more value to larger errors.
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Fig. 6.10: Individual GAM formula trained with 60% of the dataset of each user
Models MAE (average for 48 users) RMSE (average for 48 users)
Global GAM 2,74 5,45
Individual GAMs 2,73 5,66
Individual ARIMA models 3,09 4,62
Table 6.1: Global GAM, individual GAMs and individual ARIMA models
comparison: results
6.4.4.2 Results
Table 6.1 summarizes the results and shows that there is no a strong difference
between the results obtained for the global GAM and the individual GAMs. It is
important to note that the results are expressed in the unit of the predicted variable,
i.e., spatio-temporal entropy. We can also note that the average of RMSE is lower
for the global GAM compared to the individual GAMs. This indicates that larger
errors are maybe less numerous for the global GAM. However, we can see that the
average of the RMSE is slightly higher for the global GAM compared to that of
the individual ARIMA models. In addition, we can observe that the average of the
MAE is almost similar for the global and individual GAMs, and slightly lower for
the GAMs compared to that of the individual ARIMA models.
To conclude this prediction accuracy analysis, GAMs are more efficient to predict
individual spatio-temporal entropy than ARIMA in terms of MAE.
6.5 Related work
This section presents the related work close to our work according to its two main
subjects: the analysis of mobility behavior and the use of entropy-based metrics in
the literature.
6.5.1 Mobility behavior analysis
Most of the work realized in the literature about the analysis of mobility focus
on mobility patterns and use the significant locations visited by users. Hence, it is
possible to analyze the patterns extracted from the significant locations of users at
different time scale and how they evolve over time. In [4], Gonzalez et al. analyze
mobility patterns from the point of view of the significant locations visited by a user
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and observe the spatio-temporal regularity of user patterns. In [12], Zion and Lerner
also analyze the mobility of users by computing patterns with a preliminary analysis
using the semantic of significant locations and a Latent Dirichlet Allocation method
personalized for temporal analysis. In [9], Sadilek and Krumm perform a long-term
analysis of patterns of users using Fourrier analysis and Principal Component Anal-
ysis. They demonstrated the influence of temporal attributes, e.g., day of week, on
user patterns. Finally, in [5], Kulkarni et al. analyze user mobility behavior in order
to update mobility prediction models when major changes occur in the mobility of
users. In order to reach this goal, they analyze the frequency of movements and also
the major changes that appear at the level of the significantly and frequently visited
places by users.
6.5.2 Entropy-based analysis
The entropy is a well-known notion in the field of information theory, which can be
applied to various domains, from physics to text analysis. In the field of this work,
i.e., human mobility analysis, the Shannon entropy is mainly used to evaluate the
level of predictability of a user. In [11], Song et al. propose three entropy measures:
the random entropy capturing the degree of predictability of the user’s locations,
the temporal-uncorrelated entropy highlighting the visit probability of a location by
a user, and finally, the actual entropy characterizing the level of order in the visit
patterns of the user. This paper demonstrates that users are highly predictable be-
cause their patterns seem to be very regular. The authors also observe that there are
insignificant variations between different user groups, e.g., different genders, differ-
ent age-groups. The issue of this paper is that the dataset used was not very precise
in terms of location tracking. More specifically, they use a hourly time window to
compute the third entropy whereas a large number of hours was missing, 70% to be
precise for a typical user analyzed of the dataset. And this low number of precise
data maybe leads to an homogeneous vision of the mobility of the entire set of users.
In [8], Qin et al. also use the entropy to identify the level of predictability of a user.
They use a first entropy metric to measure the regularity level of a user over time
slots. In addition, they use a second entropy measure to evaluate the quality of the
clusters because this can strongly have an influence on the prediction of the next
significant location of a user. The first measure of the entropy is mainly based on
the significant location that dominates during a time slot in order to extract the
regularity of the user over the entire time slots during one day at the end of the
process. In [6], Lu et al. compute the entropy in a three-step process as described
in the first paper (see [11]) in order to highlight the level of predictability of users.
They discover that the population they study is highly predictable. They also indi-
cate the importance of weekly cycle in the mobility of their users. As for the first
paper mentioned in this section, they use a dataset in which the locations are cell
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phone towers. The quality of the dataset used can also be a problem because a user
can only have one location per day in the worst case. In [1], Austin et al. study the
regularity and predictability of movements at home. At this scale, they also find
that the patterns of the users analyzed are significantly regular and open the work
to the health domain. In a very different domain, Sharma et al. study collaborative
remote work amongst users in [10]. They propose a computation of entropy accord-
ing to a time proportion spent in different zones of a screen in order to analyze the
effectiveness of collaborative remote work between two users. Our computation of
the spatio-temporal entropy is close to this last work and has been personalized to
our analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, the research works, about mobility and mentioned
above, always use the most significant locations of users to study the mobility of the
users. Our work opens a new entropy-based metric and a new complete methodology
to study mobility in a privacy manner. Indeed, we avoid the step of the extraction of
the significant locations of users in order to analyse the mobility of a user as a pure
rhythm that can be influenced by several variables. In addition, we use Generalized
Additive Models (GAMs) to analyze the mobility rhythm of a user, and, to the
best of our knowledge, these models were not applied on this field before. We find
their use in other scientific domain, such as environmental domain. For example, in
[7], Pearce et al. analyse the impact of different local meteorology variables on air
quality.
6.6 Conclusion and future work
This research work has two main contributions. Firstly, it contributes to the descrip-
tion of a new methodology that enables to study user’s movements in a privacy-aware
manner without extracting sensitive places of users. Secondly, we show that we are
able to highlight the variables that can affect these movements using a sequence
of spatio-temporal entropy that represents the user’s movement as a rhythm. A
sequence of spatio-temporal entropy describes the level of mobility of a user as a
time series, in which each spatio-temporal entropy is computed for a specific time
window. We also present the use of Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) for this
mobility analysis by using a dataset we collected, called Breadcrumbs during the
data collection campaign of the same name. This research work also highlights that
a GAM can also be used to analyze the movements of an entire population, as we
did it this work with the 48 students analyzed. Compared to individual GAMs and
ARIMA models, a global GAM provide the best prediction in terms of accuracy
regarding the MAE.
This work opens three other interesting threads. Firstly, we could use GAMs with
longer user datasets, in terms of duration, in order to see if we observe lower MAE
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and RMSE and study their evolution over time for each user dataset. This first
analysis could also give a good understanding of the level of predictability of a user.
A second future work could focus on the prediction of the demographic data of a user
based on the learning of the mobility trends of an aggregation of multiple datasets
including the spatio-temporal entropy and other related variables. Finally, the third
work could be linked to the creation of individual personalized mobility prediction
models for a pure location prediction goal. These personalized could be based on
the seasonal mobility trends observed for each user in order to adjust their temporal
scale.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have explored several research questions, presented in Section 1.2
and organized in three groups. Although each chapter of this thesis has its own
conclusion, we first summarize our contributions in Section 7.1. Then, we present
future work perspectives that are opened from this thesis, in Section 7.2.
7.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we have proposed various solutions for preserving the location privacy
of users when they use location-based services, such as system architectures and
algorithms potentially linked to mobility prediction. In addition, we have proposed a
new metric for quantifying location privacy as a value during the sharing of locations
with location-based services. We have also presented a privacy preserving analysis
of the mobility of users by using the evolution of their spatio-temporal entropy.
All our main contributions in this thesis are summarized hereafter. For consistency
purposes, we follow the same structure in all three parts to summarize them.
Part I - Location Privacy.
In Chapter 2, we have described an architecture that includes a sharing protocol,
called ShareZ : it preserves the location privacy of users when they use location-
based services. This architecture focuses on sending location aggregations, expressed
as zones of interest, to location-based services in order to avoid the sharing of a lo-
cation stream of a user with these services. It contains an algorithm that enables
us to automatically create a location privacy tree made of the zones of interest of a
user. Instead of revealing an entire sequence of locations, the user has the possibility
to choose the granularity of the zones sent to location-based services. However, this
work has some limitations because it is focused only on location-based services that
require zones of interest in order to deliver location-based information to users. For
example, a navigation application could not use it. In summary, instead of unin-
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stalling location-based services, we let the user control, at a fine-grained scale, the
location information she wants to provide to location-based services.
In Chapter 3, we have presented an estimator for quantifying location privacy.
This work also helps us to unify the way we represent the spatio-temporal effects
of certain blurring mechanisms on a raw location or a sequence of locations by us-
ing spatio-temporal uncertainties generated when these mechanisms are applied. We
have evaluated this metric by comparing the success of several localization attacks
and the level of location privacy obtained with our metric; both were reached for
different blurring mechanisms. We have provided a definition of a generic metric
that takes into account space and time uncertainties, which are created after the
application of a blurring algorithm on raw location(s). In addition, the user herself
can weigh the spatial and/or temporal dimensions of the effects of a blurring mech-
anism. Consequently, this means that this measure is user-oriented.
Part II - Location Privacy and Mobility Prediction.
A prediction system, called MobiDict, has been presented in Chapter 4. This sys-
tem can process location streams in real time to provide predicted locations and
could, theoretically, run on mobile devices. Its evaluation has clearly shown that it
is possible to compute mobility prediction models and to provide predicted locations
with only a low number of locations. In addition, we also have highlighted that it
is required to update the models when modifications occur in the movements of the
user.
In Chapter 5, we have described an architecture that contains a system for pre-
serving the location privacy of users when they use location-based services that
need to compute future locations of users. Hence, this architecture enables location-
based services to request future location of users. The entire system, called ResPred,
includes a mobility prediction component and a location privacy component. The
latter internally blurs predicted locations in order to reach a tradeoff between user
location privacy and location-based service utility. This system also enables us to
ensure with fine-grained control the location privacy of users because they can define
their privacy preferences and, more specifically, the location privacy they are willing
to sacrifice to use the service.
Part III: Mobility Behavior Analysis.
In Chapter 6, first we have used the evolution of spatio-temporal entropy of a user
to extract her mobility behavior as rhythms. Unlike the standard mobility behavior
analysis, this research does not start with the searching of highly sensitive frequently
visited places by users. Second, Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) have been
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used to explore the influence of seasonal and demographic variables on the evolution
of the spatio-temporal entropy of a user. We also evaluate the prediction accuracy of
GAMs, compared to Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models.
We have highlighted that the new methodology proposed in this chapter enables
researchers to explore the mobility of users in a privacy preserving manner, i.e.,
without studying the user’s movements amongst her frequently visited places. This
opens a perspective on further work about the prediction, based on this mobility
rhythms, of demographic attributes of users.
7.2 Future Work
The entire research work, presented in this thesis, opens multiple options, some of
them are linked to the research papers already presented in this thesis and the others
are stimulated by the emergence of new technologies and/or paradigms.
Implementing System Architectures on Mobile Devices.
The solutions proposed in the three following chapters, in Chapter 2, 4 and 5,
could be implemented on mobile devices. Since the main part of the algorithms,
which are the support of the proposed system architectures, are written in Swift, we
could port them on iPhone devices by performing a jailbreak on them. Thus, this
implementation could enable to evaluate the feasibility of the system architectures
proposed and improve them by taking all mobile device constraints into account,
such as a rapid battery consumption. In addition, these tests could enable to create
user-friendly interfaces to involve the user in the privacy protection process.
Adapting the Location Privacy Metric to the Analysis of a Real-Time
Stream of Locations.
In Chapter 3, we have presented a location privacy estimator based on spatio-
temporal uncertainties. The idea is now to start from this metric and to modify it in
order to use it in real time when a user starts using a location-based service. Then,
this new metric could also be evaluated on a mobile device in order to evaluate its
relevance during a real case study. This also requires a jailbreak of the mobile device.
Conducting a Longer Data-Collection Campaign (Breadcrumbs 2.0).
We have used, in Chapter 6, a dataset from a data-collection campaign that we
launched in March 2018, called Breadcrumbs. One of the purposes of this dataset
was to capture the location histories of users as frequently as possible, while avoiding
critical location gaps in them. These gaps are one of the main weakness of existing
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datasets. This campaign was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty
of Business and Economics (HEC) of the University of Lausanne accepted for a
short duration of only three months. As the iOS application the server, to store
all the user datasets, are already built, we can use them to launch a longer data
collection campaign. In addition, we could implement an Android version of the iOS
application. This could enable us to analyze long-term mobility behavior and to
extend the analysis of the last research paper, as indicated in the next paragraph.
Utilizing Spatio-temporal Entropy Rhythm to Discover Demographic At-
tributes and Create Personalized Mobility Prediction Models of Users.
In Chapter 6, we have described the use of the evolution of the spatio-temporal
entropy as a means of discovering the mobility behavior of users and the events that
can affect it with Generalized Additive Models (GAMs). As the evolution of the
spatio-temporal entropy of a user can be interpreted as the user’s mobility rhythms,
these rhythms could be used as a starting point of the creation of a personalized
mobility prediction model. Hence, we could include the rhythms as a key element
of the prediction model. We could also try to discover demographic characteristics
from the movement rhythms of a user by using GAMs. To do so, we must obtain
larger, in terms of duration, user datasets as mentioned in the previous paragraph
in order to learn mobility rhythms during a long period.
Implementing a Decentralized Architecture to Share Points of Interest
using a Blockchain Technology.
In these past few years, blockchains have become increasingly well-known, along
with the popularity of cryptocurrencies, more specifically Bitcoin. This technology
enables us to create a decentralized trust supported by a shared ledger amongst all
users. In paper [2], Zyskind et al. presented a system that uses a blockchain and
digitally-signed transactions to enable users to manage the sharing of their personal
data. In this solution, the users themselves always own their data and control the
services that will have an access to their data. Another paper [1] describes how
a blockchain can be interesting for the sharing of information captured, in a city,
by sensors and other devices. In this future work proposition, the idea could be to
use the blockchain technology as a support for sharing points of interest, in order to
receive rewards of services and automatically share information with other users. The
first paper [2] would be an interesting starting point of this work. In addition, the
proposed system could be personalized by adding smart contracts in the blockchain;
this could automatically trigger specific actions according to the location information
shared by the users.
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